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ABSTRACT 
Despite exponential growth of the field of animal ethics, wildlife ethics has continued to be a 
fringe discussion. My thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution by focusing only on 
human-induced harms to wild animals. I use the rights approach to investigate demands of 
wildlife justice on human behaviour and wildlife policy. I take rights to be the best normative 
resource for determining and evaluating just and unjust relations. Given the fundamental 
position of moral rights that I espouse, moral rights must constitute the core of an ethically 
sound wildlife policy.  
The analytical framework I deploy throughout the thesis consists of the Interest Theory of 
Rights couched in the Hohfeldian matrix of rights. This framework provides some insights for 
improving on the influential rights approach expounded by Tom Regan.  I apply the adopted 
rights view to several important ethical conundrums. These include the institution of wildlife 
property; human interference in wildlife predation and wildlife population control; human-
wildlife conflict; and state obligations to ensure wildlife justice.  
From the rights view, I conclude that wild animals are morally not human property and that 
they are in fact owners of their habitats and the natural goods on which their wellbeing depends. 
Humans are morally prohibited from killing predators or lethally controlling wildlife 
populations except in the unlikely event of preventing an ecological catastrophe. Furthermore, 
humans are permitted in their acts of self- or other- defence in those circumstances where the 
humans are innocent and are not morally liable. Policies and cultures that allow the killing of 
wildlife as a resource are unjust and therefore prohibited.  
Lastly, I contend that the responsibility for protecting wildlife lies with all states whose citizens, 
organisations, or corporations harm wildlife anywhere on earth. The diffuse and 
extraterritoriality of unjust harms to wild animals seems to require a cooperative international 
approach to securing wildlife rights.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Most Western animal ethics is a series of footnotes to Peter Singer and Tom Regan. This is not 
the place for me to compare Singer and Regan’s theories. Several general textbooks in animal 
ethics and environmental ethics have ably done this (Dombrowski, 1997; Hursthouse, 2007; 
Jamieson, 2008; Rowlands, 2009). Although it was Singer's work that ignited my interest in 
human morality in relation to animals1, it is Regan whose argument I have found more 
persuasive and whose implications I find defensible. It is his work to which my thesis is a 
footnote. A footnote, but one that deviates from Regan on several important points leading 
sometimes to significantly divergent conclusions and practical recommendations. My task is to 
explore critically animal rights theory and tease out the implications for wildlife governance. I 
seek to offer a more coherent account of animal rights theory than Regan’s and go a little further 
into drawing out implications that Regan’s seminal The Case for Animal Rights sometimes does 
not draw or merely scratches on the surface.  
Humans and animals have an ambivalent relationship that varies across time and space. The 
prevailing human attitudes and behaviours towards animals span, and are shaped by, a spectrum 
of perceptions ranging from romanticism to vilification of animals. These perceptions were at 
the core of the establishment of national parks, first in North America and Europe and later, via 
colonisation, on other continents including Asia and Africa. Everywhere, however, the 
phenomenon of wildlife-protected areas is fraught with perennial conceptual and practical 
problems into which my thesis will later delve. Natural and social scientists have all weighed 
in to try to explain and resolve the problems.  
Moral philosophers have had little say about human-wildlife relations but have become 
increasingly audible in the debate on wildlife in the last few decades. This thesis is an attempt 
to apply ethical theory and reasoning to wildlife protection to help bring philosophy to the table 
of current debate in wildlife policy, conservation biology, political ecology, international 
wildlife crime, and institutional design for global intervention.   
                                                          
1 The human-animal distinction risks depicting humans as non-animals which may lead to or entrench 
anthropocentric and speciesist beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours on the moral plane. However, rather than 
adopting the more accurate phrase ‘nonhuman animal’, I will stick with ‘animal’ as it is less awkward despite its 
possible speciesist connotation. It suffices, I think, to clarify from the onset that humans are animals and the 
human/animal terminology adopted here should not be construed as sanctioning any a priori moral superiority 
of humans.  
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In this chapter, I would like to highlight the dearth of ‘wildlife ethics’ in wildlife governance 
and the relative lack of focus on wildlife in scholarly animal ethics. Secondly, I will give a 
synopsis outlining major issues and arguments of the rest of the thesis.  
1.1 Wildlife Conservation without Wildlife Ethics 
Traditionally, experts involved in conservation and management of wildlife have a science 
education in biology, ecology, economics, or natural resource management. Orthodox scientific 
training emphasises the separation of fact and value. The value aspect is viewed as something 
that taints the integrity of the scientific process, and of the resultant scientific knowledge (see 
Chalmers, 2013). On the contrary, value is the mainstay of normative theory. Consequently, 
although wildlife ethicists and wildlife scientists may be focusing on the same subject namely, 
wildlife, they very much appear to be working in two nonoverlapping domains. To ecologists, 
talk of rights for wild animals is bound to be received with disdain, bafflement, or irritation.  
Furthermore, the rationale that most governments and their intergovernmental partners offer 
for conservation of wild fauna is virtually entirely anthropocentric and instrumentalist. There 
is little or no acknowledgement of any deontic features of wildlife such as intrinsic value, or 
rights that may warrant ethical consideration of wildlife that goes beyond human interests. 
Where such recognition occurs, it is usually focused on species and biodiversity, not on 
individual wild animals.  
Some wildlife scientists and practitioners see ethics as unessential or as redundant to wildlife 
conservation and management. As Carruthers (1989: 188) reports, “Fundamentally, the 
founding of a national park concerns the allocation of certain natural resources and for this 
reason it is a political, social and economic issue more than a moral one.” The motivations for 
national parks then and now are primarily aesthetic, educational, scientific, ecological, and 
economic, and are largely amoral towards wild animals. Highlighting the financial intent, 
Alastair Gunn (2001: 76) points out that “Many national parks … maintain populations of 
trophy animals because this is the business that they are in ….” And, if the regulation of lions 
“can be done for the economic benefits of impoverished local people by the issuing of game 
[killing] licences, why not?” (Gunn 2001: 89).  
However, sentience—a key moral feature as we will see in the next two chapters—is 
acknowledged as seen from the criminalisation of cruelty to wild animals. This is evident in the 
requirement that hunters make efforts to kill wounded wild animals to put them out of 
prolonged suffering (see The Zambia Wildlife Act 1998). Furthermore, professional game 
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hunters claim high moral ground over poachers based on their purported mastery that ensures 
a swift death for their prey.  
Ethical factions exist in environmental or wildlife organisations between those who see nature 
or wildlife as imbued with some moral value and those who see nature and wildlife only in 
instrumental terms, subservient to human interests. Conflict exists “between those who regard 
the preservationist2 strategies as the only option for the survival of Africa’s wildlife and those 
who believe that conservation should include the economic utilization of wildlife as one of its 
management strategies” (Makombe, 1994: 3). The International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) —whose members include 217 states and government agencies, and non-
governmental organisations—disagrees with the preservationists. The IUCN holds the view 
that, “People prevented from using their wildlife legally will tend to ignore it, eliminate it, or 
use it illegally, to the disadvantage of the resource and those who might develop it and use it 
legally” (Makombe, 1994: 4). Given the size and influence of IUCN, Lisa Mighetto (1991) is 
right in stating that the instrumentalists are predominant and therefore tend to have greater 
impact on conservation legislation and policy. It will not be surprising, therefore, that 
acknowledging moral standing or moral rights for individual wild animals is generally regarded 
as anathema in mainstream conservation thought and practice. 
In sum, the modus operandi for wildlife protected area management is entrenched in the narrow 
economic cost-benefit analysis framework. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the literature in 
mainstream wildlife conservation and management refer to wild animals as ‘resources’, 
‘endowments’ or as objects of human ‘proprietorship’ ultimately for the satisfaction of 
consumptive and non-consumptive human desires. Wild animals are relegated virtually to mere 
things without moral standing. Thus, wildlife governance falls under the ambit of economics—
and related social sciences—with supportive empirical facts coming from the life sciences. 
Consequently, so far, under the current wildlife governance ethos, there seems to be little or no 
room for moral rights for wild animals.  
1.2 Animal Ethics without Wildlife 
Animal ethics is a relatively new development in moral philosophy. The field owes much of its 
late 19th and early 20th century roots not to philosophy but to ‘sentimental’ fiction writers who 
                                                          
2 Preservationists, as the name indicates, argue that nature must be left as close as possible in its pristine state 
even if this means reduced value or perhaps even disvalue for humans. Conservationists, on the other hand, 
represent the position of actively managing nature and wild animals to produce certain states valuable to 
humans.  
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romanticised the humanness of animals or highlighted the animalsness of humans (Mighetto, 
1991). The field has grown rapidly, however, drawing some considerable interest among 
philosophers in the past fifty years. This growth has however been skewed towards Western 
experiences of animals that has largely been with domesticated animals. Hence, most animal 
ethics authors conceive of how humans ought to behave in relation to animals on issues of 
biomedical animal experimentation, fashion that uses animal products, factory farming, 
whaling, sport and entertainment involving animals (e.g. bull fighting, animal circuses, zoos), 
and companion animals (Patterson, 2002; Regan, 2004b; Kemmerer, 2006).  
As Mighetto (1991: 109) affirms, “human condemnation of suffering has been difficult to 
extend to wildlife.” This is, however, not for want of philosophically intriguing and morally 
important issues pertaining to wildlife. I think that, that wild animals in their natural setting 
have thus far received only paltry attention from philosophers in the Western world is at least 
partly due to spatial, causal, and psychological remoteness. The last few years have however 
seen a surge in philosophical discussion of wildlife suffering. Oscar Horta (2010) and Catia 
Faria (2016) have especially thrown more light on this hitherto side-lined issue. The two 
philosophers’ theoretical orientation appears to be utilitarianism. This is because they both 
move from the sheer badness and magnitude of wildlife suffering to strong human obligations 
to alleviate suffering whenever this is prudently practicable. As with Singers theory, I will 
therefore eschew in this thesis the important discussion Horta and Faria bring to animal ethics—
wildlife suffering. My focus is only a relatively small subset of wildlife suffering—that which 
results from human exploitation and spill-over effects of human activities. 
Yet, as Franklin (2005, xix) duly acknowledges, "competition between humans and animals for 
the use of a particular natural resource is an authentic conflict of otherwise legitimate 
[philosophical] interests." An increasing number of moral philosophers have begun to pay some 
attention, if only cursory, to the phenomenon of human-wildlife relations. However, even the 
attention devoted to wildlife ethics tends to be piecemeal, conceptual and touch on what appears 
to be philosophically more interesting matters than those of practical relevance and urgency. 
For instance, several philosophers have been preoccupied with the implications of animal rights 
theory on predator-prey relationship among animals (Sagoff, 1984; Regan, 2004a; Ebert and 
Machan, 2012; etc.). And Lori Gruen, while admitting that complexities of human-wildlife 
relations warrant philosophical attention, concedes that she “will only be able to scratch the 
surface” (Gruen 2011: 165).  
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Breaking away from the patchy approach, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) have offered one 
of the most extensive ethical treatments of human-wildlife relations. They allude to the dearth 
in wildlife ethics:  
What is lacking is a more systematic theory of the relations between human and wild animal 
communities, one which ties together the various ad hoc arguments presented to date, and goes 
further in addressing a range of issues and conflicts which [animal rights theory] has so far ignored 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 167). 
It is discussions in this new direction that give hope of solutions to the theoretical and practical 
problems that characterise dimensions of the human-wildlife interface in various contexts from 
peasants in African Tropics, semi-nomadic Inuit in Canada, to rich trophy hunters in Europe 
and North America, and ivory craft buyers in China.   
This thesis is motivated by the need to fill the current virtual moral vacuum in wildlife 
conservation practice and disproportionately fewer wildlife discussions in animal ethics. As 
mentioned already, my approach follows Tom Regan’s animal rights theory, which recognises 
a special moral status for every individual nonhuman animal, but I do add some qualifications 
and diversions, which will become evident in Chapters 2 and 3.  
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Many writers and activists tend to take moral rights as a given. As renowned rights philosopher 
James Griffin notes, “philosophers often give the impression of plucking … rights out of thin 
air” (Griffin, 1986: 224). They ignore to build or defend a theory of rights from scratch 
providing the logical structure of moral rights and substantive normative rationale for moral 
rights. This glossing over the philosophical foundations of moral rights can lead to muddled 
discussions, avoidable theoretical impasses, and even absurd practical implications. Chapter 2 
of this thesis departs from the trend among applied ethicists of taking moral rights as a 
philosophic given. I explain the Hohfeldian logical structure of rights showing what distinct 
generic kinds of rights there are. Understanding of rights as not homogenous but as a 
heterogeneous four-fold group of moral advantages (claims, liberties, powers, immunities) 
enriches our view of the moral landscape and sharpens the language for analysing issues of 
justice to wild animals. Hohfeldian rights also help show as quasi problems some apparent 
conundrums that arise in the course of applying moral rights theory.  
However, a typology of rights and logical relations between the rights and their correlative 
moral obligations is only part of the story of moral rights theory. Hence, Chapter 2 further 
discusses the normative function of moral rights. The Will Theory of Rights (WTR) competes 
with the Interest Theory of Rights (ITR) picking choice and interests respectively as the thing 
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of value that moral rights protect. I critically run through some examples and counterexamples 
that have been identified as supporting one or refuting the other. My verdict is that ITR is more 
internally coherent and sits well with some of our firmly held beliefs about morality without 
having to make ad hoc adjustments to escape potentially fatal objections. An important 
implication of this verdict is that beings who cannot make a higher-order rational choice or who 
cannot exercise some active moral rights still possess individual moral rights because of some 
important interests some of which may depend merely on behavioural preferences. These 
beings include infants, senile adults, and some animals.  
With a theory of moral rights in place, Chapter 3 proceeds to discuss critically the foremost 
version of animal rights theory—Tom Regan’s. Although successful in inspiring animal rights 
in philosophy departments, in street protests, or vegan leafletting, Regan’s theory has some 
inconsistencies, questionable assumptions, theoretical excesses, and unpalatable implications. 
Among the concepts contested is the rhetorically important notion of a subject-of-a-right. This 
is Regan’s famous several-in-one criterion for being a right-holder. I criticise the notion as 
conceptually fuzzy in not being able to spell out whether the criterion provides necessary or 
sufficient conditions, either of which, in my view, fails. I argue that mere sentience as espoused 
by Jeremy Bentham centuries ago suffices and avoids some inadvertent anthropocentric 
components in ‘subject-of-a-life’.  
Although, I agree with Regan’s theory on many important points, in Chapter 3 I challenge or 
clarify his rights to just treatment, to respectful treatment, and to assistance. The first two, I 
argue, are redundant or turn out to be a tautology when we consider what justice or respect is. 
After we have mapped out a complete ‘genome’ of rights, there is nothing left to be called a 
right to justice or a right to respect as justice and respect—at least narrowly conceived—are 
values that supervene on moral rights or have moral rights as their explanans. Upholding moral 
rights yields justice and respect. Further, the right to assistance requires stringent qualification 
to curb the spectre of rights inflation. I therefore argue to limit the moral right to assistance 
only to those who owe us an emergent duty through birth, or some initial harms which may not 
necessarily constitute an injustice.  
Lastly, I discuss some situations Regan presents as situations in which violating someone’s 
right is morally permissible. The most important case is, for me, that of defence of the innocent, 
which I only scratch on the surface in Chapter 3 but discuss in greater detail in subsequent 
chapter sections. Through a discussion of Regan’s theory, I emerge with a version of animal 
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rights theory that is nuanced and shaped by my understanding of the structure and purpose of 
moral rights that are a product of Chapter 2. The theory is now ready for application to some 
issues at the human-wildlife interface. 
The first issue I apply the theory of animal moral rights theory to is that of some wild animals 
preying on others and wildlife behaviour or population increase endangering others through 
damage to the environment. This is the focus of Chapter 4. The problem of predation has 
become a regular topic in animal ethics for at least two philosophical reasons. Firstly, there is 
what David Benatar (2001) refers to as the ‘naïve argument against moral vegetarianism’. The 
naïve argument raises the challenge against moral vegetarianism that since it is acceptable for 
predators to kill for food, there is nothing wrong in humans’ killing for food. Conversely, this 
view holds that, if humans are not permitted to kill for food, predation must be stopped, which 
purveyors of the ‘naïve argument’ see as an absurd and, therefore, unacceptable implication. I 
will, however, not focus on this formulation of the problem of predation. My focus is, rather, 
on the challenge against the entire theory of moral rights for wild animals. This problem arises 
from the apparently absurd implication of animal rights theory that we must have a wildlife 
policy that eliminates or reduces the incidence of predation.  
There have been already several solutions offered to the problem of wildlife predation I address. 
For some, there is no absurdity and we should follow through with the policy of ending 
predation in the wild. Some writers employ understandings of negative and positive duties to 
weave through some challenges against the laissez-faire approach to predation. I argue that the 
interventionist view is mistaken and that—in standard cases of predation involving wild prey 
and wild predators—not only are we not required to prevent predation but also, we are 
prohibited from intervening to stop predation. I rely on the Hohfeldian framework to 
disentangle moral rights of prey, predators, and putative rescuers. In so doing, I provide a 
solution which (a) is coherent and (b) repels the usual counterexamples and (c) avoids accepting 
the absurd implication of policing nature. My solution also avoids ad hoc detours and biting 
the bullet, which I think some of the solutions in the literature do. Through interplay of the 
Hohfeldian matrix and the purpose of moral rights, I point out why we are prohibited from 
saving a zebra from hyenas, why we may be permitted or required to save a child from a lion, 
and why we are required to save a cat from a child.  
Chapter 4 deals with a further challenge to animal rights theory. This is the challenge that 
implementation of a rights-based wildlife policy would be disastrous for the environment, 
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ecosystems, and biological diversity. I argue that ascription of intrinsic value to the 
environment is misguided for the simple reason that intrinsic moral value is a property of those 
beings who have an interest in a state of affairs. The axiomatic thesis of moral rights theory—
at least the one defended in Chapter 2—is that to be morally considerable, a being must be such 
that a state of affairs can improve or diminish that being’s experience. Ecological collectives 
are entities that fail this sentience test and can therefore have only instrumental value. I argue, 
therefore, for a zoocentric wildlife policy that permits human interference only to correct past 
human wrongs against wildlife or to prevent some environmental catastrophe that would result 
in great suffering and deaths of wild animals. It is a policy that differs significantly with current 
practice in which wild animals are so easily expendable for the sake of sustaining or reshaping 
an ecosystem in order to serve anthropocentric goals. 
In Chapter 5, I focus on the implications of animal rights theory on the institution of property. 
Currently, humans own wildlife legally under various property regimes. I challenge the status 
quo by arguing that, if wild animals have moral rights, then it is a logical confusion to treat 
them as property of humans. Essentially, this is because the moral rights that wild animals have 
preclude the wild animals’ being somebody’s property given what the concept of ownership 
entails. In my view, ownership of wildlife can only be purchased at the conceptual price of a 
diluting what it means to possess certain rights or what it means to own something. In other 
words, rights of control, use, and security in one’s property are elements of ownership that 
appear not to be compatible with the rights of truly wild wildlife.  
I present a further argument that rather than being property, wild animals are owners of their 
habitats and the natural goods found therein that are essential for their species-specific 
flourishing. The traditional justifications for ownership, namely ‘labour-mixing’ and ‘first 
occupancy’, though not satisfactory, provide the ingredients for my argument. I argue that wild 
animals are morally justified owners of their habitats and the natural goods they need to have 
their kind’s wellbeing. My view is that if an animal—human or nonhuman—is the first to 
possess a resource or to create a resource from previously unowned resources, the thing in the 
animal’s possession is its legitimate property provided the thing possessed is relevantly 
connected to some element of the animal’s wellbeing. Lastly, in Chapter 5, I defend wildlife 
property theory against the challenge posed by sovereignty for wild animals that purports to 
supersede wildlife property theory.  I argue that wildlife sovereignty is based on a rather weak 
analogy with colonialism and that, in the context of moral protection for wildlife, sovereignty 
is redundant.  
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The issues discussed in the chapters so far have very little to do with human-wildlife relations 
as such but rather merely with humans as wildlife managers. In Chapter 6, I turn to the direct 
human-wildlife interface. I frame the chapter in the umbrella concept of human-wildlife 
conflict. Human-wildlife conflict is a perennial feature of human-wildlife relations. Some 
authors (e.g. David Schmidtz, 2002) have referred to the two parties as ‘natural enemies’. 
‘Natural enemies’ does not do full justice to the complex relationship between humans and wild 
animals although it is a true characterisation of the relationship in many respects. But whereas 
Schmidtz seems to focus on wildlife as the enemy, my discussion points more to humans as the 
enemy. For example, Schmidtz narrates how scared he was when huge elephants came near a 
tent he was sleeping in. At this point, in my view, he had already morally trespassed into 
elephant property and would have done double wrongs had he tried to harm the elephant to 
defend himself.  
The theory of self-defence maps out and thereby restricts instances when humans are permitted 
to defensively harm wild animals. I defend the controversial ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy as a 
legitimate form of other-defence of wildlife against poachers. Although here I only argue for 
moral permissibility of such interventions, in Chapter 7 I will argue more positively for 
protective intervention as a moral requirement of states.  
Other issues I discuss in Chapter 6 include responding ethically to threats wildlife pose to 
humans. I point out that in many cases where wild animals are perceived as threats, it is humans 
who have provoked the wild animals in the form of intrusive tourism or human encroachment 
on wildlife property. This means that in many cases, a self- or other-defence justification for 
harming wild animals is voided. Self- and other-defence applies only in cases where the human 
victim of a wildlife threat is innocent. I argue that, in many cases, humans are arguably either 
morally culpable or morally liable.  
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the emotionally charged problem of human interests that are 
premised on exploitation of wildlife. I deal with the problem of bushmeat for subsistence of 
peasants living near protected areas and the more intense problem of tribal peoples who rely 
not only on wildlife as a source of nutrition but also on hunting as part of their cultural heritage.  
A utilitarian approach might be compromising and perhaps advocate limiting the numbers of 
wild animals killed and restricting methods used. That option is unavailable for an adherent to 
the view of wildlife justice based on moral rights of individual wild animals. I argue that the 
only non-speciesist and rights-respecting policy is prohibition of any killing of wild animals to 
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satisfy human interests. I argue that both in the case of humans and in the case of wildlife, 
nothing in the Hohfeldian matrix changes because of a human’s desperation for survival. That 
is, the deontic relations between the imperilled human and the individual whose meat would 
lead to that human’s survival remain the same at the point of the human’s starvation as they 
were when he was well-fed. The right of an innocent individual—a monkey or a human—not 
to be killed does not become weaker or vanish the nearer some human being gets to starvation. 
‘Survival of the fittest’ is incompatible with a theory that acknowledges moral rights for 
individuals.  
Chapter 7 addresses the question of human obligations to protect wild animals. I reject a narrow 
statist approach to wildlife protection. This is the approach that reflects current wildlife 
governance practice. Currently, wildlife is legal property of the states in which they happen to 
be located. Obviously—as with all property—it is the primary responsibility of the owner to 
protect her property. Even if we assumed wildlife was not property, the narrow statist view 
might continue to prevail as it does in the case of protection of human rights, which is regarded 
as the primary responsibility of the states where the humans reside or the states of which the 
humans are citizens. Some philosophers think that such a statist approach is fallacious because 
some states are tyrannical, weak, or porous, in which case they cannot be expected to protect 
citizens’ or residents’ rights. Such philosophers recommend some cosmopolitan framework for 
enforcing duties for ensuring human rights. Although such recommendations accurately 
identify the problem with the statist approach, my solution differs in at least two respects. I put 
stringent qualifications for one to be a subject or respondent of positive moral rights. My 
arguments are based on moral rights and not any conventional rights under which I see no 
problem regarding positive rights as such. I am further opposed to a speciesist cosmopolitanism 
as currently dominates the literature.  
After arguing for a non-speciesist cosmopolitanism, I advance a new statist-cosmopolitanism 
for protecting wild animals. In the beginning, the only obligations of justice humans have 
towards wild animals are very much laissez-faire. However, many predicaments of wild 
animals now are a result of human direct exploitation of wildlife or wildlife property, or a result 
of spill-over effects of human activities such as pollution and climate change. This, I argue, 
creates an emergent positive duty—not to assist but—to intervene in ways that will help 
wildlife actual and would-be victims of human exploitation. An example is providing support 
to orphans of poached elephant parents or of chimpanzee parents kidnapped for biomedical 
experiments 
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I argue—using the cases of Safari Club International and Western-based transnational 
corporations—that states around the world are responsible for wildlife rights violations around 
the world. This implies an acquired or emergent compensatory duty of justice. Those who 
threaten wildlife come from far off states. Sometimes foreign states make laws that render such 
far off states complicit to wildlife crimes. I argue that since states where wild animals are found 
do not own the wild animals, foreign states treat these ‘host’ states which are usually poor states 
unfairly both by not themselves making and enforcing tougher laws against wildlife crime and 
by absconding from doing their share of the collective responsibility to protect wild animals 
threatened by the international human community. I end with some tentative recommendations 
on how states need to cooperate to protect wildlife from humans and to compensate for harms 
that are being committed as we speak.  
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Chapter 2 An Animal-friendly Theory of Moral Rights 
‘Moral right’ is not a term that is commonly known or used in everyday ethical discussions. It 
is ‘human right’ that is the medium through which many everyday moral and political 
advantages are demanded and cashed out. Human rights are a topic for innumerable scholarly 
works in philosophy and in the social sciences. Social change movements will normally express 
their cause in terms of human rights. ‘Civil’, ‘political’, ‘legal’ are all common variants to 
‘human’. ‘Human’ can also be specified into other adjectives such as ‘children’s’ or ‘women’s 
rights’ that presuppose that the beneficiary of a right is a human being. Such is the ubiquity of 
human rights that, I think, the mere mention of some animal rights is likely to face automatic 
opposition. If moral rights are synonymous with human rights, then we can talk only about 
animal rights figuratively or mistakenly. My aim in this chapter is to argue that moral rights 
theory is not tied to humanness but to certain features such that whichever being has those 
features—regardless of species membership—is eligible for holding moral rights.  
Before I embark on applying the animal rights perspective to human-wildlife relations I must 
attend to some meta-rights issues pertaining to the general theory of rights, namely the nature 
and function of moral rights. First, I seek to answer the question of what moral rights are. Rights 
theorists in moral philosophy and jurisprudence begin their analysis of rights with a conceptual 
framework drawn by the American jurist Wesley Newton Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s matrix of rights 
is admirable for its elucidation of the logical relations that rights establish among members of 
the moral community, and the precision this matrix introduces.  
The second aim of this chapter is to discuss critically the function of moral rights. Is the job of 
moral rights to protect holders’ interests (benefits) or will (autonomy)? I present and respond 
to some objections raised against both the Will Theory of Rights (WTR) and the Interest Theory 
of Rights (ITR). I find the objections considered here to have only produced the illusion of 
weakening or refuting the interest theory of rights. On the contrary, WTR has some notorious 
difficulties that make it less viable independently. Most damning is WTR’s identification of 
autonomy as the rights-qualifying feature.  
I argue that, understood in a certain way, WTR can be subsumed under ITR without any morally 
relevant residue. This, I think, can be done by recognising and treating choice-making, self-
determination, or autonomy as merely a different sort of interest—albeit a second-order kind 
of interest. Such a view tries to draw the different theories of rights together. And one 
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consequence of this view is that animals qualify as right holders with respect to certain interests 
that are vital for their wellbeing. 
2.1 The Structure of Moral Rights 
Showing the coherence of the concept of a moral right requires a philosophical toolkit. L. W. 
Sumner (1987)—like many other philosophers of rights be they Interest or Will theorists—
settles for the Hohfeldian taxonomy of rights as his ‘building blocks’ for his analysis of rights. 
Below, I present a slight modification of Sumner’s presentation of the Hohfeldian taxonomy of 
rights. Hohfeld referred to a liberty as a ‘privilege’, and he referred to a ‘claim’ as a ‘right’. 
Here I simply adopt Sumner’s term ‘liberty’, which is also used by Mathew Kramer. Kramer 
(1998) sticks with Hohfeld’s ‘right’ for ‘claim’. I however adopt the vocabulary of a ‘claim’ 
for the following reason. A claim is only one type of a right. The other types are liberty, power, 
and immunity. Though cumbersome, rights should be further specified as claim-rights, liberty-
rights, power-rights, and immunity-rights. This is conceptually vital when taking stock of moral 
conundrums purportedly involving moral rights. 
The structure of moral rights can be divided into first-order and second-order incidents. This 
division is crucial for rights analyses as will be demonstrated in wildlife rights issues discussed 
in ensuing chapters.  
First-order incidents 
A moral right has three essential elements. Sumner (1987) calls these elements subject, object—
collectively known as the scope—and content.3 For example, in (1), ‘X’ is the subject of a right, 
the right-holder. ‘Y’ is the object, the being against whom a right is held; he has a no-claim 
juxtaposed with X’s liberty. Lastly, ‘φ’ is the content, that which puts ‘X’ morally at an 
advantage in relation to ‘Y’. Gewirth (1981) employs the term ‘respondent’ for ‘object’ and 
‘object’ for ‘content’. ‘Object’ is thus rendered ambiguous since Sumner uses the same term 
for something else. I will employ subject to refer to the right-holder, respondent to refer to the 
person or entity whom the right in question obligates, and content to refer to what the right is 
about.   
                                                          
3 Other authors use ‘substance’ instead of ‘content’ (Shue, 1980; Griffin, 2008). I will, however, stick with 
Sumner’s terminology.  
(1) X has a liberty with respect to Y to φ. (2) Y has a no-claim against X that X not φ. 
(3)  X has a claim against Y that Y (not) φ.  (4)  Y has a duty to X to (not) φ.  
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The first-order positions denote deontic relations—stating what is required, forbidden, or 
permitted—that state obligations and moral advantages as shown in the summary above. 
Positions (1) and (3) are correlatives of (2) and (4) respectively. These positions are fixed. In 
other words, the first-order matrix “contains no mechanism for creating, altering, extinguishing, 
or otherwise manipulating these relations” (Sumner, 1987: 27).  None of the normative 
positions can be changed by the right-holder or can be legitimately altered by a second party. 
The fixity of first-order relation does not reflect the real world and would render the rights 
theory explanatory weak. However, the second-order rules complete the Hohfeldian matrix and 
introduces flexibility that increases the explanatory and analytical potential of rights theory. 
Second-order incidents 
(5) X has power over Y to affect R 
(relation). 
(6) Y has a liability to X’s affecting R. 
(7) X has an immunity against Y that Y 
does not alter R.  
(8) Y has a disability with respect to X    
      to affect R.  
The second-order rules give alethic positions—stating the necessary, impossible, or possible—
that afford leeway to manipulate the first-order normative relations or state when such 
manipulations are morally impossible. These say what can and cannot be done. The elements 
in (5) - (8) have the same correlative and opposite positions as those in the first-order matrix. 
But how are the two sub-matrices related? There is a symmetry between corresponding deontic 
and alethic relations. For example, (1) and (5): “I have the liberty to do something just in case 
doing it is permissible for me.… I have the power to affect some relation just in case affecting 
it is possible for me” (Sumner 1987, 31). Both are active rights stating that the right-bearer 
must not be prevented from doing what the right permits or empowers them to do. Contrast 
with (3) and (7) which place restrictions on actions of obligors. The combined matrices now 
form a versatile system for explicating rights-relations.   
Correlativity axiom 
Scholars of rights differ on whether all claims correlate with duties and vice versa. Some who 
argue against the rights theory find rights nihilism—thesis that there are no moral rights—as 
an inevitable upshot of the view that not all duties have rights correlatives, and that in fact, 
duties need not have rights correlatives at all. Adina Preda reports H. L. A. Hart, as saying “if 
a right-holder is simply the beneficiary of a (legal) duty, then all talk of rights could be reduced 
to talk of duties” (Preda, 2012: 255). The language of rights—rights nihilists or sceptics 
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argue—is not only redundant but is also pernicious to moral discourse as it results in an 
uncontrollable inflation of claims to moral advantages.  
Others, however, insist on the indispensability of rights ontologically and pragmatically. 
Samuel Stoljar, for example, says: “Rights … must exist prior to duties as there must be claims 
to before there can be claims against; obviously, it is truer to say that I have a duty not to 
interfere with you because you have a right, not that I have a right because you have a duty not 
to interfere” (Stoljar, 1984: 8). However, although Stoljar’s view sounds semantically 
appropriate, on closer scrutiny, there seems to be something wrong with the view that rights 
have ontological priority over duties.  
The error of taking rights as ontologically preceding duties seems to arise from confusing 
interests with the protection of interests or, autonomy and the protection of autonomy (see 
Kramer 1998, n 18). For example, I have an interest in remaining alive. So far this does not 
institute any moral relations conferring rights on me and duties on others not to murder me. If 
my interests were never under threat, it would not make sense to talk about rights in as far as 
rights are moral protections. Only the possibility of murder necessitates my right to life. Hence, 
interests take precedence over rights. But as soon as I have a right, someone else simultaneously 
has a correlative obligation as well. A claim and its correlative duty emerge or disappear 
together. Mathew Kramer (1998) rightly defends this view, which he calls the 'correlativity 
axiom'. 
The correlativity axiom states that claim-rights cannot exist without duties and vice versa; 
they mutually entail each other without any temporal hierarchy between them. Kramer’s 
analogy of the slope is, in my view, quite effective. “Just as a slope’s downward direction is 
not logically or existentially prior to its upward direction, a duty is not logically or 
existentially prior to the right with which it is correlated. The existence of each is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the existence of the other” (Kramer 1998: 26). I think it is the 
same way a glass with a liquid reaching exactly its half mark is both half-empty and half-
full. The two phrases describe the same reality and their truth-values will be the same 
always. If I am in the process of emptying the glass, it seems semantically more appropriate 
to talk about a half empty glass, and half full if I am in the process of filling the glass up. If 
the correlativity axiom thesis is true, then the attempt to write off rights from the moral 
discourse is not only dangerous but groundless. Rights analytically entail their correlatives. 
So far, so good. However, Kramer goes further to assert something I disagree with.  
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Kramer (1998: 25, n. 10) is confident that the so-called right-less duties can be shown to be 
either not genuinely obligatory or that their correlative rights can be somewhat located. In his 
view, rights-based theories and duty-based theories are merely emphasising different aspects 
of the same deontic relationship. I disagree. 
 There are, in my view, duty-based normative theories that have no correlative rights. If X has 
a claim, then someone, Y, must have a duty vis-à-vis the content of X’s rights. It is however 
not the case that if Y has a duty, then there is someone, X, who has a correlative right. Virtue 
theory and consequentialism can, and do, recognise duties to which the beneficiaries may have 
no corresponding rights. Indeed, even commonsense morality holds that, in addition to specific, 
or personal, duties to do good for family and friends, I have a duty to do good for others in 
general. And in cases where I can help only one of many needing help, I have a duty to help 
but none of the many needing help has a right that I help him or her in particular. 
Lastly, Mathew Kramer talks only about the claim/duty correlatives. However, the correlativity 
axiom is no less true for all the other Hohfeldian incidents. Thus, we can say of liberty and no-
claim, power and liability, and immunity and disability, that they are each necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the other and that none has existential precedence over the other. A 
right where we have one without the other is a logical contradiction. Rights are temporally at 
par with duties and they do not fall victim to the reductionist attempt which seeks to cut out 
rights from the moral story. 
A possible objection is that the correlativity axiom comes up short regarding power-rights. For 
example, it seems correct to say Tim has the power-right to make a promise to Sue, thereby 
giving Sue a claim-right (that he keeps the promise) and Tim a duty (to keep the promise). True, 
this power-right has implications for the rights and duties that could be created. But it appears 
true that, right now, having not yet made any promise to Sue, Tim has the power-right and no 
one else has any corresponding rights or duties. If this account is true, then clearly there can be 
a right (a power-right) to which there is no corresponding obligation. 
I think an answer is available to the objection of a seeming power-right that is nevertheless 
without a correlative moral position. The correlativity axiom is discussed with claims and duties 
in mind. But I contend that the axiom holds even for the other three rights including the power-
right. With regards to the power-right, the correlativity axiom claims that whenever subject X 
has a power-right against respondent Y in relation to content C, it is the case that Y has a 
liability to X with regards to the content in question. However, when it comes to promising, it 
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seems reasonable—as Thomson (1990) finds it—to say a promise has not occurred if the 
promisor’s intentional statement does not receive uptake from the would-be promisee.  
Prior to Sue’s uptake, the moral relations between Sue and Tim remains unaltered. Sue is not 
at all liable to Tim’s promise. This is true because Sue is under no obligation to accept the 
promise. A fortiori, no changes occur in Tim and Sue’s deontic relations pertaining to claims 
and duties. The creditor has a power-right against the debtor. Under strict liability, the injured 
has a power-right over the person that has injured her. This kind of relationship does not arise 
in the case of a promisor and the intended promisee for the would-be promisee might very well 
turn down whatever it is they are being promised.  
It is not true, therefore, that the power-right fails to satisfy the correlativity axiom between 
rights and correlative obligations. A power-right can only be held or rightfully exercised against 
a liable respondent, and a liable respondent cannot rightfully extricate herself from another’s 
power-right against her. I will not try to offer an alternative account of promising. It suffices 
for me to simply show that a promising transaction does not seem to show a clear case in which 
a power-right exists and yet there is nobody that is liable to the exercise of that power.  
2.2 The Function of Moral Rights 
One way to conceptually analyse rights is to elucidate and apportion what L. W. Sumner calls 
the “normative function”, and William Edmundson refers as the “raison d’être” of rights 
(Sumner, 1987: 98; Edmundson, 2012: 97). If successfully accomplished, this analysis can help 
delimit the proper use of rights. In principle, at least, the analysis draws a line between who can 
be a right-holder, and who can be a respondent. The response to the question of the function of 
moral rights has polarised those who view rights as choice protectors and those who view rights 
as interest protectors. It must be noted however that some writers regard the interest/choice 
distinction as presenting us a false dichotomy and have therefore proposed ‘inclusive’ or 
‘hybrid’ theories that merge the two, or some other third alternative (Sreenivasan, 2005; Wenar, 
2005; Cruft, 2004; Rainbolt, 1993). Others have depicted the polarisation as a proxy battle 
between welfarism and Kantianism (Wenar, 2005; 224).  
A further preliminary note is that some thinkers regard the interest/choice theory debate as 
being over the question: “What is a Right?” (Rainbolt, 2006: 3).  In my view, this is an error, 
one which Adina Preda also makes. She thinks the debate is about clarifying “what it means to 
have a right, not to provide a ground or justification for rights” (Preda: 2012: 253). On the 
contrary, the question of what a right is or what it is to have a right is separately addressed by 
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the Hohfeldian schema outlined above. Each of the normatively advantageous incidents 
constitutes a possible definiens of a right. If someone is asked what it means to have a claim, 
for example, they need only point to the relevant correlational relationship: “X has a claim 
against Y regarding performance or non-performance of a certain act if and only if Y has a duty 
towards X to perform or not to perform the act in question”. 
 I follow Sumner (1987) and Kramer (1998) in thinking of this debate as an effort to designate 
the normative purpose that rights play in moral, jural and political contexts.4  
2.2.1 Will Theory of Rights  
The will theory of rights (WTR)—also known as the choice or agency theory of rights—
identifies the raison d’être for rights as protecting the right-holder’s autonomy. According to 
Hillel Steiner—the view’s contemporary protagonist—WTR asserts “that something is a right 
if it is either a claim or an immunity to which are attached powers of waiver and enforcement 
over its correlative constraint” (Steiner, 1994: 61; emphasis added). As L. W. Sumner 
elaborates, on this view of rights, “a claim which cannot be alienated in any way, thus which is 
beyond its holder’s normative control, cannot count as a right” (Sumner, 1987: 97). In short, 
on this view, it is not the case that anyone with some legitimate interest to protect or promote 
is an eligible right-holder. A claim is not a right if it does not accord the claimant control to 
maintain, waive, or extinguish the claim.  
However, WTR is afflicted with a flaw which I believe is so serious as to render the theory 
untenable. To this flaw, I will now turn.  
Narrowness of scope (subjects) and content of rights 
The WTR’s major problem seems to be that it unjustifiably excludes categories of beings many 
people find—both intuitively and argumentatively—to be legitimate right-holders. Some such 
groups include severely mentally challenged adults, infants, and some animals.  According to 
Hillel Steiner, minors cannot be right-holders because “their presumed incapacity to make 
responsible decisions … makes them … inappropriate subjects of powers and liberties whose 
possession is precisely what having rights amount to” (Steiner, 1994: 245). The denial of rights 
to children is bound to be met by many with some justified incredulity. “Many people would 
shrink from a theory which defines ‘right’ in a way that commits the proponents of the theory 
                                                          
4 It must be said from the onset that there is no logical equivalence between moral and non-moral rights 
(conventional) rights. For this reason, legal counterexamples may not always provide sufficient or appropriate 
objections to ITR or WTR. There are legal rights that are not moral rights or that are morally indefensible.  
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to the view that children and mentally infirm people have no rights at all” (Kramer, 1998: 69). 
However, no matter how great the number of people who recoil from WTR’s exclusion of 
children from being right-holders, it does not count as a decisive reason for rejecting the theory. 
Rejecting WTR requires an argument. 
Below I present an argument rejecting WTR on the ground of its omission of children and other 
rational incompetents. 
(1) According to the WTR, all moral rights exist if but only if their purpose is to protect the 
exercise of agents’ mature wills (autonomy). 
(2) If all moral rights exist only if their purpose is to protect the exercise of agents’ mature 
wills, then, according to the WTR, agents without mature wills cannot have any moral 
rights. 
(3) Babies, young children, and the mentally infirm do not have mature wills.  
(4) So, babies, young children, and the mentally infirm cannot have any moral rights, 
according to WTR. 
(5) However, babies, young children, and the mentally infirm most definitely do have some 
moral rights. 
(6) Hence, the WTR is a mistaken theory. 
Some Will theorists such as Steiner will accept all premises (1) – (3) and the conclusion reached 
at (4). But they will reject premise (5) and, for that reason, reject the rejection of their theory 
expressed in the argument’s conclusion (6). Hillel Steiner is happy to bite the bullet of denying 
the seemingly indubitable, (5), and only admit the usage of children’s rights as merely a 
rhetorical device (Steiner, 1994: 245). However, in his view, children are owed only right-less 
duties, albeit strong duties, which dictate that children are protected and provided for by the 
state or by their parents.  
I will argue that we must reject premise (2), which sets capacity to exercise one’s will as a 
necessary condition for rights possession. First, I will criticise as ad hoc the attempt to sneak 
children into the domain of rights by fiat of proxy decision makers. This, however, leaves 
untouched those like Steiner who have no problem accepting premise (4). Therefore, second, I 
argue that there are harms that are cases of injustice to the victims and—on Steiner’s own 
understanding of justice—those are cases of violations of children’s real rights.  
As David Archard (2014: 7) reports, according to some writers, the narrowness problem of 
WTR is soluble simply by introducing third party decision makers. At least in some of the 
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cases, the “seemingly absurd consequence [i.e. (4)] can be finessed by an adjustment that allows 
for infants and the incompetents to hold powers through proxies, such as parents and legal 
guardians” (Edmundson, 2012: 100). This attempt at repairing WTR fails, however. I will give 
two reasons why this effort to rescue WTR fails. 
First, we can imagine two children found in the bush by Paedophile.  Paedophile soon discovers 
Lucky is accompanied by his father while Orphan is all by himself. Paedophile may not 
sexually defile Lucky because Lucky has a claim-right not to be sexually abused in virtue of 
having a proxy choice-maker in his father. However, Paedophile may sexually abuse Orphan 
because he is not a mature will controller and has no mature will controller to represent him 
against Paedophile. Clearly, this conclusion is morally unpalatable. Nothing about the injustice 
of paedophilia should rest on the presence or absence of a third party. Orphans without adult 
guardians are not a child molester’s paradise.  
Fortunately for Orphan, some Will theorists (Steiner, 1994) have another way to protect him. 
They claim that there are some right-less duties that would prohibit the likes of Paedophile from 
proceeding to abuse him. Apparently, there are other grounds for children’s moral 
considerability that have nothing to do with them being right-holders. For Steiner, adults have 
right-less duties not to harm children. But it is rather odd that two children facing the same 
threat need different justifications necessitated by the seemingly morally trivial presence of a 
father for one of the children. Moreover, for Lucky, should his father mysteriously vanish, 
Paedophile may not now pounce on him because the right-less defence automatically kicks in. 
It appears Lucky’s right—through father’s presence—against Paedophile is surplus to his moral 
needs as far as protection from Paedophile; it has been a third wheel all along.  
However, Steiner is not caught up in the proxy decision-maker ad hoc move. He denies the 
existence of a claim-right for children. As per his definition of a right, the power to control 
one’s own will is a necessary existence condition for a claim-right. The time has come to make 
a new charge against WTR, and against Steiner specifically. This is the charge that paedophilia 
is an act of injustice and not just a diabolical moral wrongdoing. I agree with Steiner that “the 
elementary particles of justice are rights. Rights are items which are … parcelled out by 
principles of justice” (Steiner, 1994: 2). Such is the commitment of Steiner to rights as 
analysans of justice that Wilshere (2013) refers to Steiner’s theory as ‘justice-as-rights’. This 
means that we cannot talk about justice proper without talking about rights. 
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In dismissing children’s rights, Steiner says, “Only Plato and a few misguided others have 
imagined that the demands of rights or justice encompass all our duties, that our duties are all 
correlative ones”5 (Steiner, 1994: 62). The disjunction ‘rights or justice’ seems to reiterate the 
rights/justice equivalence. However, the point is that Plato, in Steiner’s view, makes the 
mistake of defining too broadly the concept of justice as to let in right-less duties. For Steiner, 
it is the right-less duties and not those correlative to rights which ground all wrongdoing to 
children and mentally infirm adults. On this view, we should recognise that children’s interests 
are morally important and must be promoted or protected as such without falling for the 
temptation of postulating children’s rights (Archard, 2014: 8).  
Now I can expose what I see as Steiner’s error. If we cannot conceptually speak of children’s 
rights violations, then—given that rights are elementary particles of justice, in Steiner’s own 
words—there can be no injustices against children. Thus, short-changing a child or an elderly 
person with dementia after they buy my ice cream is morally wrong though not an injustice, by 
Steiner’s lights. Furthermore, if a terrorist forcefully detains a mature woman of sound mind, 
he commits an injustice against her but not so against the child the woman is kidnapped with. 
These implications do not only offend against the legal and common understanding of what 
justice means but must also draw a dubious conceptual line between two equally innocent 
people who suffer the same harm at the hands of the same villain for the same reason.6  
For many people—including me—a sound and elegant theory of rights must affirm that a 
mentally sound suspect has a claim-right against torture to extract a confession from her just as 
a mentally incompetent elderly person being tortured for the torturer’s sadistic pleasure. And 
since rights violations signal injustices, both victims of torture suffer an injustice. It does not 
matter that the person being tortured for information has the choice to waive the torturer’s duty 
not to extinguish cigarette butts on her skin—whatever that choice or power might mean! In 
both cases, it is the interest of the victim in not being tortured that seems to be doing the 
explaining of the torturer’s duty; reference to control or power in one of the cases to waive the 
duty not to be tortured seems to be superfluous.  
                                                          
5 H. L. A. Hart seems to render support to Steiner’s view as he thinks that “certainly there is no noun or noun 
phrase in Plato or Aristotle which is the equivalent of our expression ‘a right’ (Hart, 1982: 172). My point is that 
if Steiner sees Plato as erring in the said respect, then he sees rights or justice as occupying a much smaller, and 
perhaps, more special, place on the moral map. It is a view, I think, many moral philosophers will share.  
6 Someone could escape my argument—the argument that since children can be treated unjustly and justice is 
solely a matter of complying with rights, therefore children must have rights—by denying that justice is solely a 
matter of complying with rights. But Steiner, who is my interlocutor now, has no access to this escape route 
since, for him, justice is solely a matter of complying with rights. 
 22 
 
Given what seems to be an insurmountable problem for WTR, its candidature as a coherent 
substantive theory of rights is in serious doubt, if not totally beyond redemption. However, 
there is a different substantive theory of rights that I describe and defend in the next section.  
2.2.2 Interest Theory of Rights 
The interest theory of rights (ITR) is also known as the benefit theory of rights. On this view, 
rights play the normative function of protecting some aspect of the subject’s wellbeing. In other 
words, someone has “an obligation to the right-holder because it is the right-holder’s interest 
which is protected by the right” (Rainbolt, 2006: 4). On ITR view of rights, someone has a right 
only when they have an interest to promote or protect, however interest is conceived. 
However, ITR seems vulnerable to counterexamples of “rights which are not in the interest of 
the right-holder” (Rainbolt, 2006: 4). There are two distinct types of such cases: burdensome 
rights, and mandatory rights. The theory is also said to have a third handicap of conferring 
wrongly rights on third parties. I shall address these problems in turn. 
Burdensome rights  
Let us imagine a scenario in which Jeremy’s uncle, Immanuel, who has been mean to him in 
his lifetime, desires to continue to haunt and taunt him even after Immanuel’s death. So, 
Immanuel leaves in his will to Jeremy some possession he clearly knows will be a disvalue to 
Jeremy. Let us take this possession to be some property which bring traumatic childhood 
memories to Jeremy, is costly to maintain to the municipality’s minimum requirements, and 
incurs a variety of property taxes. We should imagine further that the property in question is 
associated with past events that makes no one interested in buying it or receiving it as a donation 
from Jeremy. We have thus the paradoxical situation of a right to something of no interest—
indeed a great disvalue—to the right-holder. Thus, it is argued, ITR is seriously flawed as it 
yields a contradiction.   
Interest theorists can relatively easily respond to this attack by denying that Immanuel’s will 
confers a genuine moral right upon his loathed nephew, Jeremy. This brings into question the 
Hohfeldian relation that would regard Jeremy as a right-holder in this context. Uncle Immanuel 
has a power-right to φ in relation to Jeremy if and only if Jeremy has liability in relation to 
Immanuel’s φ-ing. Immanuel’s power thus confers on Jeremy the claim-right to the property 
in question. Jeremy’s new claim implies that someone has a correlative duty not to use or take 
the said property without Jeremy’s permission. But if it were common knowledge that the 
property was a psychological and pecuniary nuisance to Jeremy and that he would not care 
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what happened to it provided this did not increase the costs on him, surely no one would have 
a duty not to use it? In other words, Jeremy has no substantive moral claim.  
Rowan Cruft is dismissive of burdensome rights as he rejects the idea of “value-independent” 
analysis of rights “because it is not possible for a person to be genuinely owed recompense for 
the non-performance of an action that would not have been of value to that person” (Cruft 2004, 
365). Cruft correctly argues that rights require a further necessary condition, namely that their 
violation should be able to generate an apology or recompense for the omission or commission. 
In the above inheritance scenario, all things being equal, nobody would genuinely owe Jeremy 
an apology or recompense for using or destroying Jeremy’s ‘property’.  
Judith Jarvis Thomson provides us with an explanation of exactly what is morally going on 
when property legitimately changes hands, which includes inheritance cases. The current owner 
makes this assertion: “Henceforth this banana is yours.” To complete the transfer, the new 
owner must say, “Okay, fine” (Thomson, 1990: 322).  The Immanuel-to-Jeremy transfer would 
only be complete and in force upon uptake of the uncle’s offer by the nephew. The burdensome 
rights objection to ITR may be effective if we were talking about some conventional rights 
whereby in some jurisdictions, an heir willy-nilly becomes owner of the bequest. The objection 
clearly fails with regards to moral rights.  
I must reiterate that the focus of this thesis is moral rights. The truth-conditions for a legal right 
may not be necessary or sufficient for a moral right. Thus, ITR concerned with moral rights 
does not necessarily suffer the same handicaps as an account focusing on legal rights. As Stoljar 
(1984: 9) observes, some objections to moral rights that argue from legal rights appear 
superficially plausible only because we fail to acknowledge that moral rights can and do 
conflict with the dictates of the legislature. Indeed, confounding the two kinds of rights can 
introduce pseudo problems in discussions on moral rights. As there can be all manner of silly 
legal rights, we can find real-life counterexamples to otherwise good theories of rights that have 
only moral rights in mind. As much as the theories have to be tested by practical cases, these 
must be the appropriate kind.  
The problem of third parties 
In an agreement between two people, there could be others, third parties, who stand to benefit—
and conversely, to be harmed—by circumstances of the agreement. Do the third parties who 
stand to benefit from the agreement have rights against some or all parties to the agreement? 
The ITR seems to imply an affirmative response and yet that implication appears absurd.  
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The problem is two-fold. First, it appears that contractors are right-holders, and yet it might be 
the case that a contractor signs a contract not to benefit herself but somebody else, the third 
party. Second, since the third party is a beneficiary, it seems to follow on ITR that the third 
party has a right to the content of the contract. This, however, threatens to open a floodgate of 
claims and contradicts the principle that “parties cannot base their prayers for legal remedies 
on the rights of others, of third parties” (Edmundson, 2012: 99).  
To use an example, take three individuals X, Y and Z. Y owes X 99p. Z owes Y £99. Y is 
unable to pay X because Z is unwilling or unable to pay Y. Employing Hohfeldian language, 
we end up with the following relations: X has a claim vis-à-vis Y’s duty. Y has a claim 
correlative to Z’s duty. In alethic terms, X has power over Y; Y has power over Z; but it is not 
the case that X has power over Z. The problem for ITR is that following its lights, Z has a duty 
to X because her repaying of the debt she owes Y is ultimately in X’s interest. However, to say 
X has a claim or power against Z is counterintuitive and untenable.  
Steiner (1994: 61-62) imagines a florist who receives an order from someone to deliver flowers 
to a third party—a couple, the bride and the groom. The crunch for ITR is supposed to be the 
fact that the bride and the groom have an undeniable interest in the flowers being delivered and 
yet presumably they have no claim-right against the florist. This is perfectly explicable under 
WTR as the bride and the groom do not possess any power to morally enforce or waive the 
delivery of the flowers. But the situation is allegedly fatal to ITR since, clearly, the marrying 
couple have no claim-right to the flowers in spite of their interest in the flowers.  
The second problem for ITR from the florist case is that—it is argued—the person who makes 
the order is not the beneficiary of the contract with the florist and yet he is the right-holder. 
Critics say that ITR is faced with the problem of right-holders without interests and 
beneficiaries without rights. I think, however, that Steiner’s florist counterexample to ITR can 
be successfully deflected.  
Firstly, if I enter any contract to benefit some other persons, it is trivially true at least that I am 
a beneficiary. This cannot be denied as the critics of ITR do. This can be shown to be the case 
by an analysis of the rights in the contract. X enters a contract with Y for Y to φ. Φ-ing here is 
the interest ITR affirms. It does not matter that φ-ing refers to X or some other person or thing, 
it remains true that φ-ing necessarily serves X’s interest, provided, among other things, X did 
not contract under duress or under an impaired mental state. Humans sometimes have an 
interest in having or seeing something done especially as a fulfilment of their will. If we ask X 
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what his interest is in any contract, it seems perfectly sensible for him to say his interest is in 
seeing Y fulfil her contractual obligations. It is beside the point whether Y’s discharging her 
duties actually has neutral, positive, or negative value to X. As I will explain shortly, the interest 
here at stake is a higher-order one to do with autonomy rather than physical welfare.  
The error in the accusation of a right-holder without benefit is exposed in H. L. A. Hart’s report 
about Jeremy Bentham. For Bentham, according to Hart, to benefit is not equivalent to addition 
of pleasure or avoidance of pain. This means that even if it turns out the contractor gains no 
pleasure from the contract or he suffers pain as a result, discharge of the obligation might 
nevertheless be in his interest. Hart reports that for Bentham, “theft of £1 from a millionaire 
indifferent to the loss constitutes a detriment to him and an offence against him; while 
forbearance from such theft constitutes a … benefit to which he has a legal right” (Hart, 1982: 
184; my emphasis). The interest at stake in this is similar to the contractor’s interest. It is the 
interest of having and maintaining normative control on the claim to one’s property. The 
defaulting contractor usurps this control by unilaterally deciding to forego her contractual 
obligations even if the breach materially benefits the claim-right holder.  
My final take is that the critics are criticising an ITR caricature. They have distorted or 
misunderstood the ITR position. Steiner charges that, contrary to ITR, “there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between being a right-holder and being the beneficiary of a correlative duty” 
(Steiner, 1994: 62). ITR proponents rightly deny this attribution.  Instead, they “maintain that 
every right-holder is a beneficiary of a duty, but they do not maintain that every beneficiary of 
a duty is a right-holder” (Kramer, 1998: 67). To respond effectively to the charges against ITR, 
one must argue that being a beneficiary is not a sufficient condition for being a right-holder and 
that the power to waive one’s claim is in and of itself a kind of benefit.  
That the power to exercise one’s choice is a kind of interest points to a possible convergence 
between WTR and ITR. I will explore this in the next section. I will also offer a response to the 
view that ITR “does little conceptual filtering, and authorises a wide range of debate about 
interests and their importance” (Edmundson, 2012: 97). This will help in giving a fuller 
response to the problem of third party beneficiaries seemingly having a claim on the discharge 
of a contract they are not party to. 
2.3 Moral Rights and Wellbeing 
In this section, I will argue that moral rights are grounded in wellbeing. This will be done with 
the partial aim of showing the superiority of ITR over WTR. The underpinning concern for all 
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normative theory is wellbeing.7 No doubt, moral philosophers will disagree on an abundance 
of questions and answers. But these questions and answers are in some way about what 
constitutes wellbeing and how we ought to live our lives or treat one another to promote or 
safeguard wellbeing. My view is that ITR best depicts justice as the first line of defence for 
wellbeing. Joel Feinberg’s contrast between a world without rights and a world with rights 
captures well the primacy of rights for wellbeing. In a world without rights, persons 
would think of themselves as having no special claim to kindness or consideration from others, 
so that whenever even minimally decent treatment is forthcoming they would think of themselves 
as lucky rather than inherently deserving, and their benefactors extraordinarily virtuous and 
worthy of great gratitude. The harm to individual self-esteem and character development would 
be incalculable.… A world with [rights] is one in which all persons … are dignified objects of 
respect, both in their own eyes and in the view of others. No amount of love and compassion, or 
obedience to higher authority, or noble oblige, can substitute those values (Feinberg, 1973: 58-
59).  
Feinberg rightly regards rights as priceless and incomparable individual possessions. This goes 
to buttress the view that rights cannot be subsumed under right-less duties without huge 
normative loss. As Simon Caney rightly observes, rights “designate the most fundamental 
moral requirements that individuals can claim” (Caney, 2005: 165). Without moral rights a 
person’s wellbeing is susceptible to tyranny and can be easily sacrificed at the altar of aggregate 
social good or indeed some other person’s or group’s whim.  The ITR, as I have understood it, 
best captures the value of rights by knitting rights tightly with wellbeing.  
Joseph Raz gives what is now a popular a definition of rights that explicitly picks out wellbeing 
as the undergirding value. I will present the definition as rephrased by Gopal Sreenivasan.  
Razian ITR thesis: “Y has a claim-right against X that X φ just in case, other things being equal, 
an aspect of Y’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding X under a duty” 
(Sreenivasan, 2005: 264).  
Raz only talks about claim-rights. But as Rowan Cruft (2004: 370) rightly points out, “other 
Hohfeldian positions” can easily fit in Raz’s definition.  Rowan Cruft thinks, however, that 
Raz’s definition is incorrect because “it implies that every right must serve its holder’s 
interests” (Cruft, 2004: 373). This is a general criticism against ITR and a defensive response 
has been given above against this sort of criticism. I have defended the view that, at least in 
general, every bona fide moral right must serve the right-holder’s interest.  
                                                          
7 See Roger Crisp (2016: 18-19) for a brief explanation of the place of wellbeing in moral theory. And Allen 
Buchanan speaks of “one simple but powerful observation at the heart of morality: morality is fundamentally … 
concerned with avoiding states of affairs that are harmful for individuals” (Buchanan, 1986: 561).  
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Here I will make a positive case for ITR by elaborating on the relationship between moral rights 
and wellbeing. I will end by proposing a formulation of ITR that escapes the problem of rights 
inflation that the Razian formulation is susceptible to.  
Raz’s definition of a right has the advantage of making explicit the connection of rights to 
wellbeing. A fuller discussion of wellbeing is beyond the purpose of this thesis. But briefly, 
hedonism and desire-satisfaction theories of wellbeing seem implausible in part because of the 
possibility of delusive pleasures and because of wacky desires (Hooker, 2015: 17; see also 
Hooker, 2000: 37-43). A more credible theory of wellbeing is the Objective List Theory (OLT).  
On OLT, one’s wellbeing depends on one’s enjoying from a list of elements that are constitutive 
of wellbeing. William Frankena (1973: 87-88) has provided what I think is a master list of 
which most writers’ lists are duplicates or abbreviations. I pick out the following elements that 
seem relatively uncontroversial: Autonomy and liberty; Health; Pleasure; Truth and 
knowledge; Power and achievement; Security and peace; Esteem; Love; Friendship.  
Individuals vary at least partly because of biological determinants and because individuals are 
to a great degree shaped by cultures which deem more valuable some elements of wellbeing 
than others. I assume no lexicality among the elements and I do not claim that all must be 
present jointly for one to have wellbeing. The crucial point for me is that the content of any 
right must track at least some of these elements. For example, the woman’s claim that the 
terrorist does not kidnap her tracks—at least in part—the element of ‘liberty’. The millionaire’s 
right that someone does not help herself to his £1 is justified by the element of ‘autonomy’. 
Orphan’s right against Paedophile emanates from the element of ‘security and peace’.  
That ITR grounds rights in the protection or promotion of individual wellbeing is clearly 
something that speaks in ITR’s favour. That autonomy makes it on the list of elements indicates 
that WTR does not have monopoly over the element. Autonomy is an important element for at 
least two reasons. It forestalls the charge of elitism against OLT. Every individual with 
autonomy will have a claim against anyone impeding the decision to live life as the individual 
sees it fit (Crisp, 2016; Hooker, 2000: 41-42). Since every individual is different in their 
physical attributes, character, and dispositions, the autonomy element enables individuals carve 
out their own destiny and ranking or even foregoing any other elements of wellbeing as they 
wish. At least one justification for autonomy rights is enabling one to freely choose from among 
possible options that are aligned to some elements of wellbeing. One may not be coerced 
against pursuing a lifestyle of pleasure for an ascetic spiritual or intellectual one, for example. 
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A potential downside to autonomy as an element of wellbeing is that “autonomy is blind to the 
quality of options chosen [and] autonomously choosing bad options makes one’s life worse 
than a comparable non-autonomous life is” (Raz, 1986: 411-412).  As Hooker (2015: 24) 
explains, it seems perfectly conceivable that a life with more autonomy is equal with respect to 
other elements of wellbeing (e.g. important knowledge) with another life with less autonomy. 
This is because autonomous decisions can yield outcomes with value and disvalue that may 
cancel each other out to bring the pleasure or significant achievement—for example—to the 
same amount in a life with more autonomy and one with less but wisely exercised autonomy. 
This creates a potential paradox that respecting autonomy might in fact produce the opposite 
of wellbeing if an individual’s choices return a preponderance of disvalue over value. This 
problem is not insurmountable, however.  
It seems we engage in autonomy fetishism if we respect autonomy at the expense of other 
personal goods. Autonomy “does not extend to the morally bad and repugnant. Since autonomy 
is valuable only if it is directed at the good it supplies no reason to provide, nor any reason to 
protect, worthless let alone bad options” (Raz, 1986: 411). This is an important qualification 
that forestalls rights claims that clearly harm the wellbeing of claimants.  
Furthermore, an important presupposition of autonomy as a value is rationality. Although 
occasional mistakes are part of any story towards attaining important knowledge or significant 
achievement, consistent irrational exercise of autonomy is better understood as a malfunction 
or dysfunction of the faculty of autonomy.8 It would be rather odd to suggest that consistently 
self-destructive behaviours have the protection of moral rights.  
The Razian conception of a right risks causing rights inflation. When is an aspect of a being’s 
wellbeing sufficient reason for holding some moral agent under a duty? In my view, merely 
being in dire need in the presence of a putative obligor does not provide sufficient reason to 
hold that person under a right-based duty. To be clear, there are other duties at stake such as 
duties of beneficence. But rights provide for a very special demand that can be claimed and 
enforced as a matter of justice. Some philosophers (e.g. Cochrane, 2010), however, find Raz’s 
definition plausible and this leads them to confer rights to assistance to wild animals who are 
                                                          
8 Ideological indoctrination or radicalisation is a good example of autonomy-damaging processes. I think states 
act morally rightly when they institute programmes for de-radicalisation even if—as expected—such 
programmes are resisted by the radicalised and the radicalisers. Further, young children, in virtue of having 
underdeveloped rationality, are justifiably placed under some paternalism that should decrease inversely with 
evidence of improving rationality. 
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victims of natural processes like the r-reproductive strategy.9 Inflation is upon us if all 
imperilled excess offspring have a right against humans to intervene.  
Those who think having an interest alone might be sufficient reason to confer a right upon 
someone face a further problem of demarcation. Interests vary in gravity and it is not clear how 
serious an interest must be to be a sufficient reason to generate a positive right. The Razian 
approach implies the unacceptable rule that every Jim with a serious enough interest has a right 
against some innocent agent to ensure Jim’s interest is met. I propose a modified formulation: 
Reformulated ITR thesis: “Y has a right against X regarding some φ just in case, other things 
being equal, φ tracks some element of Y’s well-being and X is a moral agent relevantly 
positioned to bear the obligation correlative to Y’s right”. 
To be ‘relevantly positioned’ means that X can be identified as legitimately owing Y the 
performance or non-performance of certain actions that have a bearing on Y’s wellbeing.  Each 
of the rights—claims, liberties, powers, immunities—has its own conditions for determining 
that an agent is relevantly positioned to be the obligor in relation to some right-holder. Some 
of these will be spelled out in Chapter 3 when I discuss Tom Regan’s taxa of acquired and 
unacquired duties. My singular interest now is to show that merely having a particularly 
important interest does not make one a bearer of a moral right against some agent, and thus, 
that an influx of claims is not in the offing.  
Moral rights protect innocents from others’ imposing burdens upon them except burdens they 
have incurred through their own actions. Imposing burdens upon innocent individuals who have 
not incurred any responsibilities through their actions violates the rights of those individuals. 
If Y has an important interest but X is innocent and has not done anything to incur any burdens, 
demanding that X satisfies Y’s interest threatens X’s rights. Just as rights issue prohibitions 
against physical injury, rights issue prohibitions against harming someone in their exercise of 
their autonomy, which includes decisions on how owners dispense with their resources. To say 
starving Y has a right against innocent wealthy stranger X and to enforce that ‘right’—in the 
absence of some morally justified conventions—is to commit an injustice against X by 
violating his autonomy right to decide whether to share some of his wealth with the needy. This 
                                                          
9 The r-strategy is a reproductive strategy in which organisms produce excessive numbers of offspring with an 
extremely low survival rate to adulthood. Oscar Horta has popularised r-strategy as one natural process that 
poses a moral challenge to how humans relate with wild animals. I will make brief reference to this in the final 
chapter.  
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is not to deny that X has no strong moral obligations to help Y. It is simply to say X’s failure 
to discharge such an obligation does not constitute a rights violation or an injustice.  
Since for WTR proponents, autonomy is the sole value protected by rights, they surely cannot 
object to my account of autonomy as warding off the wave of claim-rights enforced against the 
unwilling but innocent haves. It is the owner’s choice to waive her claim-right to even the tiniest 
of her wealth. Any unauthorised taking must be met with apology or recompense. Of the two 
theories of rights, ITR seems much more plausible. Unlike WTR, ITR accords rights to young 
people and senile elderly people, it rhymes with our considered moral beliefs, it has versatile 
explanatory power and does not resort to biting the bullet or making ad hoc adjustments to 
accommodate potential falsifiers.10  
This chapter set out to provide theory of moral rights by both providing the structure of moral 
rights and putting forward a substantive account of the function of rights. The complaint by 
James Griffin that many rights theorists tend to take rights as a given is especially true for many 
animal rights theorists. There is a temptation to assume moral rights as a settled matter or at 
least to take comfort in the equation that animal rights theory will be flawed only to the extent 
that human rights theory is flawed. However, a closer study of moral rights has thus far been 
beneficial in a number of respects. 
The Hohfeldian analytical framework unlocks the explanatory potential of moral rights beyond 
the commonly discussed claims and liberties. As I will try to show in subsequent chapters, 
immunities and powers play a crucial role in explicating conundrums of moral rights as they 
relate to predation and self- and other- defence, for example. Obviously, if WTR were true and 
ITR false, the project of animal rights would be doomed or at least radically different. However, 
this chapter has attempted to argue that WTR is irredeemable particularly on its denial of 
children’s rights.  
Furthermore, this chapter has attempted to rebut criticisms and counterexamples raised against 
ITR. By highlighting the ontological link between moral rights and wellbeing and elucidating 
the importance of autonomy for wellbeing, I avoid the absurdity of rights to self-harm while 
curbing an influx of claim-rights based on the mere existence of important interests. Since many 
animals can be said to have a wellbeing, it seems an anomaly to speak of certain rights such as 
the right to security (Tadros, 2015) as ‘human’ rights since wild animals have a wellbeing on 
                                                          
10 See Hooker (2000: 4) for a list of criteria for assessing a moral theory. Based on those criteria, I think ITR 
comes off as the better theory than WTR. 
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which security is an important element. I think ‘human rights’ are a theological relic that has 
relegated animals as resources to satisfy ‘man’s’ needs and wants.  
With this theoretical background in place, in the next chapter, I present and discuss what can 
easily be said to be the beginning of wisdom on animal rights. This is the theory of animal 
rights of Tom Regan, especially as expounded in his seminal work The Case for Animal Rights. 
I make a critical appraisal of Regan’s theory, ridding it of theoretical excesses and generally 
improving on it with clarifications borne out of the analytical framework and substantive 
account of rights discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Tom Regan’s Animal Rights Theory 
“I doubt that we have any of the rights that we have in virtue of being human, and even if we 
do, being human is not the property that we have that is most fundamental in explaining why 
we have these rights” (Tadros, 2015: 447). In this chapter, my main aim is to defend the view 
that moral rights are not a preserve of humans. Following Regan, I contend that animals that 
meet certain minimum criteria have a moral status that warrants their possession of moral rights. 
Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights will provide the point of reference for my discussion. The 
preceding chapter will provide the analytical lens through which I examine Regan’s theory. It 
would be pointless to try and reinvent the wheel; but my view is that Regan’s theory, as robust 
as it is, can benefit from some revision for theoretical coherence and parsimony as well as better 
and more extensive application to real life wildlife ethics problems. In short, I hope to make 
Regan’s case leaner in adherence to Occam’s razor.  The end result, it is hoped, is a theory that 
has fewer metaphysical postulations and no ad hoc moves, and applies more sharply to ethical 
problems involving humans’ relations with animals in general and with wild animals in 
particular.  
Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights is extensive. In this chapter, I will only discuss arguments 
and issues that have relevance to my discussion of wildlife rights. 
3.1 Rejection of the Agency criterion 
One of the foremost reasons for rejecting the idea of moral rights for animals is that animals 
lack moral agency, which is identified by some as the definitive criterion for possessing moral 
rights. In this section, I reject the agency criterion before proceeding to look at and defend 
interests as providing the basis for rights.  
We seem to be on firm ground in thinking that young children, senile adults, the mentally 
disabled, the insane, and the like, all are members of the moral community. They are morally 
considerable in their own right. But the Kantian argument posits that nothing short of moral 
agency or autonomy allows one to enjoy the protection of moral rights. Moral agency is deemed 
the necessary and sufficient condition for holding rights. The implication of this is chilling. 
Denied the protection moral rights confer by imposing stringent moral burdens upon moral 
agents, members of the non-autonomous categories may be killed, tortured, or have their 
welfare diminished gratuitously.  
However, Kant was apparently aware of this implication and he created a caveat to prevent 
cruelty to those without moral autonomy, and to animals in particular. This is the caveat of 
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indirect duties. I now attempt to show Kant’s notion of indirect duties fails to sufficiently 
protect animals. In fact, indirect duties leave animals still vulnerable to many current human 
practices against which rights would otherwise offer them some real protection.  
There are no indirect duties 
By indirect duties is meant that V behaves morally towards X not because X matters morally 
but only in virtue of some relationship between X and Y who matters morally. In the current 
context, the indirect duty approach “holds that we should protect animals insofar as it serves a 
human interest to do so” (Garner, 2013: 62). Indirect duties manifest an anthropocentric 
approach that places value on animals only to the extent that treating animals in certain ways 
may aid or, as the case may be, injure human interests.  
Appeal to indirect duties is incoherent. What we have here is a binary. A being can only be 
owed direct duties or they cannot. There is nothing in between. A duty is a kind of moral 
response or relation to some being with a moral status. Hence those who deny to animals moral 
status cannot coherently admit any sort of duties to them, not even disguised as indirect duties.  
The so-called indirect duties approach to animal ethics postulated by philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant and John Rawls are nothing—in the final analysis—but duties owed to humans. 
If John owns a bicycle, then it is morally wrong to wilfully damage it or to take it away without 
John’s permission. No duty is owed to the bicycle; the only duty here is the one to John. In 
terms of legal status, the place of the bicycle may be taken by a chattel during days of slavery 
or it may be taken by John’s parrot pet. John has a right to any of these things and that alone 
suffices to provide some protection to the bicycle, slave, or parrot. There is no need to invoke 
the language of indirect duties in prescribing how others may or may not treat any of these 
things. As Joel Feinberg pointed out, we can only have duties regarding and not to these 
(Feinberg, 1974: 45). The owner is the subject or bearer of the right and the parrot, bicycle, or 
slave would be merely the content of that right. Clearly, the content of a right is not the recipient 
of moral duties. 
Kant shuts animals outside of moral considerability by insisting only those can enter who have 
the ticket of moral autonomy, the ability to decide what is morally right or wrong based on 
appeal to impartial reasons. By Kant’s lights, however, animals are in some luck. They must 
not be treated malevolently. The reason they must not be treated malevolently is that doing so 
would induce humans to perpetrate similar acts on other humans. This account of the wrongness 
of treating animals malevolently, however, has the implausible implication that a lone man can 
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do whatever he pleases with the animals he lives with on an island completely separated from 
any other human populations.  
Kant’s empirical assumption is also questionable. His argument works only if there is 
statistically significant evidence that those humans who are cruel to animals as a result go on 
to be cruel to fellow humans. It will not do to simply establish correlation between cruelty to 
animals and cruelty to humans. This could be explained the other way around, that humans who 
are cruel to humans become cruel to animals also, perhaps as a way of rehearsing their cruelty 
to humans or because human targets are not readily available. Correlation can also be explained 
by a third underlying event or phenomenon causing cruelty to both humans and to animals.  
In fact, it is not implausible to argue that people who use animals in the way we judge morally 
wrong are not necessarily being cruel to the animals. Bernard Rollin is likely right when he 
says most researchers, farmers, rodeo people, and trappers are not intentionally cruel. “They 
are not trying to hurt animals and are not deriving pleasure from animal suffering; they are 
trying to advance knowledge, cure diseases, make a profit, keep food prices down, supply fur 
coats, and so on” (Rollin, 2006: 158). If this is the case, the cruelty argument leaves intact many 
practices moral rights theorists find morally objectionable. 
But let me concede arguendo that mistreating animals leads some humans who do that to 
mistreat humans as well. This leads us to the odd conclusion that it is wrong for some humans 
to mistreat animals and it is not wrong for some humans to mistreat animals. If my X-ing 
inevitably causes my Y-ing and Y-ing is morally wrong, then my X-ing is morally wrong; I 
ought not X. But it does not follow that X-ing is morally wrong for other moral agents who 
have a different psychological constitution that provides them with a safety valve to prevent Y-
ing following from their X-ing. In other words, if it is the case that X-ing is morally wrong, it 
cannot be that X-ing is not morally wrong. The gist of my argument here is that the moral 
wrongness of cruelty to animals cannot be consistently premised on the contingent facts that it 
could result in harm to humans. What the purveyors of the cruelty argument might say, 
however, is that it is imprudent to mistreat animals because doing so probabilistically results in 
the immorality of mistreating humans.  
The Argument from Potential Moral Agency 
Another caveat devised to prevent the implications of restricting moral rights to those who 
possess moral autonomy is that of the potential to possess moral autonomy. This way, we can 
bring back in young children at least as holders of rights. So, we may now accept talk of the 
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rights of children, or even of unborn human beings. Since young children have the inherent 
capacity to provide moral reasons for their actions and omissions, they have moral rights. This 
is in contradistinction with animals—whether young or adult—that supposedly do not and 
cannot have their behaviour guided by moral reasons and are not able to make any moral 
judgements. But this inclusion of babies and exclusion of animals seems nothing but speciesist 
arbitrariness. It commits a logical misstep.  
The potentiality argument can be schematically presented as follows.      
(1) Y has the right to φ. 
(2) X has the potential to become Y. 
(3) Therefore, X has the right to φ.  
Employing the counterexample method, the potentiality argument allows the following. 
(4) Eighteen-year-olds have a right to vote. 
(5) Babies have the potential to develop into Eighteen-year-olds. 
(6) Therefore, babies have a right to vote.  
The potentiality argument is clearly invalid because the two true premises (4 and 5) are true 
and yet they yield a false conclusion. The argument from potentiality only entails one correct 
conclusion: ‘Babies have the potential to develop into beings with the right to vote’. As Eric 
Rakowski rightly puts it, “the fact that we will all die some day is no excuse for someone’s 
acting as though our bodies were already lifeless shells” (Rakowski, 1991: 359).   
Even more importantly, the argument from potentiality fails to deliver the desired outcome that 
babies have a right to life, to parental care, to state protection from parental abuse, and so on. 
Thus, those who try to exclude animals from, and include babies in, the real of rights through 
the potentiality detour seem to have failed since babies are undeniably holders of rights despite 
lacking moral autonomy. 
We can therefore now turn to the less demanding criterion—interests. We will do so through a 
discussion of Tom Regan’s subject-of-a-life standard.  
3.2 Subject-of-a-life Criterion 
In the first two chapters of The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan weighs and dismisses 
scientific, theological, and philosophical arguments that deny that animals are not morally 
considerable in themselves because they lack certain essential characteristics for moral 
considerability. Some of the characteristics animals are purported to lack include 
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consciousness, beliefs, linguistic ability, conative capacities, a soul, and moral autonomy. 
Regan argues that some animals—which he strategically limits to mammalian yearlings and 
older—possess some of these features.  
Although Regan rightly accords animals what he terms preference autonomy, he finds it “highly 
unlikely” that animals have moral autonomy (Regan, 2004a: 84). Because animals lack moral 
autonomy, he groups them under moral patients together with human babies, the senile, the 
insane, and others with a seriously compromised mental faculty. The patient/agent distinction 
is an important one that shall resurface in several places especially in Chapter 6. Mark 
Rowlands makes the distinction as follows: 
X is a moral patient if and only if X is a legitimate object of moral concern …. X is a moral agent 
if and only if X is (a) morally responsible for, and so can be (b) morally evaluated (praised or 
blamed, broadly understood) for its motives and actions (Rowlands, 2012: 72, 74). 
Regan identifies the hallmark of a moral agent as (a) having the capacity to bring impartial 
moral principles to determine the rightness or wrongness of a course of action and, (b) being 
able to freely act or not to act as dictated by those principles (Regan, 2004a: 151). This seems 
fairly uncontroversial. A moral agent, for example, must be able to grasp the Golden Rule and 
freely choose to abide by it or not. Moral patients fail to meet this benchmark although they do 
meet what is necessary to count morally.  
The previous section has tried to argue that the view that moral agency is not a necessary 
condition for being morally considerable. This leaves us with those features which animals just 
like human moral patients might after all possess.  
Regan (2004a: 243) summarises the relevant features in the now famous subject-of-a-life 
‘criterion’ stated below. A subject-of-a-life has: 
(a) Beliefs and desires;  
(b) perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future;  
(c) An emotional life with feelings of pleasure and pain; 
(d) Preference- and welfare– interests; 
(e) The ability to initiate actions in pursuit of their desires and goals;  
(f) A psychophysical identity over time; and  
(g) An individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, 
logically independent of their utility for others and logically independent of their being 
objects of anyone else’s interests. 
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Regan’s criterion is a vitally important one that Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson describes as “one 
of those potentially life-altering insights” (in Regan, 2004b; ix-x).  It omits most, if not all, 
conditions that are normally given for acknowledgment of human rights and denial of animal 
rights. It provides characteristics that are widely shared by both moral patients and moral agents 
and thus leaves the door to the moral community open to individuals from either category.  
However, as potentially life-changing as it may be, the subject-of-a-life criterion also invites 
some questions. Firstly, are these—(a) to (g)—criteria or it is a criterion? To call all elements 
in this list a criterion seems to point to all the seven as being considered collectively as 
providing a sufficient condition for being a subject-of-a-life. Then each of them would only 
count as a necessary condition. If they are criteria, they could individually, or a combination of 
some of them, form sufficient conditions for being a subject-of-a-life.  
Rowlands (2009) calls the two interpretations as the strong and the weak respectively. But he 
does not fully mitigate the vagueness of the ‘criterion’ by depicting the weak interpretation as 
requiring that ‘most’ of the conditions be met for a being to be a subject-of-a-life (Rowlands, 
2009: 60). ‘Most’ translates to at least four of the conditions. No reason is given why any 
number of components less than four—say three—cannot suffice for a subject-of-a-life. 
Rowlands’ view is that Regan means the stronger sense (Rowlands, 2009: 61).  Rowland’s 
interpretation seems correct as Regan talks of “a set of psychological capacities” that are 
“jointly sufficient” (Regan, 2006: 17). I disagree with both the strong (Regan’s position) and 
the weak views of the subject-of-a-life criterion as characterised by Rowlands.  
Firstly, according to Regan, understood in the strong sense of the criterion, an individual who 
is a subject-of-a-life must be able to have their life faring well or worse independently of 
whether they somehow augment or detract from others’ interests (g). This condition does not 
add anything new. If an entity possesses (c) and (d), how can that being possibly not also have 
(g) as well? If a being has an emotional life with feelings of pleasure and pain, it seems logically 
true that its life is not faring well if it is characterised by more pain than pleasure. Indeed, any 
instance of pleasure or pain is prima facie an instance of its life going well or ill respectively.11  
Similarly, it is a tautology to claim that a being has preference and welfare interests (d) and 
that it has an individual welfare in the sense that its experiences can be positive or negative 
                                                          
11 Here I speak only of normal pleasures. Some pleasures can come from a diseased mind resulting in sadism or 
sadomasochism. These are symptomatic of a malfunctioned or dysfunctional psyche and, I think, cannot be said 
to be adding anything positive to a good life. 
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irrespective of the value such experiences have for others. If a being has preference or welfare 
interests, holding some things constant (for example, the preferences are authentic and do not 
have evil ends), it follows necessarily that the frustration of such interests bodes ill for that 
being quite independently of how interests of third parties are affected. Since (g) is redundant 
as it is entailed by some of the other conditions such as (c) and (d), it need not be listed as a 
necessary condition.  
What about the rest of the conditions? Are (a) – (f) individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
for a being to be a subject-of-a-life? I cannot answer in the affirmative. If something has 
perception, memory, and a sense of the future in general (b), it seems repetitive to demand that 
it should also have a psychophysical identity over time (f). And physical identity is not 
necessary at all. We already visualise contrary cases from religions and fairy tales of the 
existence of spiritual entities or those whose bodies are metamorphosing from time to time 
whose experiences and lives nevertheless matter to them. We can also easily imagine a person 
suffering from something worse than transient global amnesia.  One example is a person who 
cannot remember her past. She is full of life but lives only in the moment.  Today she is reading 
Shakespeare. The next day, she has forgotten all about Othello and is totally engulfed in 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and so on. Every day is completely erased on the next day 
and with no anticipation for tomorrow. She cannot recognise herself in the mirror the next day 
as the person she was yesterday. I think she is eligible for rights despite lacking self-identity 
over time. 
It seems Regan’s ‘insightful’ phrase has not travelled too far, if at all, ahead of Bentham’s 
parsimonious “Can they suffer?” It turns out that beings can suffer if and only if they are an 
experiencing subject-of-a-life. Having preference and welfare interests seems necessary and 
sufficient for suffering, and consequently, for being a subject-of-a-life as well. We are back to 
welfarism, which is less obscure and more widely recognised as the fulcrum for normative 
theory, as noted in the brief discussion on wellbeing in Chapter 2.  
3.3 Sentience, Interests, and Rights 
Sentience is a concept that is widely used in ethical discourse, especially in animal ethics. For 
most philosophers, however, sentience serves as the all-important dividing line for moral status. 
Sentience is seen by many as a sufficient condition for admission into the realm of right-
holders. But is it also a necessary condition for moral status? Regan categorically states, 
“provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition for a being’s possession of the right 
not to be made to suffer non-trivial pain” (Regan, 1979: 80). Sentience is necessary to have 
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interests at all. If a being is not sentient, then the being may be alive, but there is nothing that 
the being prefers, wants, or desires (Francione and Garner, 2010: 15).  
How is the bridge to be made between interests and moral rights? “A sufficient condition for 
being owed such duties [of justice] is that one have a welfare—that one be the experiencing 
subject of a life that fares well or ill for one as an individual” (Regan, 2004a: 171). Why do we, 
and not sticks or stones, have rights? Regan (2004b, 50) says it is because “what happens to 
us—whether our bodies, our freedoms, or our lives themselves—matters to us because it makes 
a difference to the quality and duration of our lives, as experienced by us whether anybody else 
cares about this or not.” Here Regan answers the question without any reference to the notion 
of inherent value that he says is integral to his account of rights. He resists any appeals to 
parsimony to dispense with the idea of inherent value saying, “simplicity is not everything” 
(Regan, 2006: 48). 
The concept of inherent value has puzzled, and has been rejected by, some philosophers 
including Cochrane (2012) and Rowlands (2009). Claire Palmer deems unnecessary to an 
account of animal rights the “high level views” and complexity that Regan’s theory manifests 
(Palmer, 2010: 33). Rowlands (2009, 86-97) offers an extensive rejection of inherent value on 
grounds that it is mysterious, ad hoc, and unnecessary. Dombrowski (1997: 29) questions the 
relevance of inherent value because its criteria “are remarkably similar to those for basic rights, 
indicating, perhaps, that a being has basic rights to the extent that it has inherent value.” If the 
two notions—basic rights and inherent value—were equivalent, as Dombrowski seems to hint, 
then there would be no need to postulate one, inherent value, as forming the basis for the other, 
rights.  
I will not delve into the discussion of what inherent value is and its role, or lack thereof, in 
animal rights theory. It suffices here to say standard interest theory of rights holds simply that 
having an interest “leads to a duty on others to ensure that this right—following directly from 
the possession of an interest—is upheld” (Garner, 2013: 95). I would however insist on the 
qualifications I have made in Chapter 2 and in this chapter that prevent all or too many interests 
begetting moral rights. 
I am, however, persuaded by a rather narrow conception of inherent value. This is the sense in 
which it plays the role akin to “Kant’s idea of something’s existing as an ‘end in itself’” (Regan 
2006, 48). Because subjects-of-a-life are negatively and positively affected by various 
experiences, they have inherent value in that those experiences matter to them. Some of the 
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experiences come with value and others with disvalue to them. They have an interest in how 
things go for them irrespective of how this pans out for others. Joel Feinberg alludes to this 
simpler view of inherent value when he says beings are loci of value in their own right if they 
have certain interests “the integrated satisfaction of which constitutes their welfare or good” 
(Feinberg, 1974: 50). It is this value that proceeds from a being’s interests which cries out to 
moral agents for recognition and consideration. Conceived as such, interests are value-
impregnated; they come axiologically pre-packed.  
As Alasdair Cochrane points out, there would be no need to assume inherent value under 
Regan’s fashion since “possession of interests is the necessary … condition for holding rights” 
(Cochrane, 2012: 17).12 If X has some preference or welfare interests, or moral autonomy, then 
X is eligible for moral rights. If X has moral rights, then X has some preference, or welfare 
interests, or moral autonomy. Principally, moral rights are there to prevent harm by requiring 
that certain things (not) be done. If a being cannot be harmed or benefited, then it has no 
interests and no rights.      
Besides the concept of inherent value, Regan puts forward several kinds of rights and duties 
that, in my view, stray from their correct use in a theory of rights. His loose usage of the 
technical notion of rights can result in theoretical confusions that will hinder a clear analysis 
and resolution of practical problems involving wildlife and humans.  
3.4 Some Dubious Rights 
Inasmuch as Tom Regan’s animal rights theory is famous for its being ground-breaking, it is 
also infamous for its lack of economy. Regan’s theory contains several principles whose 
meaning, relevance, or logical relationships are not readily clear. This has opened up his theory 
to criticisms from within the animal rights camp and from proponents of rival approaches to 
animal ethics. Here I discuss briefly two such opaque or unnecessary principles: the right to 
respectful treatment, and the right to just treatment. My method here is to use the Hohfeldian 
framework set out in Chapter 2 to trim what I see as excesses and duplications in Regan’s 
account of moral rights.   
                                                          
12 As noted already, above, for Cochrane, having strong interests is not only necessary but also sufficient for 
being a rights-holder. My view, however, is that, at least in the case moral rights, possessing interests is 
necessary but may not be sufficient for having a right against some moral agent.  
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3.4.1 The Right to Just Treatment 
According to Regan, there is a basic right to just treatment that is correlative with the 
unacquired duty of justice (2004a: 274, 278). The duty to justice, he defines as “the duty not 
treat individuals differently in the absence of a relevant dissimilarity [between them]” (2004a: 
274). This definition is problematic for reasons I shall soon make clear.  
In the preceding chapter, I discussed how the concept of justice relates to moral rights. I arrived 
at the conclusion that injustice is done if, and only if, and because some right is violated. I must 
stress, at this point, that a theory of rights is a theory of justice. As Cochrane (2012: 13) 
correctly points out, “the language of rights immediately implies that [our] treatment of animals 
is a matter of justice.” I, however, make the stronger claim that all cases of injustice are 
exhaustively covered under the language of rights elucidated in Chapter 2. Since justice is 
completely reducible to rights relations, a right to justice would be, at the end of the day, 
tantamount to a right to moral rights. In view of this, Regan’s duty to justice is unhelpful for at 
least two reasons. 
Firstly, once we have arrived at the notion of moral rights and fully understood the structure of 
rights and their correlative obligations, there is no place left to posit an overarching right to just 
treatment. A claim, liberty, power, or immunity constitutes an instance of injustice once it is 
violated. Justice is not a right but rather a property of a certain kind of moral phenomenon 
namely, an instance of upholding some moral right.  
Secondly, Regan’s view that the duty to justice consists in not treating differently individuals 
who lack a relevant dissimilarity results in unacceptable implications. A woman meets two 
hungry strangers who are identical in every relevant respect including both having gambled 
away their food. Therefore, from her perspective, at least, there is no relevant dissimilarity. But 
she arbitrarily feeds one of them and not the other even when she has enough food that she does 
not really need. Her action is morally deplorable but not on account of injustice. There is no 
relevant dissimilarity between the two hungry individuals, but the woman treats them 
differently as she pleases. Yet, she commits no injustice. It would be odd to charge the woman 
with failing in her ‘duty to justice’. But this is what Regan would like us to find her guilty of.  
No one has a right not to be treated differently from another individual even in the absence of 
some relevant dissimilarity. The individual X must have her own claim against Z irrespective 
of whether Y has a claim with the same content against Z. If any number of individuals has no 
claim-right against me to something I have in abundance, I have a liberty-right how to dispense 
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with that something. The one and only relevant similarity that warrants the same treatment is 
that both X and Y have a claim-right of the same content against the same respondent. I 
conclude, therefore, that both Regan’s right to justice and the correlative duty must be vacuous. 
3.4.2 The Right to Respectful Treatment 
Another right Regan puts forward is that to respectful treatment. All subjects of a life have a 
basic moral right to respectful treatment: “We are to treat those individuals who have inherent 
value in ways that respect their inherent value” (Regan, 2004a: 248). He elaborates: 
“Individuals who possess this right are never to be treated as mere resources for others; in 
particular, harms intentionally done to any one subject cannot be justified by aggregating 
benefits derived by others” (Regan, 2006: 43). One cannot help but notice that the right to 
respectful treatment serves the same role as Kant’s notion of an end in itself that Regan has 
already equated to the notion of inherent value.  
This observation aside, the right to respectful treatment is surplus to the requirements of a moral 
rights theory. This is because if I can catalogue all my rights and another person does not violate 
a single one of them, then that person has treated me with respect. Rights protect an individual’s 
welfare and conative interests. If all of an individual’s rights are not violated, then no room is 
left for treating him merely as a resource. In other words, moral rights classified as claims, 
liberties, powers, and immunities have done all the work Regan wants the ‘right’ to respectful 
treatment to perform. The structure of every right is such that it in itself dictates how others 
ought (not) to behave towards the right-holder. Power-rights for example, require that the 
person with the correlative liability permits the burdens—or advantages for that matter—being 
imposed upon him. In everyday usage, when we say we ought to respect other people’s rights, 
this serves only as a reminder. This reminder is no more a right than the rule that you must 
follow road signs is itself a road sign. It certainly does not play the foundational role for rights 
that Regan attributes to it. 
3.5 Kinds of Rights-Correlative Obligations 
In his analysis of moral rights, Regan distinguishes between unacquired and acquired duties. 
Unacquired duties are those that do not result from volitional acts of moral agents or result from 
some institutional arrangements. The opposite of these, he calls acquired duties (Regan, 2004a: 
273). I think a good example of acquired duties would be those of an adoptive parent.  
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There are at least two objections to Regan’s dichotomous taxonomy of duties. The objections 
are that the taxonomy is inadequate and that the duty to treat others justly is a tautology. So, I 
will address now why the unacquired/acquired distinction is inadequate.  
Acquired duties as seen by Regan are straightforward to envision. As Tom Beauchamp aptly 
observes, “[w]hen we deliberately create both dependence and vulnerability in [domesticated] 
animals, and take caring and supervisory charge of them, we acquire moral obligations of care” 
(Beauchamp, 2011: 215). But we would be wrong if we ended here, as Regan does, because 
the division between unacquired duties and acquired ones is not watertight and the second taxon 
is not properly described. The class of unacquired duties consists of those duties that are not 
due to voluntary acts of the bearers and are independent of positions in social institutions.  
However, this is also true of some so-called acquired duties that they do not arise from 
institutional setups or voluntary acts of obligors. I will refer to such duties as ‘emergent duties’. 
‘Emergent duties’ is a more appropriate label for such duties because ‘acquired’ connotes 
wrongly that such duties arise only from voluntary acts or institutional arrangements. Some 
emergent duties are not from such situations although they are unacquired. They are necessary 
by-products of the unintended consequences of the actions of moral agents. If I unintentionally 
spill my drink on someone’s book, at the very least, I owe them an apology, and at the most, I 
would be obliged to replace their damaged book. In short, there is a kind of duty that emerges 
as a result of my actions although unwilled by me and therefore not voluntary, and whether or 
not social arrangements put me in that morally burdensome position.  
A man possesses a prima facie emergent duty to his child from a pregnancy he did not will. 
Same for the woman, unless, of course, in the highly unlikely event that semen was forcibly or 
fraudulently extracted or inseminated. John Locke aptly expresses the idea I espouse: “For 
children being … born weak and unable to provide for themselves, they have … a Right to be 
nourished and maintained by their Parents, nay a right not only to bare Subsistence but to the 
conveniences and comforts of Life, as far as the conditions of their Parents can afford it” (1967: 
I, 89; emphasis added). Regan’s division of duties has no provision for this kind of emergent 
duty. And it is not an unimportant duty. For example, it may be the basis for demanding 
compensatory goods from an agent’s actions even though the harm the agent caused was 
unintended. It is not the case that one is morally liable only if one is morally culpable.  
Furthermore, if I keep male and female companion dogs and in spite of precautionary measures, 
the two have puppies, I become burdened with the duty to provide for and protect the puppies. 
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Then, of course, there are those duties arising from wilful promising and contracting which 
Regan had in mind as being the only sort of duties outside the unacquired sort. The 
unacquired/emergent duties distinction has led to an important illumination between negative 
duties such as the duty not to harm others, and positive duties such as the duty to provide for 
or protect others. 
3.6 The Right to Assistance 
Is there a moral right and its correlative duty to assistance? Regan (2004a: 249) answers in the 
affirmative. He stresses that the duty to assistance is not a matter of kindness: 
When the vulnerable are used as means to such ends, people who understand the wrong done have 
a duty to intervene, to stand up and speak out in defense of the victim. Moreover, the duty here is 
itself a demand for justice, not a plea for generosity. These victims are owed assistance from us; 
help is something they are due, not something it would be ‘awfully’ nice for us to render (Regan, 
2004b: 43-44; emphasis added). 
A right to assistance is a positive right. It places a moral burden, a duty, on someone that, with 
respect to some content, they are obligated to provide for the right-bearer. I also answer in the 
affirmative but for a different and, I believe, more plausible reason.  
In my view, unacquired duties will correlate only with negative rights. Emergent duties will 
correlate with some negative rights as well as with all positive rights. In virtue of being a being 
with interests befitting of moral protection, Jane demands moral respect from any and all moral 
agents. She has pro tanto moral protection against anyone’s killing her.  
The right to assistance is a claim-right. It imposes a duty on another or others to come to the 
right-holder’s aid when certain conditions are fulfilled such as when they need food, shelter, 
protection, rescue, and so on. But this right, though it has the same structure as the right to life, 
has a different genesis than the right to life. Unacquired duties do not correlate with positive 
rights such as would compel others to assist someone. The right to be assisted comes only from 
emergent duties. All adoptive parents, like everybody else, have the unacquired duties not to 
harm their children. But, unlike everybody else, they become saddled with the duties of 
assistance—protecting and providing for the children. 
With regards to the children’s negative rights, there is symmetry in the responsibility for parents 
and strangers. In the event of failure in this responsibility on the part of both stranger and the 
parent not to harm the children, blame is an appropriate moral response.  
However, with respect to positive rights, there is asymmetry in blame for stranger and parent 
in failing to protect or assist the children. The parent is blamed more compared to the stranger. 
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Common sense morality favours my view on the duty to assistance against Regan’s. Regan 
regards the duty to assistance as owed by all moral agents vis-à-vis any holders of positive 
rights.  
This said, there are many cases where we can use emergent duties as grounds for compensation 
rather than plain up-to-the-agent goodwill assistance. Emergent duties may, for example, 
provide grounds for animal rights to some human intervention when animals are made to suffer 
or vulnerable to suffering from unintended anthropogenic habitat destruction. This will be 
discussed at length in Chapter 7. 
Moral agents have the moral right—the power-right—to trade their moral claims, liberties, 
immunities, and powers. People trade some rights when they make promises and agreements 
that meet certain moral preconditions. Such preconditions include at least that the participants 
are of sound mind, no participant engages in deceit such as concealing important information, 
no participant threatens another’s rights, and the content of the agreement does not involve 
violation of others’ moral rights (Hooker, 2000: 53). To the extent that trading rights is morally 
and legally reasonable and accepted in the case of small children or other people who for some 
reason are unable do so in their own behalf, no problem should arise for agreements in animals’ 
behalf. If, for example, Sue leaves a certain amount of her estate to her pony, others may 
morally enter into contracts in the pony’s behalf. For example, with vets to conduct health 
checks on her and medically treat her, someone to supply her with food as needed, someone to 
ensure her home is clean, warm and safe, and so on.  
Beauchamp (2011: 218-219) makes a good case for rights of animals as beneficiaries of human 
agreements. Rainer Ebert and Tibor Machan also highlight this benign trait of humans. 
Autonomous humans, they point out, “might freely choose to make commitments to each other 
to secure each other’s’ moral rights and the rights of moral patients” (Ebert and Machan, 2012: 
155). However, I take rights which emerge from such commitments as conventional rights and 
not moral rights.  
Wisdom in animal rights arguably begins with Tom Regan’s theory. In this chapter, I have tried 
to give an exposition of the essence of Regan’s theory of rights. If it were a perfect theory, I 
would only need to draw its implications regarding various aspects of wildlife governance that 
Regan and other animal rights theorists have not done. However, despite its overall 
persuasiveness, I argue against some specific assumptions, principles, and inferences.  
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Regan has persuasively argued that many animals have a moral status that guarantees them 
rights. He argues that some animals have a cognitive capacity that enables them experience 
certain states of consciousness as good and others as bad. The world can be worse or better for 
them. This capacity to have experiences that makes one’s life go better or worse is vital for 
possession of rights. However, Regan’s exposition of his catchy subject-of-a-life criterion for 
rights possession is overly sophisticated and vague. Sentience, I point out, is a more 
parsimonious criterion for possessing rights.  
Further, I argue that Regan’s theory exhibits some metaphysical excesses especially with his 
discussion of inherent value. It seems unnecessary to posit inherent value over and above 
identification of sentience as the primary value tracker. Harmful experiences are a disvalue and 
experiences that enhance wellbeing are valuable. Those interests relevantly connected to an 
animal’s wellbeing represent what is valuable. Moral rights represent a normative system that 
protects an individual from being harmed through violations or deprivation. I also argue that 
some of Regan’s rights are tautologies that only add surplus weight to the theory. These rights 
include the right to just treatment and the right to respectful treatment. In my view, Regan’s 
right to assistance is also mistaken and accompanied with some inconsistencies. I argue that 
Regan’s view that there is a right to assistance for victims of injustice but none for victims of 
natural processes or events is indefensible. I elucidate and elaborate Regan’s dichotomy of 
acquired and unacquired by introducing the notion of emergent rights.  
My discussion of Regan clarifies and makes slight modifications that will sometimes lead us in 
different ways when dealing with some moral problem in human-wildlife relations. I am now 
at the point where I can pose the question: If wild animals are bona fide right-holders, what are 
the implications for wildlife legislation, policy, and practice or, in short, wildlife governance? 
The rest of the thesis will be trying to answer this question.  
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Chapter 4 Predation and Wildlife Population Control  
I have thus far avoided bringing any practical animal issues into the theoretic discussions of the 
last two chapters. This and the next two chapters will deal with what should—and what should 
not—go into an ethically sound wildlife policy. This chapter addresses two problems regarding 
implementation of a rights-based wildlife policy.  
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I discuss the challenge the problem 
of predation poses to animal rights theory. In particular, I examine the potentially lethal charge 
by J. Baird Callicott that “Reganic animal rights imply the ecological nightmare of a policy of 
predator extermination” (Callicott, 1992b: 258, n. 15). Some animal ethicists surprisingly 
embrace this apparently repugnant policy recommendation. Although, I disagree with Regan’s 
manner of responding to the problem of predation, I agree with him that the rights view does 
not entail the policy of humans policing nature to protect prey from predators or extirpating 
predators altogether. I argue that there are both theoretical and practical problems with that 
policy. These problems make ridding nature of predators morally wrong and haughty. 
In the second part of this chapter, I defend animal rights theory from the view that it is not an 
environmental ethic and, therefore, would not carter for environmental goals aimed at 
environmental sustainability and preservation of biodiversity. I argue that an animal rights ethic 
need not be catastrophic to environmental collectives like species and ecosystems. I end by 
presenting a non-dogmatist animal rights view that, though acknowledging the axiological 
monopoly of sentient wildlife in the natural environment, stresses that wildlife policies may 
permit strategies that override the rights of some individuals in order that, generally, the rights 
of all other wild animals may be safeguarded. Although a code of rules to guide wildlife policy 
has rights-based rules at its core, it must contain other ancillary rules. This is not unique to the 
animal kingdom but is also manifest and is justified in some public policies. John Broome 
(2012), for example, usefully demarcates between the duty of justice and the duty of goodness, 
which respectively correlate with individual rights and the public good. Public policy generally 
must tread carefully between pressure both from individual rights and the public good.  
4.1 What is Predation?  
Sinclair et al (2006) describe predation as covering a range of behaviours that include 
herbivory, parasitism, carnivory, and cannibalism. According to Begon et al (2006), the 
taxonomy of predators consists of herbivores which consume plants, carnivores which consume 
animals, and omnivores which consume both plants and animals. For my purposes, predation 
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will mean exclusively carnivory, “the classical concept of predation where the predator kills 
and eats the animal prey” (Sinclair, et al, 2006: 165). Predators will mean carnivores and 
omnivores (partial carnivores). Examples of such animals include all species of the cat family, 
hyenas, wild dogs, chimpanzees, sharks, bears, and falcons.  
A complete predator-prey typology would include wild animals, humans, companion animals, 
and farm animals. Predators and prey can come from any of these groups. Normally carnivorous 
animals are portrayed as predators and herbivores as prey but reality is not so black and white. 
For example, lions, when infirm, from old age, injury, or disease, are sometimes preyed on by 
hyenas. However, I will generally follow the popular way of seeing carnivores as predators and 
herbivores as prey. Though not categorically true, this seems statistically to be the case and, at 
least for pedagogical reasons, does simplify the picture.13  
Further, the predation that interests me, in the main, is that occurring between carnivores and 
herbivores that are in the wild such as protected areas. Clare Palmer’s (2011: 702) categories 
of wildness of animals as being locational, dispositional, or constitutive do not provide a clear 
fit for these protected animals. I am therefore tempted to stipulate. I will be referring only to 
those wild animals in protected areas such as the national parks. This leaves out those wild 
animals that are in captivity in zoos or science laboratories even though they may be of the 
same species as those in the protected areas. The reason for this is that the issues I concern 
myself with here are those that pertain to in situ as opposed to ex situ wildlife conservation. 
There are also some free-roaming wild animals that are not in designated protected areas. Some 
of my arguments have implications for such animals.  
The fact that predators cause untold harm to prey animals as such does not raise any moral 
concerns for wildlife managers. In fact, predators are ecologically seen as essential for the 
natural control of ungulate’s behaviour and populations (Wagner, 1995). Predator control is 
merely a wildlife management issue to keep populations in balance and forestall disturbances 
to environmental balance. This is not different, in principle, from human control of herbivore 
populations for the same reasons. In fact, in some cases ecologists have deemed it necessary to 
(re)introduce carnivores into an ecosystem to achieve some desired ecological balance. Hence, 
the problem of predation arises mainly in moral philosophy. Different perspectives offer 
                                                          
13 One study (Kruuk, 2014: 137) revealed that the diet of lions in Serengeti National Park constituted over 90% 
ungulates (8% buffalo, 10% gazelle, 26% zebra, and 49% wildebeest). 
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different prescriptions on what must/may be done to predators in view of their predatory 
behaviour.   
Like all ethicists, animal ethicists take suffering as axiomatically morally bad and, whenever 
possible and permissible, something to be reduced or eliminated. The results of philosophising 
about predation have potential to alter how wildlife management views and responds to the 
predator-prey relationship. Indeed, the goal of applied ethics is to improve the world through, 
say, recommendation of ethically sound policy. In what immediately follows, I present the 
philosophical problem of predation, debate some proposed solutions, and put forth my own 
analysis and solution. 
4.2 The Problem of Predation  
The problem of predation has at least two possible formulations. The first one—not relevant 
here—is advanced to justify human meat-eating by claiming that no significant difference 
exists between human predation and that of wild carnivores. This is the so-called naïve 
argument against moral vegetarianism. The thrust of this argument, as Benatar (2001: 103) 
explains, is that “because it is not wrong for carnivorous animals like lions and tigers to kill 
other animals for food, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so.”  The version of the problem 
relevant now is not the one defending human carnivory but something more radical.  
The second formulation of the philosophical problem of predation is simply that ascription of 
rights to wild animals has the absurd implication that either humans must interfere to reduce or 
end predation. Some philosophers (e.g. Sapontzis, 1987) deny that there is any absurdity in the 
interference position. But critics say those who find unpalatable the prescription to interfere in 
predation must forthwith abandon animal rights theory. This is because, taking rights seriously 
requires preventing rights violations. Baird Callicott clearly spells out the predation problem: 
“Among the most disturbing implications drawn from … rights theory is that, were it is possible 
for us to do so, we ought to protect innocent vegetarian animals from their carnivorous 
predators” (Callicott, 1992b: 258). The gist of Callicott’s view is that, since Regan’s view 
directs us to the ridiculous policy of acting as policemen between lions and zebras, the theory 
that animals possess moral rights must be wholly abandoned.  I will endeavour to show that the 
predation problem poses no real threat to animal rights theory. I will first explain and critique 
Regan’s proposed solution.  
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4.3 Regan’s Laissez-faire View 
Tom Regan does not think animal rights theory leads to the absurd implication his opponents 
imagine it to. He is unequivocal on what animal rights theory implies we do about wild animals. 
He argues for a hands-off approach; we should leave wild animals alone. He elaborates: 
The total amount of suffering animals cause one another in the wild is not the concern of morally 
enlightened wildlife management. Being neither accountants nor managers of felicity in nature, 
wildlife managers should be principally concerned with letting animals be, keeping human predators 
out of their affairs, allowing these ‘other nations’ to carve out their own destiny (Regan, 2004: 357).  
Elisa Aaltola lends further support to Regan’s position. In her view, if we are to “respect 
animals as they are, predators are to be left to flourish” despite the obvious suffering they cause 
to prey animals (Aaltola, 2010: 86). But this approach immediately rings alarms and Mark 
Sagoff acutely alerts us to what appears to be a blatant case of wanting to eat the cake and 
having it simultaneously. “To speak of the rights of animals … and at the same time to let 
nearly all of them perish unnecessarily in the most brutal and horrible ways is not to display 
humanity but hypocrisy in the extreme” (Sagoff, 2002: 41). So, having stated his laissez-faire 
view, as Clare Palmer (2010) calls it, how does Regan defend it against the alleged absurdity 
and how does he escape Sagoff’s charge of hypocrisy?  
By reference to accounting and felicity, Regan reminds us of his resistance to a utilitarian-based 
wildlife management ethic that treats animals as receptacles of comparable value. For him, the 
aim of wildlife management is not to produce the highest aggregate wellbeing among animals 
in the wild or including the wellbeing of humans. Regan is thus against wildlife management 
as conceived in the current practice and theory of ecology. In his view, wildlife managers are 
morally obligated to discharge their negative and their emergent positive duties. They should 
let wild animals be, and they should ensure that other humans let wild animals be. This is a 
contentious point from within and from without animal rights theory.  
Why do we have to refrain from interfering in wildlife predation? Regan replies: “Justice … 
not only imposes duties of nonharm; it also imposes the duty of assistance, understood as the 
duty to aid those who suffer from injustice” (2004a: 249). But, prey animals suffer no injustice 
since a carnivore “neither can nor does violate anyone’s rights” (Regan, 2004a: 285). 
Carnivores lack moral agency, which is a necessary condition for rights violation. Hence, the 
morally right policy for humans in the case of predation is simply ‘hands-off’.  
Although helpful in offering a rights-based policy prescription for wildlife management, 
Regan’s analysis suffers from some flaws. I will now discuss these errors and offer what I see 
as an improved, more consistent position.  
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4.3.1 A Critique of Regan’s Approach 
There are some things that can be said in praise of Regan’s effort to argue for anti-paternalism 
in human management of wildlife. However, some of his assumptions and some implications 
of his argument must be resisted. According to Regan, justice imposes both duties not to harm 
and duties to aid those whose rights are or would be violated. This view of entitlement to aid 
is, however, problematic for at least two reasons. First, the right to aid is not automatic. Second, 
in those cases the right to aid does arise, its bearers need not be victims of injustice.  
The negative duty to not harm wild animals wrongfully is uncontroversial. Every right-holder 
demands that all moral agents individually or collectively refrain from harming her. However, 
merely being a victim of rights violations does not necessarily give one the right to aid against 
every moral agent. There are some circumstances in which the (putative) victim has a claim 
that moral agents come to her aid. For example, such a right can be held against those who have 
made the victim vulnerable. However, this is not symmetrical to the universal negative right to 
not be harmed, which has its respondents all moral agents.  
I will assume, for the sake of argument, that we have a general positive duty to help victims of 
injustice. Regan finds the nature of the cause of harm to be morally decisive regarding whether 
a right to aid exist. On this ground, Regan allows for a claim against us for one whose harm is 
a result of injustice while denying the same right to one whose harm is not a result of injustice. 
If I am a doctor and I find a child bleeding profusely from a wound, by Regan’s lights, I must 
ask who or what caused the wound before making up my mind whether the child has a claim 
that I treat her wound. If the cause is a malicious normal adult, I have a duty to help; if it is a 
rabid dog, I might as well walk on and leave the child bleeding and in pain.  
The role Regan wants causality to play in the triggering of duties is clearly an odd one. I agree 
with Dale Jamieson’s verdict that Regan comes up short of providing “a satisfactory ground 
for distinguishing cases in which we are required to provide assistance from those in which we 
are not required to provide assistance” (Jamieson, 1990: 352). At best, Regan’s line-drawing is 
arbitrary; at worst, it is an illicit ad hoc move to pre-empt the argument from predation because 
prey are not necessarily victims of injustice. Regan’s handling of the following case shows why 
his manoeuvre is arbitrary or ad hoc.  
An implication Regan would have to accept as resulting from his view of duty allocation on 
grounds of nature of cause is that we have no duty to rescue a child who is about to be snatched 
by a lion. Instead of biting the bullet Regan backtracks, saying “we have a prima facie duty of 
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assistance in this case” (Regan, 2004a: xxxvi). Admittedly, since there is no rights violation in 
the offing, this is not a justice-based duty. But it seems suspiciously the only reason Regan is 
introducing this ‘duty’ is to keep humans in and animals out. He makes an ad hoc adjustment 
in order to maintain a speciesist bias for he does not extend his generosity regarding this ‘duty’ 
to nonhuman animal prey.  
Regan, however, offers yet another reason to justify the unequal treatment of two seemingly 
equally vulnerable beings. He thinks that we have no duty to assist those who are victims of 
non-agential harm. But for the child about to be devoured by a predator, he makes an exception. 
For a wildebeest in a child’s situation, Regan says the wildebeest has no right to assistance. The 
special duty to assist the child threatened by the lion arises from the child’s dependence on the 
protection of adult humans for its survival. But this duty does not arise in the case of members 
of wild prey species, adult or young, because they do not need our help to survive. “As a general 
rule, they do not need help from us in their struggle for survival, and we do not fail to discharge 
our duty when we choose not to lend our assistance” (Regan, 2004a: xxxvii).  
Regan has needlessly tried to allow for differential treatment of humans and animals faced with 
predation. In his view, the idea that there is a duty that protects the child but not the wildebeest 
is based on the child’s vulnerability and the wildebeest’s capability to survive. But the 
wildebeest is being devoured as we speak. This child and this wildebeest are equally vulnerable. 
Empirically, Regan’s conception of vulnerability is questionable. The wildebeest is not 
necessarily more competent than the human in this case and perhaps even in general. Human 
beings tend to have some form of child protection even against the child’s parents. 
There is in fact the special case of insular prey species facing a new ‘invasive’ predator species 
on the island. Let us assume the predators are on the island due to non-anthropogenic 
environmental circumstances. They have not been introduced or reintroduced by 
conservationists. The prey will be ill-equipped to deal with this threat and Regan—on the pain 
of inconsistency—must accept interference in this case. It seems to me that if Regan is to be 
consistent, the cases to save the child or the wildebeest fall or stand together. My view is that 
vulnerability is not a sufficient condition to warrant aid to either species member—that is, 
human or wildebeest. 
Furthermore, Tom Regan defends his discriminatory duty by saying “if members of prey 
species, including the young, were unable to survive without our assistance, there would be no 
prey species” (Regan, 2004a: xxxvii). This is a transgression against rights theory which 
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identify the locus of moral value as the individual rather than some features of the species or 
group to which the individual belongs. As rights, it is anathema to discount the harm to an 
individual wildebeest on the basis of the survival of the wildebeest species. The survival of 
species of wild fauna might be best served through utilitarian aggregation or unjust means. The 
survival of a group does not reflect a just system and so, by referring to the survival of species, 
Regan does not avert the problem of what we ought to do when an individual wild animal is 
threatened with serious harm from predation.  
Further, we can imagine the vulnerable prey wild animal in question being one of the last 
reproductive male of an endangered species. The animal is definitely going to be killed if we 
do nothing, and the vulnerability or incompetence of this species is exactly what has led to its 
decimation by predators. But except in the case of compensatory justice, Regan (2004a: xxxix-
xl) does not think we owe the duty to assistance to endangered species.  
My point is that Regan’s use of species competence based on their hitherto evolutionary success 
is inconsistent with his denial that endangered species (species who may lack evolutionary 
competencies by no fault or actions of humans) have a right that we assist them, a right that 
members of more populous species would lack by dint of their abundance. I am not arguing 
that endangered species have a right to human assistance but simply that invoking wild animals’ 
competencies is a suspiciously speciesist ad hoc move by Regan.  
It seems clear at this point that Regan has failed to give a coherent answer to the problem of 
predation. He sets off well by denying that animals have a right to life against other animals 
since carnivores lack moral agency. But he is forced to make ad hoc adjustments when he is 
faced with the conundrum of saving a child and a wildebeest when both are faced with pain 
and ultimate death via canine asphyxiation. He comes up with a duty to save the child but not 
the wildebeest. Regan’s attempt to distinguish the baby from the prey animals on grounds of 
competence fails as facts may easily change to render the wildebeest more vulnerable than, or 
as vulnerable as, the baby. The attempts to explain away the particular wildebeest’s 
vulnerability by appeal to the wildebeest evolutionary adaptability to predation or by pointing 
to wildebeest stable species populations fail. It is now my turn to offer a solution to the problem 
of predation, one that avoids Regan’s pitfalls. 
4.4 A Revised Rights-Based Response to the Problem of Predation 
Since Regan’s argument that wild animals have moral rights is generally persuasive, how can 
we now remedy his inconsistency on the predator-prey question? My starting point is first to 
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agree with Regan in denying that it is an implication of animal rights theory that prey animals 
are protected from predators. I disagree with Regan on his understanding of the right to 
assistance and on how he draws the line that burdens us with the duty to assist humans but not 
animals when the threat is a moral patient. The result is a position that I think is consistent with 
moral rights as a theory of justice.  
According to the theory of moral rights defended in this thesis, all beings with subjective 
interests have a pro tanto right against all moral agents from harming them through violations 
or deprivations. This is a negative right. Because of the universal quantifier for both the subjects 
and the respondents of a right, such a right is truly universal. The honeymoon ends here, 
however. Positive rights are not free for all and a clear case has to be made regarding the subject, 
content, and respondent of a right before we can have a valid moral right.  
All wild animals have a negative claim-right against all normal adult humans that such humans 
do not harm the wild animals in any of their interests constitutive of their own wellbeing. The 
right ceases to exist if we substitute normal adult humans with carnivores. What we have is a 
negation of the universal right: No being has a right against any carnivores that the carnivores 
do not harm them. Therefore, no injustice results from predation regardless of who the victim 
is. “On the basis of rights, at least, humans have no duties to act in the wild in the context of 
predation, flood, or drought, for instance” (Palmer, 2011: 707). Clare Palmer is right but with 
this strong denial of the right to assistance for imperilled humans, we open a Pandora’s Box.   
The denial of the right to assist those who are victims of non-agential causes seems to contradict 
some of our widely accepted, promulgated, and morally justified human behaviour. Steve F. 
Sapontzis (1987:30) points to our everyday morality that when a “premoral” child is tormenting 
a cat, we are not only permitted to intervene to stop the tormenting but, in fact, we are required 
to do so. Sapontzis is right to point out that we justifiably intervene in stopping a child from 
harming the cat. But he errs in saying it follows “that humans are morally obligated to prevent 
predation” (1987: 229). There are at least two reasons why intervention in wildlife predation 
does not follow from the requirement that we intervene to stop a child tormenting a cat.  
Firstly, from the rights point of view, there are reasons to intervene both for the child’s and the 
cat’s interests. Many lay people and philosophers would agree that parents have an emergent 
duty to raise morally upright children with a character that exhibits respect or even compassion 
for others. The child does no moral wrong in breaking another’s toy on purpose. Nevertheless, 
the parent has a duty to cultivate a good character in her child from the earliest age. She must 
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guide the child against such behaviour toward other people’s property, and in general, against 
any behaviour with bad consequences. We act appropriately when we blame or punish parents 
who fail to rein in their children to stop them causing others gratuitous harm. Parents assume 
an array of emergent parental duties that overall should ensure a good upbringing for their 
children. Hence, given that the child has no right to harm the cat, it is proper and morally 
required that parents or guardians intervene to prevent the child from harming the cat. 
Secondly, the cat in question appears to be a pet. If this is the case, then we likely have a 
situation of human-induced dependence. “Does this created dependence mean that humans owe 
assistance to domesticated animals that they do not owe to animals in general? Yes” (Palmer, 
2011: 715). Sapontzis thus missteps in arguing, by analogy, from the permissibility of 
interference to prevent the child from harming the cat to recommending human interference for 
prey against predators in the wild. Palmer’s analysis of vulnerability-creation and moral 
responsibility is helpful to our understanding of what is going on.  
When humans create more vulnerability in wild animals than already exists in the wild, humans 
become duty-bound to prevent harm that may come to the wild animals as a consequence of 
the exacerbated vulnerability. This may include interference to prevent predation. However, 
there are some caveats to intervention that are discussed under the alter ego defence in Chapter 
6. The point I make here is simply that permissible intervention in the cat-child case does not 
imply permissible intervention in wildlife predation. 
I have thus far restricted my discussion to what is or is not implied by moral rights theory with 
respect to predation. This is not to say there are no other moral grounds for acting to prevent 
harmful actions provided no individual rights stand in the way. But the second reason for 
interference advanced in the cat-child case applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case of rescuing 
the child but neglecting to rescue the wildebeest against the prowling lion. In both cases, 
whosoever has the emergent duty to justifiably protect the vulnerable, other things considered, 
owes the would-be victim the duty to rescue. My argument thus escapes the charge of 
speciesism that I think Regan’s argument falls prey to.  
However, the case for the asymmetrical response in saving the child but not the wildebeest has 
some nuances of its own. The child and the wildebeest start from the point of moral parity with 
respect to negative rights. I agree with Ebert and Machan (2012: 155) that “it is prima facie not 
morally wrong not to do what will harm the lion in scenarios … in which a lion is preying on a 
small child and on a wildebeest, respectively.” The human and the animal should fight for their 
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own survival or “die in the attempt” (Callicott, 1992a: 50). A separate case must be made for 
interference based on some emergent positive rights or some other moral considerations.   
The choice between interfering for the child or for the wildebeest is not predetermined on 
account of species. According to the rights view, the species one belongs to per se carries no 
moral weight to predetermine the answer to the questions ‘to intervene or not to intervene’. 
This non-speciesist attitude shows the wrongness of non-interference in the cases of human or 
animal prey is something to be determined only after consideration of the rights relations 
involving negative rights and emergent positive duties in any given instance of predation. 
This seems an improvement over Regan’s proposed—arguably speciesist—explanation that we 
honour the wildebeest’s competences when we let it be killed while we have a duty to defend 
the vulnerable child. In other words, in my view, we cannot say beforehand that X has any 
positive rights against us or not. If the prey is human, nothing changes regarding the absence 
of an a priori duty to assist.  
4.5 Innocent Carnivores and the Defence of Prey 
I have so far reached the conclusion that preventing predation is not morally required. This 
leaves still largely unanswered the question of whether human intervention to prevent predation 
are morally permissible. The rights of the carnivore have been ignored—until now.  
Some preliminary labelling first. Prey animals are (putative) victims since they are the ones at 
risk of injury or death. Predators are innocent threats since they will injure or kill prey but are 
innocent by dint of being moral patients. Humans are bystanders or onlookers. If we adopt 
Regan’s laissez-faire recommendation, human beings are the equivalent to onlookers as they 
can only ‘helplessly’ look on as the struggle for survival goes on in nature. However, humans 
will find themselves as bystanders and even as threats themselves. These are, however, cases 
for later full exploration in Chapter 6. There is only one sense of bystander to be considered 
here. Bystanders, in my view—in addition to Helen Frowe’s (2014) view—are not only 
possible indirect threats. They are also possible rescuers in alter ego cases. I argue below they 
are morally prohibited from aiding prey as rights bearers per se. This does not translate to 
prohibition of rescue for other reasons such as saving the life of one of the few males of an 
endangered keystone species that I shall return to in the second part of this chapter.  
Elisa Aaltola (2010) has attempted a solution along similar lines I want to take. She points to a 
difference between negative rights and positive rights. On Aaltola’s understanding, on balance, 
negative rights generally have precedence over positive rights. To be clear, Jack’s negative 
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right not to be killed trumps Jill’s right to be saved, unless Jack is the one threatening Jill’s life. 
It is, however, not true that all negative rights take precedence over all positive rights.  
Imagine your daughter is lying in pain in a pool of blood and will die if her bleeding is not 
stopped soon enough. You spot and run to a camper van for help but the owner has gone off 
sightseeing.  However, you see a first aid box, break the van’s window, and take out some 
bandages and painkillers you use to save the girl’s life and relieve her pain. You have violated 
the camper’s right not to have his van damaged and not to steal his first aid supplies. Your 
daughter has a positive right that you assist her when she faces serious harm. It seems that this 
is a case in which your daughter’s positive right might trump the camper’s negative right.  
Aaltola makes her case on the premise that a negative right has priority over the positive one. 
For her, we have a negative duty not to prevent a fox from hunting a rabbit but we have only a 
positive duty to come to the rabbit’s aid. “This means the right of the fox takes priority. We 
have a stronger duty to not intervene with the fox than not to aid the rabbit.” (Aaltola, 2010: 
86). So, according to Aaltola, we recognise that the predator has a right to survival. And, of 
course, a necessary consequence is the stress, pain, and death of a prey animal.  
Aaltola’s effort is a path in the right direction but it does not take us far enough out of the 
thicket. First, negative rights do not have a priori lexical precedence over positive rights. Which 
ones are stronger and take priority is something to be determined a posteriori, case by case. 
But more importantly, as argued above, we are simply not morally required to aid the rabbit as 
a matter of justice. The rabbit lacks the positive right Aaltola purports it possesses. What 
remains is the fox’s negative liberty-right that we do not stop it from hunting, eating, and 
feeding itself and its pups. It is the fox’s right against us and we are obligated to not intervene. 
The argument for impermissibility of intervening against the fox can be outlined as follows: 
(1) The rabbit has a no-claim that the fox does not kill him—as the fox cannot discharge 
any duties;  
(2) The fox has a negative liberty-right against us not to prevent her from securing her 
subsistence—which, naturally, entails killing the rabbit.  
(3) The rabbit has no positive claim-right that we rescue her from the fox—the wild rabbit 
has neither an unacquired nor an emergent positive right to rescue against humans.  
(4) We have no power-right—that is, we are disabled morally—to alter any deontic 
relations between ourselves and the foxes in a way that disadvantages the foxes.  
(5) Therefore, we have no liberty-right to intervene to stop the fox from killing the rabbit.  
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Premises (1), (2), and (4) are all concretisations of the Hohfeldian framework of rights with 
respective obligations. Defence for premise (3), has been made above against Regan’s duty to 
assistance.  
Other philosophers besides Elisa Aaltola have been led astray by phantom positive duties to 
wild animals. Sagoff’s rhetorical question is a case in point: “If the suffering of animals creates 
a human obligation to mitigate it, is there not as much an obligation to prevent the cat from 
killing a mouse as to prevent a hunter from killing a deer?” (Sagoff, 2002: 41). For utilitarians, 
the mere existence of suffering or vulnerability might trigger an obligation to mitigate it (see, 
for example, Goodin, 1985). However, by my lights, it is the existence of a right is a necessary 
condition for the existence of a correlative obligation. Neither the mouse nor the deer’s situation 
has the protection of a moral right that induces a duty of rescue in humans.  
However, the cat-mouse and the hunter-deer cases are not quite the same. The first asymmetry 
is on the victim side. The mouse has no rights whatsoever against the cat whereas the deer has 
a claim-right that the hunter does not kill her. This takes us to the second difference which is 
on the harmer’s side. The cat’s liberty-right not to be deprived of her lunch or not to be killed 
stops us from saving the mouse. The hunter has no liberty- or claim- right against us stopping 
the kill. Quite the contrary—as I argue in Chapter 6—we may have an alter ego defence 
permission to kill the hunter to stop his killing the deer.   
The prey does not have a right against us to rescue but the predator has a right against us not to 
prevent his obtaining his food the only way he knows. In ordinary cases of defense against the 
innocent threats, the threat has no such a right against us. In the prey-predator scenario, the prey 
has a right to defend itself against the predator and may do so lethally. But this right of self-
defense is non-transferable; it is strictly agent-relative. A permission is “agent-relative … if it 
includes an essential reference to the agent in the description of the state of affairs the agent 
has to promote” (Hooker, 2000: 108). If it has no such reference, it is agent-neutral. Michael 
Ridge elucidates: “An agent-relative reason to promote A’s [wellbeing] will give me a reason 
only if I am A or suitably related to A” (Ridge, 2011). A might be suitably related to the agent 
in that A is one of the agent’s family or friends. Or there might be a pre-existing agreement 
between A and the agent. Or there might be other special relations between A and the agent. 
But humans are not prey wild animals and they are prima facie not suitably related to prey wild 
animals. Hence, they cannot engage in other-defence of the mouse. 
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However, agent-relativity should not be construed to include relativity to what the agent 
happens to like, such as the fact that the prey is deemed beautiful and the predator deemed 
pestilential. The elephant may defend itself and its baby from a pack of hyenas but this moral 
privilege eludes humans who may wish to prevent hyenas from killing the baby elephant.  
The innocent predator’s claim-right against us blocks the otherwise agent-neutral situation that 
permits humans—though not necessarily obligates humans—to assist those who are under 
threat from objects or from culpable threats. Humans lack the power-right that would permit 
them to alter the rights of the predator. In other words, humans have a disability and the predator 
is not liable to human actions. Thus, saving prey from predators is not morally required; on the 
contrary, it is morally prohibited.  
4.6  Animal Rights Theory versus Environmental Ethics 
Besides the predation conundrum, the animal rights theory potentially falls prey to yet another 
challenge. The theory does not seem, at least on face value, to augur well for environmental 
management. Animal rights theory is prima facie at variance with a conservation ethic that is 
holistic and places emphasis on sustainability of collectives such as species or ecosystems. 
Interpreting J. Baird Callicott, Tom Regan (2004a: xxxviii) has fairly represented this threat as 
follows.  
(1) If the rights view fails to provide a credible basis for addressing our obligation to 
preserve endangered species and the environment, the rights view is not the best theory, 
all things considered.  
(2) The rights view fails to provide a credible basis for addressing our obligation to preserve 
endangered species or the environment. 
(3) Therefore, the rights view is not the best theory for morally protecting wild animals, all 
things considered. 
This modus ponens supports the widespread human practice of killing those animals that 
through their behaviour or numbers threaten members of other species of flora and fauna or 
poses a threat to biodiversity in a given ecosystem.  
It is hard to disagree with premise (1). But we can nevertheless, and perhaps we need to, remove 
the requirement that it provides ‘a credible basis….’ It seems to suffice that the rights view 
does not contradict an environmental ethic whatever its basis might be.  
Premise (2) is contentious. Regan thinks the rights view is “a live option” that warrants 
exploring (Regan, 2004a: 363). Even Callicott who initially epitomised environmentalist 
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hostility towards animal rights concedes that animal rights and environmental ethics could “be 
united under a common theoretical umbrella” though he sees potential conflicts that accompany 
“all laminated layers of our social-ethical accretions” (Callicott, 1992b: 259). Mark Sagoff is 
unequivocal in affirming premise (2). “The environmentalist would sacrifice the lives of 
individual creatures to preserve the authenticity, integrity, and complexity of ecological 
systems” (Sagoff, 2002: 42). But animal rights theorists would do the exact opposite. I will 
contest the second premise to pave way for an argument that a zoocentric environmental ethic, 
as Callicott (1998) calls it, is a more tenable approach towards protecting the biotic community 
in its entirety. It is because of the intrinsic value of humans and other sentient beings that the 
environment must be protected to sustain its instrumental value. 
Management of wildlife is but one aspect of environmental management.  Ecology is the 
overarching discipline for conservation in general and wildlife management in particular. 
Ecology is a science but one that is inescapably value-oriented as the goals of wildlife 
management are generally speaking normative ones. The ecological/environmental approach 
encourages human intervention into the environment with the goal to maintain or protect whole 
natural systems. This puts the environmental approach on a collision course with animal rights 
theory that predicates ethical descriptors to individual wild animals rather than to any macro 
phenomena such as species or ecosystems.  
4.6.1 Holism or Individualism? 
Callicott (1992a) has depicted the conflict between the rights view and the ecological view as 
being underpinned by different values which yield different concerns. On one hand, on the 
animal rights view, the psycho-physical wellbeing of individual wild animals is primary 
concern. On the other hand, the ecologists and environmental ethicists have concern for “the 
disappearance of species of plants as well as animals, and for soil erosion and stream pollution” 
(Callicott, 1992a: 40). According to Callicott, for animal rights proponents, the wrongness of 
acts, policies or practices is a function of how individual wild animals fare. However, 
environmentalists advance the thesis “that the good of the biotic community is the ultimate 
measure of moral value, the rightness or wrongness, of actions” (Callicott, 1992a: 43). The 
approaches are thus appropriately labelled ‘individualistic’ and ‘holistic’ respectively. Holism 
would recommend killing of individual members of certain species, introduction of alien 
predator species, and so on, if this was deemed necessary for attaining or maintaining an 
optimal ecosystem.  
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Callicott believes the animal rights proponents are mistaken in identifying individual animals 
as loci of value. He sees the pursuit of, and respect for, atomistic interests as being potentially 
catastrophic for the environment. To drive his point home, he makes a comparison using the 
example of society.  
In society, it is imprudent, according to Callicott, to allow for unfettered pursuit of individual 
interests. Doing so would render “the community as a whole become noticeably more and more 
infirm economically, environmentally, and politically” (Callicott, 1992a: 47). We have thus “a 
duty to behave in ways that do not harm the fabric of society per se”. This shows that society 
as such, by Callicott’s lights, is an appropriate recipient of human duties. And by analogy, the 
biotic community imposes “duties binding upon moral agents in relation to that whole.” 
(Callicott, 1992a: 45). For Callicott, it is the whole and not the constituent parts that is the 
proper holder of value that generates obligations in us. Our body cells, tissues, and parts have 
no moral value in themselves and they may be dispensed with for the good of our bodies. The 
suffering and death of individuals do not matter morally provided this serves the stability of the 
whole society or biotic community. 
Callicott’s ecological point of view is therefore theoretically incompatible with animal rights 
theory. On his view, the environment in itself has intrinsic value. We transgress against this 
value if our behaviour tends to compromise the stability, integrity, and beauty of the 
environment. But do these three aspects generate such powerful duties towards the 
environment? It will be question-begging to suggest that this is because in so doing we respect 
the value in the environment. There are two possible non-circular replies.  
First, we might say stability, beauty, and integrity of the environment are instrumentally good 
for humans. This, however, takes us back to anthropocentrism, which many environmental 
ethicists including Callicott oppose. Or, second, we might say the stability, integrity, and beauty 
of the environment are not valuable in themselves but they are ultimately valuable for sentient 
life forms. On such a view, a good ecosystem is not good in itself but only instrumentally to 
the extent that it enables its sentient inhabitants to flourish in their various individual natures 
and ecological niches.  
I turn now to try and refute Callicott’s argument from analogy for nature’s intrinsic value. 
The analogy Callicott makes from our duties not to harm the fabric of our societies to duties 
not to harm ecosystems as wholes seems cogent, up to a point. The duties to society or to the 
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environment fall under what, for the lack of a better term, are referred to as ‘indirect’ duties. I 
have in Chapter 3 rejected the notion of ‘indirect’ duties. The term is redundant and conveys 
the wrong idea that we have a kind of duty to society or to ecosystems.  
We care for the environment at least partly as a matter of prudence, out of reasons that emanate 
from self-interest. Because society and the environment are so important, if not prerequisite, to 
enjoying anything else in life, humans create rules imposing mutual duties and claims with 
respect to society or the environment. Duties to not pollute rivers are not owed to rivers or 
ecosystems to which rivers belong but to other sentient beings who would be harmed by the 
pollution, for example, through poor health and death after intake or through incurring the cost 
of sourcing safer water elsewhere.  
Anthropology tells us how people create totems, taboos, myths, legends, and so on in order to 
protect or promote certain interests. Positing intrinsic value for the environment seems a 
continuation of that human gimmick. Such axiological gilding of nature might prove 
pragmatically successful, but scepticism regarding its philosophical grounds is well-placed. 
The position taken here is that such social construction of value is at best unnecessary, and at 
worst retrogressive, for an ethically sound wildlife or environmental policy.  
Regan (1992) explores mental-state (e.g. hedonism), states of affairs (e.g. beauty), and end-in-
itself (e.g. subject of a life) theories as grounds for intrinsic value in the environment. He finds 
all three wanting and concludes that environmental ethics rests on an axiological mistake. 
Mental-state and end-in-itself, for example, both require that at least X possesses sentience for 
X to have intrinsic value. Of course, the environment as a whole is not a sentient entity. 
Callicott’s environmental ethic rests on the ‘state of affairs’ of beauty of the environment. This 
means that a being can have intrinsic value simply because of the state in which it is 
independently of any observer’s valuation. Hence, nature can be said to have intrinsic value 
because of its state of being beautiful or stable even when there is nobody to appreciate the 
beauty or stability.  
However, Regan thinks that inasmuch as “one can admire what is beautiful” it is quite another 
thing to say “that one should respect the beauty in an object” (Regan, 1992: 169). That an entity 
has beauty or stability does not seem to generate any (strong) obligations upon humans on how 
that entity is treated for its own sake. If nature had any intrinsic value grounded in beauty and 
stability, it is most definitely a value that pales into insignificance when juxtaposed with the 
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moral worth of humans. Hence, in the name of consistency, a non-speciesist wildlife ethic ought 
not to prioritise nature over the intrinsic value of wild animals. Humans are not culled to protect 
the environment. Wild animals should not be culled at the altar of nature’s ‘intrinsic value’. 
Regan aptly puts forth his bottom-up approach to wildlife management thus: “Where we to 
show proper respect for the rights of the individuals who make up the biotic community, would 
not the community be preserved?” (Regan, 2004a: 363). This may appear to commit the fallacy 
of composition. But Regan does not argue that since individuals require respect, the community 
as a whole must be respected as well. Instead, Regan should be understood as making a 
probabilistic descriptive statement that when humans do not exploit animals, the land they 
dwell on, and their plant and other resources, the environment is much more likely to remain 
more stable than when humans do the opposite.  
The crux of the argument is that a societal code including rules allocating rights and correlative 
obligations would be generally more optimific for the environment than alternative codes. For 
Regan, discharging obligations to wild animals would have the desired outcomes for a 
sustainable biodiversity yielding all those benefits that humans seek in the environment, 
provided that this does not involve treating wild animals as mere receptacles of value. 
Recognition and enforcement of wildlife rights would end many anthropogenic activities that 
are largely responsible for the environmental crisis. Such activities include logging, fracking, 
and mining in wildlife habitats. In Chapter 5, I make a case for wildlife rights in natural goods 
including their habitats that, in my view, effectively would generally result in environmental 
protection. 
Animal rights and concern for extinction do have an intersection, albeit a contingent one. 
Imagine a population, N, of an ungulate species with individuals, u. The ungulate population is 
the sum of each and every individual ungulate, u (N=∑u1, u2, u3…un). Extinction is when every 
individual member of a species has ceased to exist. All that extinction requires is failures of 
reproduction. If that failure is non-anthropogenic, then biodiversity is lost without rights 
violations. 
Admittedly, though, most cases of extinction with which we are familiar involve pain, 
suffering, and early death. When we look at how every individual has ceased to exist, we are 
likely to find pain and suffering. If natural phenomena have caused the pain, suffering, and 
death of individuals, then there are no rights violations in the offing. Humans, however, have 
pro tanto duties not to cause pain, suffering, and death to animals. A lot of extinctions are 
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anthropogenic. “There is agreement that the greatest threat to both animal and plant species is 
the loss of habitat” (Plessis, 2000: 16). Other causes of extinctions include over-exploitation, 
introduced species, pollution, and pesticides, and decreasing range size (Plessis, 2000). These 
causes involve deprivations and violations against wild animals. Ending the deprivations and 
violations is likely to significantly lower extinction rates of wild animals.   
Respecting rights of wild animals means, for the most part, leaving them alone. That includes 
prohibitions against tampering with their habitat through encroachments, pollution, and 
introducing rival or predatory alien species. Regan’s point is particularly forceful given that 
many extinctions and decimations are widely attributed to human activity despite the causal 
links not being always so direct. The failure of humans to abide by the laissez-faire policy 
generates duties based on what Regan calls ‘compensatory justice’.  
The idea of compensatory justice for wildlife is analogous to what is owed to people who have 
been victims of injustice in the past and are, as a consequence of those injustices, worse off. 
This notion, Regan believes, can account for people’s bias in favour of endangered species 
when they are making wildlife policy or management decisions. If we have plentiful rabbits 
and a handful of rhinos, this alone does not, according to Regan, warrant any preferential 
treatment to the rhinos. Further inquiry is needed to show, for example, whether habitat 
destruction by humans has played a part in the present vulnerability of the rhinos. Only this 
would warrant prioritisation of rhinos over rabbits.  
But this answer is not convincing for cases where the rabbits will be harmed or disadvantaged 
by the compensatory policy or measures for rhinos. In some situations, it is the behaviour or 
numbers of the populous wild animals that causes or exacerbates the predicament of the few. 
Yet the rabbits are innocent and it will be an injustice to them if the compensatory intervention 
involves doing harm to them. Compensatory interventions will work where any costs resulting 
from the intervention are borne by the party that was morally or at the very least, causally 
responsible for the initial harm.  In this case, it is humans who should bear the cost on account 
of their culpability or liability.  
Here it suffices to point out that the two solutions Regan offers seem to fall short of providing 
answers to resolving problems involving animals and mediated by the environment. Human 
interference may cause changes in the behavioural and population dynamics of some fauna 
species. This in turn may cause harm to members of another species, to the point where the 
species may become endangered. Remedial intervention may require changing the behaviour 
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or reducing numbers of, say, the invasive or irruptive species. This may not be easily feasible 
without harming members of the invasive or irruptive species. To this problem, Regan does not 
give us any rights-based guidance. I explore this problem in the next section. 
4.7 Towards a Zoocentric Environmental Ethic 
Nature is red in tooth and claw; it was long before humans evolved to add to its already bloody 
past and processes. When theory meets practice, it is time to ditch our rosy picture of painless 
wildlife relations in a sustainable idyllic environment. Some tough decisions must be made. 
Most elements in ecosystems have evolved over aeons of time into relationships of 
interdependence, and pain is normally an integral part of the game.  
Assuming the rights view defended in previous chapters is correct, how should we manage 
wildlife and the environment? Contra Callicott, the goal of ethical wildlife management should 
not be sustaining ecological collectives. The aim of wildlife management should be protecting 
the right-holders who inhabit and subsist upon these ecological systems. However, as with all 
commons, the environment has to be saved not only from human exploitation but also from the 
very beings who depend upon it, those for whom it is being managed. This is where Callicott’s 
society-ecosystem analogy could be useful.  
Many individuals acting freely without coordination may produce perverse unintended 
consequences. That is the likely fate of unregulated enjoyment of individual rights. In the 
context of human communities, such consequences might range from inflation to global 
warming. It becomes imperative for citizens acting collectively—through the state, for 
example—to curtail the enjoyment of some of their rights to ensure some macro fundamentals 
are in place. This means the code of rules for society will not only be rights-based. At least 
there must be additional rules to prevent those consequences of rights that, though unintended, 
may be self-destructive. These rules must ensure that people will be more likely to enjoy the 
moral protection their rights give than under any other alternative set of additional rules.  
Auxiliary rules may establish conventional rights supplementary to the unacquired and 
emergent moral rights. They will establish, for example, rights of assistance from any members 
of a defined community, especially the most vulnerable such as children or the elderly, when 
the cost is not so huge upon the helpers. These are rules putting in place conventional rights 
whether enforceable by force or merely by non-coercive social sanctions. There will be rules 
about access to the commons, which, in the absence of the regulatory rules, would be depleted 
or degraded to everybody’s detriment. There will be rules compelling members to make 
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contributions towards common goals that safeguard everybody’s rights. And rules are also 
necessary to attain efficiency. Lastly, rules are needed regarding the prevention and resolution 
of conflict of moral rights.  
Devising the extra-rights rules is properly the subject matter of political philosophy in 
conjunction with some science disciplines including anthropology, economics, and ecology. 
Ideally, the making of the supplementary rules must be participatory. But rules protecting 
children and animals can be arrived at only through some fiduciary responsibilities placed upon 
those who would reasonably be expected to have the understanding and benevolence to decide 
in the recipients’ best interest. Ultimately, we end up with a set of rules—whose core specify 
moral rights augmented by conventional rules—that, if internalised by the vast majority of 
people, would yield greater expected aggregate wellbeing than any other competing set of rules. 
If this is a plausible account, we seem to have a theoretical baseline with which to approach the 
governance of wildlife—wild animals and their habitats, and the human-wildlife interface.  
A lot of wild animals have moral rights. If left alone as Regan recommends, some ecosystems 
may deteriorate, resulting in more suffering of wild animals. An example of such a scenario 
presents itself from Kenya where in Amboseli National Park a high density of elephants of one 
elephant per 0.42 km2 has led to a decline in the woodland in the park resulting in the local 
extinction of both lesser kudu and bushbuck. In addition, woodland depletion has led to decline 
in species that flourish in woodland, such as giraffe, baboons, monkeys, and gerenuk (Whyte, 
2002: 300). In such cases, should humans simply watch like helpless onlookers while the 
ecosystem degenerates to a no-winner situation, where Amboseli cannot even sustain the 
elephants that set the degeneration in motion?14 To let that happen would be futile rights 
dogmatism. Benign, informed interventions can have the most astounding impacts on the health 
of an ecosystem and flourishing of all who dwell therein. George Monbiot—a renowned 
wildlife documentarist—for example, narrates the positive impact on the ecosystem, and, 
corollary, on the lives of wild animals following the reintroduction of wolves in Yellowstone 
National Park.15  
                                                          
14 I am assuming for the sake of argument that, in the Amboseli case, the predicament was not set in motion 
anthropogenically. It is, however, probable that human activity triggered the factors resulting in a population 
explosion for elephants and population decline of some wild animals. If this were the case, then human 
intervention would be a matter of justice. There would also be a strong reason to support Regan’s laissez-faire 
recommendation.  
15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q 
 67 
 
The laissez-faire of Regan on its own appears insufficient as a moral compass for wildlife 
policy. Regan’s clause that we intervene if the undesirable state of affairs is anthropogenic is 
insufficient as some truly non-anthropogenic catastrophe can suffice to morally permit—if not 
morally require, albeit not as a matter of justice—that, other things being equal, humans 
intervene. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have imagined blasting a meteor out of space, or 
halting a virus epidemic before it wreaks havoc on a fragile ecosystem (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, 2011: 182). Of course, we do not need to look for science fiction scenarios for cases 
that would morally warrant intervention.  
I think the case above of elephants in Amboseli would suffice as a case for non-lethal 
intervention. The problem for Regan’s position is that before we intervene in a wildlife 
epidemic, we need first a study to establish that the epidemic is a case of anthroponosis or one 
in which humans have had a hand in causing or spreading. Although such a study would be 
necessary in order to rightfully coerce culpable or morally liable humans to bear the cost of 
halting the virus or mitigating effects of the epidemic, the study is irrelevant for moral 
permission to promote goodness as such.   
Instead, I propose, we need a code of rules that at least permits intervening to mitigate a morally 
bad situation provided the means are just. If a certain keystone species is under threat in a 
particularly fragile ecological niche, it does not matter that the threat is from poachers or some 
non-anthropogenic pathogens. In the absence of human causality, we cannot take comfort in 
the moral paralysis of letting nature take its course. For human beings and human morality are 
in the business of thwarting bad consequences of natural events provided no right are violated 
as means or provided, whenever the overriding of rights occurs, there is very a strong moral 
justification for doing so. 
Animals may not have rights that generate a priori duties of assistance. But as in the case of 
humans, morality goes beyond core rights relations and requires additional rules. The additional 
rules would protect species and ecosystems despite species and ecosystems not being 
appropriate recipients of human obligations. Protecting (some) species and ensuring a 
sustainable life support system is a way of protecting wild animals as individuals. What is 
important to keep in mind is that the ‘lottery’ by which those whose rights are overridden are 
picked stands up, at the very least, to requirements of procedural fairness that precludes 
individual wild animals being used merely as means.  
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For a start, the rights view goes a long way in ensuring procedural fairness by levelling 
legitimate human interests with those of wild animals. This levelling will exclude or reduce 
human scientific, economic, aesthetic, and sacramental considerations from playing any role in 
deciding which individual wild animals’ rights are overridden. Furthermore, human bias will 
be largely excluded so that the so-called charismatic species are not given undue preferential 
treatment at the expense of the rights of those less aesthetically appealing or those wild animals 
perceived as vermin or pestilence. Rights are moral levellers regardless of what emotions the 
different animals evoke in human beings.  
The rights approach I take to environmental concerns is, like Regan’s, zoocentric. I, however, 
reject the laissez-faire rights dogmatist approach. That approach turns a moral blind eye to any 
catastrophe that might result from not intervening by overriding rights of some wild animals 
for a sustainable environment that has instrumental value for all inhabitants. Biodiversity is not 
worth preserving in itself per se but only because it is vitally important for a functional 
ecosystem that provides goods and services for individual animals’ interests.  
Thus, I see Callicott’s ‘environmental fascism’ as putting the cart before the horse. Callicott’s 
view accords intrinsic value to ecological collectives while individuals may be sacrificed as 
mere means. By my lights, non-sentient beings cannot have intrinsic value. Instead, I see 
species protection first as protection of constituent members of the species, and secondly, as a 
requirement for ecosystem sustainability. The ecosystem is the life boat. Without human 
interference in the environment, we may all be imperilled, humans and wildlife together.  
Current wildlife management policy and practice is not zoocentric. Obstacles stand in the way 
of a truly wildlife-centred policy for wildlife governance. One major obstacle is the institution 
of property. Legally, wildlife are property of humans and wildlife have no rights to property in 
the form of land or the natural goods within their habitat that is essential for their survival and 
flourishing. In the next chapter, I will argue that wild animals are not property and, instead, are 
owners of property, morally speaking. This argument augments the position reached in this 
chapter, that is, the environment has zoocentric and not intrinsic value. The rights of wild 
animals take precedence over environmental protection because the environment is morally 
valuable merely as a life support system for wildlife. 
In this chapter, I have addressed the problem of wildlife predation that poses a serious challenge 
to animal rights theory. Many would doubt the soundness of a theory that requires or permits 
policing prey-predator relations. I have argued that, animal rights theory does not imply an 
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obligation to rescue prey from predator animals. On a proper understanding of moral rights, 
humans are neither permitted nor required to aid prey wild animals even though humans may 
intervene in cases of predation involving their pets and children. 
Animal rights theory faces a further challenge that it is incompatible with an environmental 
ethic that recognises intrinsic value of the environmental. I argue, however, that Callicott’s 
view is premised on a mistaken axiological grounding for ecological collectives. I argue, 
however, that the environment is the life support system for all animals and, under very special 
circumstances, may require human interventions that may potentially require or result in 
overriding some individuals’ rights. 
What animal rights theory brings to wildlife governance transforms the framework from 
anthropocentrism to zoocentrism. Educational, scientific, economic, sacramental, and aesthetic 
human interests are expunged from the goals of environmental or wildlife management. And 
when it is necessary to override some rights in the interest of preserving the ecological life 
support system, all wild animals are treated as equal. However, a zoocentric environmental 
ethic is incomplete without deciding the question who owns wildlife or the environment in 
which the wild animals reside. To this question, I will now turn. 
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Chapter 5  Wildlife Property Rights and Sovereignty 
All over the world, wildlife management has very similar goals. These goals include sustaining 
wildlife’s economic, ecological, educational, scientific, and aesthetic values. It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that in most if not all state jurisdictions, animals are objects of property 
rules. According to The Zambia Wildlife Act 1998 (Section 82 (3)), “the absolute ownership of 
every wild animal within Zambia, is hereby vested in the President on behalf of the Republic”. 
The Act further describes how absolute ownership may be transferred to a licensed hunter. 
Furthermore, “where any animal is found resident on any land, the right to harvest such animal, 
shall … vest absolutely in the owner of such land” (The Zambia Wildlife Act 1998, Section 82 
(3)). The language leaves no doubt regarding the property status of animals. Ownership is 
‘absolute’ and animals may be ‘harvested’ by agents of the state, hunters, or land owners. Such 
legislation is commonplace around the world and endorsed by many intergovernmental bodies 
and international conservation NGOs.  
As is expected of most property, there is normally free exportation and importation of wildlife 
goods—dead or alive. There are some exceptions such as those wild animals listed in Appendix 
I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).16 The catchword is ‘trade’. For the international community consisting of at least the 
182 parties to CITES, wild animals are a commodity, a resource whose chief concern for the 
humans is sustainable utilisation. Only scarcity gives members of a species protection from 
economic exploitation. Thus, the Zambian Ministry of Tourism and Arts treats lions just as a 
natural resource such as trees that may be cut down and sold at a sustainable rate. Clearly the 
conception of wildlife as property is morally problematic if we accept the position of wildlife 
rights. It deserves to be philosophically dealt with.  
 In this chapter, I will question the status of wild animals as property of humans and the 
corollary view that wild animals cannot themselves be owners of property. I aim at showing 
that, given some conclusions reached in Chapters 2 and 3, wild animals cannot be property, 
morally speaking. I argue, further, that, to the contrary, wild animals have ownership over 
certain things. Lastly, I respond to the challenge posed by the notion of wildlife sovereignty to 
my account of property rights for wild animals. 
                                                          
16 Appendix I of CITES is a list of endangered wild animals and plants trade in whom is prohibited. Those listed 
under Appendix II are subjected to regulated trade while Appendix III contains those organisms that may freely 
be traded. 
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5.1 The Concept of Property17 
A discussion of wildlife as property of humans or of wild animals as owners of property 
naturally begins with the concept of property itself. In this section, I try to explicate what 
ownership is. Anthony Honoré’s Ownership (1961) “is a classic statement on the concept of 
ownership” (Hodgson, 2012: 223). Honoré’s exposition of the incidents of ownership has been 
very influential in property-related discussions (Waldron, 1988; Quigley, 2007; Cochrane, 
2009). Honore’s conception of property therefore provides an apt starting point.  
For Honoré, ownership is characterised by the following incidents: right to possess, right to 
use, right to manage, right to capital, right to income, right to security, transmissibility, absence 
of term, residual character, prohibition of harmful use, and liability to execution. In Honoré’s 
view, the concept of property manifests a Wittgensteinian family resemblance as ownership 
“extend[s] to cases in which not all the listed incidents are present” (Honoré, 1961: 113). The 
family resemblance analogy is instructive because some family members will resemble one 
another without there being any one feature they all have in common. Similarly, the incidents 
in one instance of ownership disappear in the next and reappear yet again in another instance 
of ownership. According to Muireann Quigley (2007: 632), the family resemblance approach 
“addresses a major problem that is associated with theories of property and ownership—
namely, that not all things generally considered to be property share all the same characteristics 
or sets of characteristics.”  
I think this advantage Quigley notes is purchased at a great cost. Honoré’s conception of 
property comes with an undesirable indeterminacy. This is because it requires that if a being 
has most of the elements he provides, then that being has ownership (Quigley, 2007: 631). It is 
not clear what number marks the ‘most’ threshold, whether the ‘most’ can be made up randomly 
of any of the elements, and whether the incidents have any lexical order.18  Although Honoré 
(1961: 114) identifies the right to possess as “the foundation on which the whole superstructure 
of ownership rests”, he is silent about the ordering or expediency of the other incidents. 19 
                                                          
17 My concern is pre-legal property. By this I mean that I am concerned about property in the moral, ideal sense 
and not the conventional non-ideal sense. This pre-emptively nullifies some objections based on practices of 
property from society to society or time to time that depart from the moral sense. For example, a prohibition on 
one redesigning or maintaining their property in a certain way effectively renders that case of ownership non-
ideal. In fact, such property, in my view, is de facto, quasi-public rather than private property stricto sensu.  
18 Sreenivasan (1995, 11 n18) expresses a similar worry concerning what subset(s) of incidents would be jointly 
sufficient for ownership.  
19 Several commentators on Honoré’s property incidents seem to endorse the family resemblance nature of 
Honoré’s conception of property. I think that the text here suggests Honoré identified at least the right to possess 
as a necessary condition by labelling it as foundational to the superstructure of ownership.  
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In my view, Honoré’s incidents can be reduced to three ‘genotypic’ incidents of which the other 
‘phenotypical’ incidents are mere derivatives that may vary from one jurisdiction to another. 
The three core incidents include the right to possess—identified as core by Honoré himself—
the right to use, and the right to security. Jointly, the three incidents are also sufficient 
conditions for property ownership.20 These three constitute the hard-core of the concept of 
ownership while six elements make up auxiliary elements which may vary across space and 
time. Whereas each of the three are necessary, and together they are jointly sufficient, for 
ownership, the other incidents are but elaborations of these three depending on the jurisdiction, 
while two, liability to execution and prohibition of harmful use, appear to be general moral 
rules. I shall therefore focus only on the three core elements which I shall later use to argue for 
my two theses that wild animals cannot be property, morally speaking, and that wild animals 
are owners of some property, morally speaking.  
5.1.1 Right to possess  
Honoré makes a useful distinction between ‘possessing’ and ‘having a right to possess’. One 
can be in possession of something without that thing being his property. But to have a right to 
possess means having “the claim that others should not, without permission, interfere” (Honoré, 
1961: 114). This element may be expressed by the more self-explanatory notion of the claim-
right to exclude. It creates a negative hands-off duty in others who are not permitted access or 
are not joint owners.  
The right to exclude not only gives sovereignty over property but also warrants defensive 
actions in the protection of one’s property. Provided this right—like all other rights—is taken 
as pro tanto, the bearer of the right to exclude may use force if necessary to exclude or eject 
intruders. The owner-intruder relationship is that of power-liability. Where the owners such as 
infants, the disabled, or wildlife are not physically or intellectually able to evict violators of 
their right to exclude, alter ego defence permits capable non- duty-bearers21—and requires 
duty-bearers—to defend the owner against the violators.  
Additionally, any violations of the right to possess gives the owner “characteristically a battery 
of remedies, [including] if necessary, get back the thing owned” (Honoré, 1961: 115). It is 
                                                          
20 I am not the first to offer a tripartite concept of property. John Hadley (2015: 9) reports: “Three incidents are 
singled out by property theorists as most indicative of what it means to own something: a right to exclude, a 
right to transfer, and a right to use.” Note however that by my lights, the ‘right to transfer’ is cannibalised by the 
right to security, and arguably, the right to use. My reduction preserves eligibility of animals to ownership even 
in the absence of fiduciary human duties to carry out transferring transactions in behalf of animals. 
21 Nozick (1974: 109) rightly states that we all “have the right … to intervene to aid an unwilling victim whose 
rights are threatened”.  
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uncontroversial that justice requires remedial actions whenever rights violations occur. This is 
certainly an established principle in positive law and should not be problematic with the case 
of wildlife. As will be argued below, there is reason to recognise wild animals as owners of 
their habitats who are usually blatantly disenfranchised with respect to their ownership rights. 
Lastly, the right to exclude can occur under all the three widely recognised property regimes 
viz. private property, collective property, and common-pool resource.22 Questions and mistakes 
can arise by making a category mistake over these regimes. The most important mistake is terra 
nullius or res nullius. Aware of these possible mistakes, Oran Young cautions that we need to 
“develop some fictions about latent or tacit [property] regimes to avoid the conclusion that 
there are situations in which no regime is present” (Young, 1982: 42). This heuristic is 
particularly relevant for wildlife property rights since many wild animals’ territorial markers 
may not be easily discernible by humans. 
5.1.2 Right to use  
This incident seems so familiar as not to require much further elucidation. If I own something, 
then I must have the liberty-right to utilise it in any way I deem fit within the provisions of 
some general social rules. It seems contradictory or at least very odd that I own something that 
at the same time it is impermissible for me to use in any way at all.23 Although there may be 
legitimate social reasons restricting one’s use of their property, ultimately the owner has a right 
to use it, albeit in a restricted sense as in the case of listed buildings in the United Kingdom.  
In my view, Honoré’s rights to manage, to capital, and to income are all surrogates of the right 
to use and manifest differently in different social settings and legislations. Although they may 
be required to give a full account of some conception of property such as a liberal, communist, 
or whatever, I think these incidents are inessential to the concept of property itself. They may 
come and go or change form as we move across jurisdictions.  
5.1.3 Right to security  
Simply put, this is the right that one is secure in their possession and use of what is theirs. It is 
the right against intrusion, trespass, or expropriation. Many beings cannot protect themselves 
or their possessions. Hence it becomes important that somebody else has the duty to protect 
them. Usually, in contemporary societies, this duty falls upon the state, which has a monopoly 
                                                          
22 For authoritative discussions of property regimes, see Young (1982) and Ostrom (2015). 
23 Even such things as nuclear weapons may have circumstances when their use is justified even if only as 
deterrence. In any case, if something is ‘property’ but it is impermissible ever to use it, then someone does not 
really own it, or people ought not to really create or own such a thing in the first place. 
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on the legitimate use of force and derives some of its legitimacy from the promise of security 
to people or beings within its jurisdiction.24  
In my view, Honoré’s incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of term, and incident of 
residual character of ownership are all surrogates of the right to security and manifest 
differently in different social settings and legislations. As with the surrogates of the right to 
use, these incidents are inessential to the basic pre-legal idea of ownership.  
5.2 Can Humans Own Wildlife?  
I have highlighted how wildlife legislation treats wild animals as property owned collectively 
or privately by humans. In this section, I want to present an argument that, given the moral 
rights I have earlier argued animals possess, it is logically incoherent and practically 
problematic to regard them as property and a resource for advancing human interests. My 
position is similar to that of Gary Francione, who writes, 
The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals 
as things. We treat animals as the moral equivalent of objects with no morally significant interests…. 
Any interest that an animal has represents an economic cost that may be ignored to maximise overall 
social wealth and has no intrinsic value in our assessments. That is what is meant to be property 
(Francione, 2005: 120).   
Francione makes a noteworthy point. However, it is clear anticruelty laws that exist in many 
countries to protect animals somewhat attest that animals are not regarded as being on the same 
rung on the moral ladder as inanimate objects. A perfectionist moral theory, for example, does 
give conceptual room for calibrated moral status. However, in Chapter 3 I have already found 
wanting at least the Kantian justification of anticruelty rules. Even though anticruelty theory is 
not sound in relation to animals, it is not committed to the view that relegates animals to 
inanimate things.  
Furthermore, Francione’s claim that treating animals as property means all animals’ interests 
‘represent an economic cost’ is untrue. Sometimes the animals’ interests are aligned with the 
owner’s economic interests. When this obtains, the animal’s interests do not represent a cost. 
For example, it is presumably always in an animal’s interest to be in good health. It is almost 
always in the owner’s economic interest that their animal is in good health.  
                                                          
24 In a human-centred framing, John Broome (2012: 65) stresses that it is the state’s “serious duty to make life 
good, or at least to provide people with conditions that allow them to make life good for themselves.” No 
argument is required to identify security as one of the requisite conditions for people, and of course wildlife, to 
make life good for themselves. However, as Nozick (1974: 108-113) points out, in some cases non-state 
protective agents can and do provide security, albeit to a more limited clientele.  
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However, if we itemise all the interests that an animal has, some of them may represent an 
economic cost. One example is feeding farm animals a hormone-free diet that would take the 
animal longer to reach the market weight. A second example is letting calves of dairy cows 
suckle for the natural lactation duration. But this is a contingent matter rather than a necessary 
feature of every interest an animal has. It is the expediency of animal interests each time they 
clash with the owner’s economic interests that is worrisome. 
5.2.1 Against Owning Wildlife 
My argument against humans owning wild animals is based on the understanding that wildlife 
ownership rests on a conceptual mistake as the rights of wild animals and the wildlife legal 
owner’s rights are logically immiscible. Water and oil, when poured into the same container, 
produce a liquid that cannot be used as water or as oil. Morally speaking, ownership of wild 
animals dilutes the ‘owned’ wild animals’ rights or those rights that are definitive of ownership. 
Below, I present my argument schematically: 
(1) Wild animals have a negative claim-right: moral agents are prohibited to exploit, 
recklessly harm, or gratuitously harm25 animals (i.e., animals having a claim/duty 
deontic relation with humans).  
(2) Wild animals have a liberty-right: moral agents are prohibited to constrain animals in 
their species-like behaviour (i.e., animals have a liberty/no-claim deontic relation with 
humans).  
(3) Wild animals have an immunity-right: moral agents are morally incapable of altering 
the deontic relations in (1) and (2) on grounds of the immunity/disability alethic 
relationship they have with animals. 
(4) The human owner’s rights to possess or use wild animal ‘property’ is incoherent with 
(1) and (2).  
(5) Therefore, rules that treat wildlife as property are conceptually untenable.  
The argument supporting premises (1) to (3) has been made in Chapter 3 and the rights are 
formulated on the basis of the Hohfeldian structure of rights presented in Chapter 2. Premise 
(3) simply assures that there is morally no room for humans to change wild animals’ rights in 
                                                          
25 Some examples will help show what I mean: X is harmed gratuitously when Y spears her for Y’s sheer fun. X 
is harmed exploitatively when Y makes her carry Y’s goods for Y’s benefit only or without X’s actual or, at the 
very least, presumed, consent. X is harmed recklessly when her leg is broken through Y’s easily preventable 
action or omission.  
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(1) and (2) in the context of ownership even though this is possible under certain circumstances 
such as innocent humans’ self-defence against a wild animal.  
Antony Honoré disjunctively defines the right to possess as meaning “to have exclusive 
physical control of a thing, or to have such control as the nature of the nature of the thing 
admits” (Honoré, 1961: 114; emphasis added). However, as Regan (2004a) and Donaldson and 
Kymlicka (2011) rightly observe, wildlife rights—other things being equal—preclude at least 
non-benevolent human interference. Presumably, physical control entails some interference. 
Hence, wildlife rights preclude human rights to possession of the kind spelled out by the first 
disjunct.  
Honoré’s second disjunct appears to leave some wiggle room. What kind of control would the 
nature of wild animals admit? “Wild animals … are precisely those animals who avoid human 
contact” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 177). True, over thousands of years, wild animals 
have ‘resisted’ habituation or taming.26 Where habituation has occurred—such as the case of 
some gorilla families subjected to tourism in Uganda and Rwanda—it seems to have been 
imposed by humans. If remaining wild and avoiding contact with humans is the nature of wild 
animals, it is highly implausible that there is any acceptable form of owner-like control over 
wildlife, that is, wildlife conceptualised under Clare Palmer’s locational wildness.  
More importantly, because wild animals themselves have a right against humans having access 
to the wild animals’ bodies—and as I will argue soon, to the wild animals’ habitats as well—
the wiggle room seems to vanish. The only interference or control permitted is protective or 
remedial. If, for example, anthropogenic climate change causes suffering among wild animals 
and humans could enable wild animals to adapt to the effects of climate change, then human 
beings have a duty to intervene.27  
The argument I have presented rests on the idea that an appreciation of what having claim-
rights and liberty-rights entails, plus an appreciation of what ownership entails, plus accepting 
that animals have claim-rights and liberty rights, logically rules out wild animals’ being 
property. In other words, wild animals can only be regarded as property on pain of conceptual 
dilution of what possessing rights means or what owning something means, or on pain of 
denying that animals have claim-rights and liberty-rights. 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Hribal (2010) for detailed reports and anecdotes of animal resistance against human 
attempts to control them.  
27 See Kapembwa and Wells (2016) for an argument for wildlife rights to climate change adaptation. 
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In my view, if we have two classes of things, one of things that can be owned and another of 
things that cannot be owned, in virtue of the rights wild animals possess, they belong to the 
class of things that cannot be owned. 
In the spirit of accommodation, I should point out that there is a middle ground category. This 
is one of fiduciary relationship akin to those that obtain between parents and their children. The 
trustee has responsibilities of no harm and of care but not of ownership over the children. 
Although the parent can enjoy a relationship with her child, the child is not her property. 
Treating wild animals as property comes at a huge conceptual cost. The cost is that the rights 
of the wild animal or the property rights of the wildlife ‘owner’ must be so stretched as to blur 
or distort the meaning of the rights of the wild animals or of having right in property rights. For 
example, owning wild animals will come with so many clauses that owning will ultimately be 
akin to the ‘ownership’ of one spouse by the other or of children by their guardians. This 
reductio ad absurdum works against human ownership of wildlife. 
What happens when humans, wives or children are (legally) owned? The connotation and 
psychology of ownership is that of superior and subordinate. It is a power relationship in which 
the owned is usually at the mercy of the owner. The claim: “X is my property” has significant 
illocutionary and perlocutionary significance. The historic and psychological baggage of 
‘property’ is that third parties have no say in how one relates with one’s property. It is only 
when the owner’s relationship with their property unjustifiably harms the third parties that the 
third parties can complain. This would leave wild animals and their rights vulnerable to wanton 
violations as wildlife ranch owners can do pretty much as they please with their wild animals 
without harming any other persons as only happy hunters will likely visit the enclosed ranch.  
5.3 Justification for Ownership 
A lot of things we own, we have come to own because we bought them or the things were given 
to us as gifts or bequest. These means of acquiring property shall not concern me here. Rather, 
I will be discussing how anybody morally acquires anything at all before they can give or sell 
it to others. This pushes us to imagine a time when everything was unowned. Let us call this 
state null property. According to Oran Young, null property “involves extreme laissez-faire 
arrangements under which individual participants are free to do exactly as they please without 
even the constraints imposed by some system of property or use rights” (Young, 1982: 51-52). 
The land of null property is one of liberty and no claims regarding access to resources. Null 
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property entails Judith Thompson’s Ownership-Has-Origins Thesis28 according to which, “X 
owns a thing if and only if something happened that made X own it” (Thompson, 1990: 323). 
The idea of initial acquisition implicitly communicates the idea of no prior ownership. Initial 
acquisition need not be private property; it could be by a whole tribe that moves into a 
previously unowned territory. The task ahead—as Thomson’s bi-conditional thesis suggests—
is to find the necessary and sufficient condition or set of conditions that captures the 
‘something’ that begets initial ownership of a previously unowned thing. 
5.3.1 First Occupancy Theory 
A familiar proposal is that the ‘something’ that moves us from property tabula rasa to some 
property regime is simply being the first to access the resource.  ‘First occupancy’ is somewhat 
a misnomer since not all resources have to do with occupation. ‘First taking’ or the more 
common expressions of ‘the law of first capture’ or ‘finders keepers’ are more accurate labels. 
In general, ‘first occupancy’ means that if X arrives at an unowned resource before Y does, X 
is legitimately permitted to make the resource hers and rightfully exclude Y from it.  
In relation to wildlife, the first occupancy criterion faces what John Hadley (2015) calls the 
‘identification problem’. The identification problem is the problem of determining accurately 
which animal species or individual wild animals where the first in any ecosystem or habitat. 
The first occupancy thesis is, according to Hadley, unpersuasive because it is unable to provide 
an accurate answer to this question. When we look carefully, however, this is only a pseudo-
problem to first occupancy as a justification for excluding others from a resource.  
The first reason the problem of identification is unimportant regarding the first occupancy 
thesis is that wild animals are moral patients that owe each other no duties. This is because, as 
the ought-implies-can cliché tells us, those without the ability to recognize and be guided by 
duties cannot have duties. It is therefore immaterial whether Species 1 was in the territory a 
hundred years before Species 2. Nor is it of any moral significance that an individual wild 
animal arrived prior to another regardless of species membership. First, as has been argued in 
Chapter 4, species are not bearers of any moral rights, that is, property rights or otherwise. Only 
individual wild animals matter morally, at least on the rights account.   
Second, when he talks of individuals arriving at different times, Hadley seems to have in mind 
private property rights. However, the correct property regime for wildlife is common property 
                                                          
28 I shall give no space to a discussion of the rival Jointly-Owned-from-the Outset Thesis. I believe Feser (2005: 
59-63) has satisfactorily dismissed the thesis as unjustified, counterintuitive, mysterious, and indeterminate.  
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or a common-pool resource regime. A common-pool resource regime “occurs where the rights 
reside jointly in some group of actors who own undivided shares of property in question…. 
[E]ach owner possesses the right to use the property, and they jointly possess the right to 
exclude others from using it (Young, 1982: 22). All individual wild animals from all species 
will individually own a given parcel of land—say a national park—and jointly exclude all 
human beings. All types of regimes do exclude, at least to the extent that the goods in question 
are excludable goods.  
All individuals have a liberty-right to the natural goods found in a given habitat. Within the 
animal kingdom, there will be conflicts about access to natural goods. Dispute prevention and 
resolution among wild animals regarding access have similar characteristics as those involving 
human beings. They are characterised by avoidance as when a male lion circumvents another’s 
marked territory; compromise as when two rival males co-exist within the same pride; conquest 
as when avoidance and compromise do not work and a fight leads to the surrender (fleeing) or 
death of one individual or group of individuals.  
All these phenomena among wild animals are none of humans’ business. The bush, so to say, 
is free for all wild animals, subject to the law of survival of the fittest. Wildlife ecology can tell 
us individuals of which species reside in an area and what relationships they form whether 
symbiotic, parasitic, predatory, and so on. Moral agents, that is, humans, have no say morally 
speaking. First occupancy justification only applies to wildlife against humans or vice versa. 
This thread will be expanded on in the next chapter when I discuss human-wildlife territorial 
conflict. Here it suffices to point out that Hadley’s worry over identification of arrivals is not a 
problem for first occupancy.   
First occupancy does help point us in the right direction in our search for justification of initial 
appropriation. ‘First come, first served’ is a useful allocative device. But in and of itself, it does 
not provide justification of initial ownership. It does not seem to be the ‘something’ Thomson 
asked for as it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for owning something. However, 
if we assume scarcity and individuals having equal liberty or equal claims to a resource, then 
the first come first served principle may be employed as a tiebreaker.  
5.3.2 The Labour-mixing Theory 
Perhaps the most widely discussed theory of property is John Locke’s labour-mixing theory. 
According to this theory if R is unowned and X labours on it, X thereby owns R and may 
rightfully exclude another person or being Y, from the resource.  In John Locke’s own words,  
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Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left in, he hath mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.…. 
[I]t hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: 
for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can hath a right 
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, for others (Locke, 
1967: II, 27).  
If someone uses their intellectual or physical capacities to remove from nature or transform a 
resource to make usable what was not (so) usable prior to the labour, then they have a right to 
exclude others from the resource. Locke’s labour-mixing justification for initial acquisition has 
received support from contemporary writers. One such a supporter is Edward Feser. 
Edward Feser (2005) presents the labouring condition as being Sorites-like. Below a certain 
level of mixing or control, one does not own a resource, but one does own a resource if one has 
mixed one’s labour with it, or exerted control over it, beyond a certain threshold. To begin to 
own something requires “significantly altering a resource, at least by coming to control that 
resource” (Feser, 2005: 65). To stake a legitimate claim to a resource to warrant excluding 
others, according to Feser, one must either “drastically” do something to it or take adequate 
control of the thing. For example, if a man finds an unowned water hole and only uses it 
occasionally, he does not own it. However, “if instead, he builds a fence around it, posts guard 
dogs, and so forth, he has acquired full ownership” (Feser, 2005: 69).  Hence, for Feser, mixing 
one’s labour to an unowned resource through significantly altering it or controlling it is a 
sufficient condition to begin legitimately to exclude others from the resource.  
The labour-mixing condition as a condition for first legitimate acquisition has an intuitive 
appeal and everywhere around us we see instances of it legally upheld. But not everything that 
glitters is gold. On closer inspection, labour-mixing seems flawed; it is not a necessary or 
sufficient condition for excluding others from a resource.  
The labour-mixing condition is too narrow. It is too narrow because it does not provide 
justification for untransformed property, one that no one has added any labour to. Imagine an 
unfenced, unguarded clear piece of land that some families’ children go to play in at the 
weekend. It is morally their play field although none of them or their parents altered it in any 
way or have dogs guarding it. If we follow Locke and Feser, the field is unowned—it is still, 
in principle, appropriable—and hence the families have no claim-right to prevent an individual 
who wishes to mix her labour with it in a way that will make it unusable as a playfield, say, 
through cultivation.  
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The narrowness of ownership by labour-mixing has serious ramifications for humans and wild 
animals alike. There are many people or animals that do not labour in the conventional 
transformative sense as such but, by all intents and purposes, are morally eligible to own some 
‘unmixed’ goods. For example, some wait only for fruits to ripen, pick them, and put them in 
their mouths or in the mouths of their young ones. Migratory wild animals travel seasonally for 
hundreds of miles simply to go and eat seasonal foods which are available for a few weeks in 
this place before moving to another location conducive for breeding purposes.  
The same for nomadic hunter-gatherer tribal peoples. Under labour-mixing, they would not be 
owners of the fruit-bearing plants they depend on for their subsistence. Some tribal peoples and 
some wildlife would be doomed if the very thing which grounds their right to self-preservation 
could be morally appropriated by someone else. Feser is particularly misguided in requiring 
that one is able to protect some resource. His condition has the implication that those without 
the ability to build a fence, to stand with a spear by the water hole, or do not have guard dogs 
to protect it can never own the naturally occurring source of water upon which their very lives 
depend. Why should a fence or a guard dog make such a huge difference? 
We must resist this repugnant implication of the restricted labour-mixing requirement. A 
plausible theory of ownership should give the children the right to exclude others from their 
playfield; grant the disabled dog-less man ownership of the water hole; and recognise the 
nomads and wildlife rights to fruit-bearing forests that excludes transformative users such as 
loggers or miners from exploiting, degrading, or damaging the resources. In short, a sound 
theory of initial acquisition should allow for ownership of untransformed resources by 
individuals or collectives.  
Another problem with the labour-mixing condition is that of ritualistic or pointless labour-
mixing.  
Consider the case of Eddie, digging a hole on an unowned parcel of land. Eddie digs and digs. 
Before long, he is in the hole over his head, doggedly determined to keep digging down. He is 
not laying pipes or putting in a pool, but simply digging for the enjoyment of it, say, the exertion 
releases a neurochemical that gives rise to a pleasant feeling (Hadley, 2015: 43).  
 
Let us assume Eddie’s pleasure-giving exertion instantiates a case of labour-mixing. The case 
seems to render the right to exclude unintelligible or redundant since, although Eddie has 
transformed an unowned resource, he has no use whatsoever for it. Perhaps Locke’s ‘spoilage’ 
proviso already prevents Eddie from owning the hole since—having already attained the sort 
after pleasure of digging—he no longer wants or needs it.  
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Hadley, however, has a different problem with the case. He thinks that Eddie’s labour would 
count as an appropriation-legitimating condition only if he were sacrificing some other activity 
he could be doing instead of digging the hole. Extrapolating to wild animals Hadley asks: 
“More pertinently, when animals expend energy in the process of labouring, are they making a 
sacrifice in the sense of bearing some cost to themselves?” (Hadley, 2015: 43). By Hadley’s 
lights, if our answer is negative, then labour-mixing does not qualify Eddie or wild animals to 
own the products of their labour.  
Hadley’s conclusion, however, has no bearing on whether labour-mixing is a sufficient 
condition for ownership. Consider the following: On Monday Jim cultivates a portion of 
unowned land and in so doing, foregoes collecting compost for his vegetables. On Tuesday Jim 
cultivates the same amount of land as yesterday but he had nothing else to do. By Hadley’s 
logic, Jim appropriates the piece he cultivated on Monday but not the one he cultivated on 
Tuesday. In my view, having an opportunity cost or not does nothing to change our intuition 
that Jim, prima facie, owns what he cultivated on both days. If Jim loved gardening and had 
virtually nothing to forego, according to Hadley, he would have no right against his neighbour 
helping herself to the vegetables on Jim’s garden. This is an absurd implication of making 
sacrifice matter for legitimate appropriation.  
Let me end with a potential eliminator of wild animals from being possible owners. This is the 
argument that one needs to engage in labour as a result of one’s rational choice for him or her 
to be eligible to owning the product of their labour. The argument, reports Hadley (2015: 41), 
posits that “would-be property owners are autonomous enough to be industrious and creative, 
and responsible for their own choices in life.” This requirement reflects more the moral 
narcissism of humans than it offers a real condition to qualify labouring as ownership-
producing. One problem is how the autonomy condition comports with our ontogenic and 
phylogenetic development. In both our development from infancy and our evolutionary 
development, it does not seem unreasonable to assume the notion of ownership precedes the 
emergence of full-blown rational autonomy.  
Moreover, it seems human labouring is rooted in the survival instinct. True, humans have 
widened their labouring options and their superior intellect allows them to carry out more 
deliberative, creative labouring. Granted the beavers cannot choose to not build their labour-
intensive complex dams, human beings cannot choose not to labour in the generic sense of the 
term either. That we can labour in a wider variety of ways is not sufficient to put a moral wedge 
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between our labouring and beavers’ labouring. Moreover, there are some human beings whose 
labouring is an uninterrupted routine that the beaver-human line becomes very blurred. 
Supposing hunter-gatherer tribal peoples could not choose not to do what they do, we have 
nevertheless no reason not to affirm that they own what they collect and whatever temporary 
shelters they build.  
In conclusion, with or without the Lockean proviso, labour-mixing is not a sufficient or 
necessary condition for the moral right to exclude others from a resource. It is potentially part 
of the story, but not the whole story to ownership. It is conceivable that one labours on a 
resource and leaves enough and as good of it for others, and yet he does not need it (anymore, 
for example). Perhaps, then, a needs-base account will yield a sound justification for 
appropriation. I will now therefore turn to a need-based account of ownership.  
5.4 John Hadley’s Basic Needs Argument 
John Hadley (2015) has attempted to give a full non-Lockean justification of animal property 
ownership. His argument (Hadley, 2015: 54) can be schematically framed as follows: 
(1) If an individual has an interest that crosses a threshold level of moral importance, then 
she has a right to use the goods in question. 
(2) Wild animals have an interest in using natural goods (land, vegetation, waters, rocks, 
soils, etc.) to meet their basic needs. 
(3) Wild animals’ interest in using natural goods to meet their basic needs crosses the 
threshold of moral importance for them to have the right to use the natural goods. 
(4) If wild animals have a right to use natural goods, then they have a property right in the 
natural goods. 
(5) Therefore—since they have a right to use natural goods—wild animals have a property 
right in natural goods.29  
If we accept the truth or reasonableness of premises 1–4, the truth or reasonableness of 5, the 
conclusion, is undeniable. In other words, Hadley’s argument is logically valid. But we need 
not accept it as a sound argument yet as it is possible that at least one of the premises is false 
or unreasonable. As it turns out, by my lights, only one premise is true—premise 2. As Hadley 
(2015: 54-55) rightly puts it, “that animals use natural goods in order to meet their basic needs 
… is a truism of ecology”. 
                                                          
29 The statements 1–5 are paraphrased very closely to the original statements. Some are almost verbatim but the 
number of square brackets and ellipses required would make this recasting of the argument rather unaesthetic. 
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The first premise is untrue. I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that having an important interest 
is not a sufficient condition to having a right to the content of that which one has an interest in. 
Hadley’s error is common among rights theorists. James Griffin (2008) for example, thinks 
individuals in Africa with AIDS have a right against rich pharmaceuticals in Western countries 
who could provide them with anti-retroviral drugs.30  However, rights-based duties are too 
strong to support such a view. If I am hungry and thirsty because my money was stolen, this 
does not give me a right to the resources of the next rich person I find. I could beg, but not 
demand that he gives me some food and water. Important interests such as basic needs are 
necessary conditions for having moral rights, but they are not sufficient conditions. If premise 
1 is false, so is premise (3). 
The fourth premise is false. It is not the case that if wild animals have a right to use natural 
goods, then they have a property right in the natural good. An example can help elucidate why 
the conditional of premise (4) is false. Imagine wild animals in a national park. Some 
phytopathogens attack a plant which is essential to their diet leaving them threatened with 
malnutrition and starvation. However, not too far away, a human landowner has these plants 
on his land in a healthy state and in abundance.  
First, it is not the case that the wild animals have a right to use the natural goods on the human’s 
parcel of land. This is because, the landowner, having ownership, has the right to exclude the 
wild animals from his land. Analytically, he has no duty to the threatened wild animals to 
provide them with his own resource. This, however, is trivial. It only says the antecedent is 
false and, therefore, does not show the falsity of (4).  
Secondly, and more importantly, let us suppose the landowner lets the wild animals use his 
land for feeding for a certain period while experts try to control the plant disease. The wild 
animals are using the natural goods but, pace Hadley (premise 4), it does not follow from this 
that they own the said piece of land. The land still belongs to the human Good Samaritan. 
Hence, the fourth premise is false.  A property owner can let any number of users have access 
to her property without relinquishing her ownership or her right to exclude. 
                                                          
30 I only deny that the positive rights to anti-retroviral drugs are moral rights. Other ethical grounds could easily 
be used to justify some conventional rights for pharmaceuticals to offer free or cheaper drugs to those who 
cannot afford them. In the wildlife domain, loosely speaking, according to the Endangered Species Act 1973 of 
the U.S., landowners have no right to exclude from their land individual wild animals belonging to endangered 
species. This is an example of a conventional and not a moral right, at least in my view.  
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Although Hadley makes a valid inference from his premises, we cannot accept his argument as 
sound. This is because premises (1), (3), and (4) are false. Need, as such, is a strong ground for 
conventional rights. But it falls short of grounding moral rights in general and the right to 
property in particular.31  
5.5 From Animal Rights to Wildlife Property Rights 
The discussions in the foregoing sections have led me to this point where I must present what 
I believe to be a plausible view of wildlife property. My strategy will be to construct a 
justification for wild animals’ owning property by improving on existing ones that I have 
discussed. With the hindsight of the strengths and weaknesses of positions discussed, I offer 
what is hoped to be a coherent convergence of strands from the various views which is 
essentially an extension of animal rights theory. John Hadley has rightly admitted that “animal 
property rights theory … deserves to be regarded as implicit in traditional animal rights theory” 
(Hadley, 2015: 76). What follows, may therefore, not be so surprising.  
We have seen that when we abstract from the liberal conception, the bare concept of property, 
it is highly plausible that that wild animals do meet the necessary conditions to be the sort of 
thing that could own resources. There is no reason to believe wild animals cannot have the right 
to exclude humans from resources that serve as wild animals’ means of survival and 
subsistence; the right to use the natural goods found in their habitats; and the right to security 
in their enjoyment and possession of the rights to exclude and use.  
The question that remains unanswered is what kind of justification can be offered for wild 
animals’—and indeed human beings’—right to exclude others from that which is owned, land 
for example. It is this sort of justification that I will now try to offer.  
My starting point is null property. I will limit my discussion only to natural goods. All things 
found in the natural world that are not themselves right holders are appropriate objects of 
appropriation.  
The Lockean theory goes some way in justifying possession of property rights. However, 
Lockean property theory was tailored for humans. Even in the case of humans, the theory is 
still faced with some important difficulties. I argue that the Lockean grounds of ownership are 
strengthened when we keep them on the wellbeing leash. In other words, the first occupancy 
                                                          
31 Some rights theorists ground their argument for positive basic human rights on the seriousness of needs for 
subsistence, security, and liberty. See for example, Henry Shue (1980). To the extent that these rights are argued 
for in a political context, they should be construed as conventional social contract rights rather than moral rights. 
On my understanding the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty are generally negative moral rights.  
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and the labour-mixing criteria must be expressed in the language of rights. Below is my 
formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for initial acquisition by either humans 
or wild animals: 
Let us imagine X and Y—both sentient eligible right-bearers—as early and late arrivals 
respectively with respect to some unowned natural resource, R.  
Initial Acquisition Thesis: X owns R if and only if, and because, (a) X is the first to capture R 
or create R from some previously unowned resources and (b) R potentially or actually protects 
or promotes some element of X’s wellbeing.  
The first condition, (a), represents the First Occupancy and the Labour-Mixing criteria for 
initial acquisition. The maladies afflicting First Occupancy and Labour-Mixing are all, at least 
in part, due to the absence of the second part (b). The Lockean account ends up with the 
narrowness problem because the labour-mixing account does not take first occupancy plus my 
second requirement seriously. In my acquisition thesis, this flaw has been corrected. If X 
coming in from the South finds a tree that bears sweet nutritious fruits to meet his needs, he has 
the right to exclude Y, who comes in later from the North32 and finds left unowned only trees 
bearing less sweet and less nutritious fruits. The trees are in their natural state, unaltered by 
either X or Y. My thesis has the advantage that should Z come later—and unbeknown to X or 
Y—grafts, mulches, and waters the trees to improve the quality and quantity of fruits, this does 
not change X’s and Y’s ownership of the trees despite the duo having not mixed their labour 
with the trees. A compromise or reward may be agreed for Z’s troubles. But Z has no right to 
exclude X or Y from the resource. 
The problem of ritualistic labour-mixers has also vanished. Under the Lockean account, this 
problem would be curtailed by the spoilage proviso. But the spoilage proviso has now become 
redundant since X can only own R if R is essentially linked to his wellbeing. If we find X has 
so much of R that it is surplus for his wellbeing, he has no right to exclude Y from it.33 It is also 
clear under my account why Hadley’s Eddie does not own the hole he has dug merely for 
digging pleasure.  
                                                          
32 The South/North bit is meant to rule out that, before their encounter at R, the two had some relationship 
creating room for prior expectations, agreements, or traditions. 
33 We must not confuse legal with moral rights. X may still have legal rights to exclude even without moral 
rights. This is because legal rights may take into account other moral and prudential considerations.  
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But surely, by appropriating the sweetest and most nutritious tree—and thereby not leaving 
enough and as sweet and nutritious for others—X commits an injustice against Y? The answer 
is no. On my account, and Feser’s (2005), X commits an injustice against Y only if X violates 
some right of Y’s. Prior to appropriation by X, R was unowned, and, by definition, Y had no 
claim to R. There are virtuous or even selfish reasons for X favourably altering Y’s restriction 
in accessing R as an exercise of his power-right. But as far as the account of justice given here 
is concerned, X’s initial acquisition cannot result in any injustice against any late-comers.  
The new initial acquisition account has clear implications for wildlife owning natural goods. 
The list of elements of wellbeing for wild animals is expectedly shorter than that of human 
beings. The list will largely constitute physical and psycho-social wellbeing. These elements 
are naturally realisable chiefly in an environment where humans have only limited access, if at 
all. Wild animals live in their natural habitat. Wildlife look for and find food in their natural 
habitat; wild animals protect themselves from danger in their natural habitat; wild animals 
create social bonds, and play in their natural habitats. These are but four examples that illustrate 
some of the interests that underpin the justification for the wildlife right to possess natural 
goods. These examples show that wild animals do meet condition (b) of the initial acquisition 
thesis.  
Since wildlife rights apply only against human beings, X represents wild animals or humans 
and Y humans only, and R some natural goods such as forests. By dint of being early 
evolutionary arrivals, wild animals are generally the first occupants of their habitats. Non-zero 
sum (win-win) interspecific relationships are feasible between humans and at least some wild 
animal species. In principle, there is no necessity to having a moral prohibition on humans’ 
accessing natural goods to which the wild animals had initial access. But it is a contingent fact 
we learn from ecology and experience that human settlements and activities—as we will see in 
the next chapter—are usually inimical or even mutually exclusive to the interests of wildlife. 
The idea of first occupancy faces the problem of allowing for the right to possess and wellbeing 
to come apart. However, my proposed initial acquisition thesis solves the problem by making 
the law of first capture effective only if the appropriator’s antecedent moral rights—that are, 
by definition, always, generally speaking, protecting some element of wellbeing—are at 
stake.34 It is worth noting that Locke himself predicated his justification of ownership on 
                                                          
34 Regarding human appropriation, first occupancy remains a problem. This is because autonomy and important 
achievement—important elements of human wellbeing—are rather slippery elements of wellbeing that I think let 
humans appropriate more than is necessary, or even good, for their physical and psycho-social wellbeing. Some 
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preservation or subsistence, albeit sometimes couched in theological terms. My view is an 
improvement on this because preservation is too narrow. Wellbeing is more robust as it caters 
for those rights that track non-consumptive or non- life-threatening psycho-social elements of 
wellbeing. For humans, especially, autonomy is a good example of such elements since 
someone can enjoy physical wellbeing but still suffer from violation of their autonomy. 
Humans may also own something for aesthetic, sentimental, or sacramental reasons that are 
beyond sheer preservation. 
5.6  Wildlife Property Rights or Wild Animal Sovereignty? 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) criticise animal rights theory and property rights 
theory as insufficient or underdeveloped for protecting wild animals. For Donaldson and 
Kymlicka the failure of animal rights theory to protect wild animals from certain harms 
including forcible dislocation signals not an “accidental oversight” but rather, “the limits of any 
theory that defines animals’ rights solely on the basis of their intrinsic moral status” (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka, 2011: 156). Instead, by their lights, what is needed is an account that “articulates 
the sort of relations between human communities and wild animal communities that are both 
feasible and morally defensible” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 157).  
In this section, I contend that Donaldson and Kymlicka fall short on the principle of charity in 
their criticism of animal rights theory in general and, in particular, to the theory’s application 
to wildlife ownership. I will demonstrate that the cases they think expose theoretic limitations 
are in fact pseudo problems—they are scenarios that animal rights theory, and of course, by 
extension, wildlife property theory, adequately deals with. I will then argue that the “wild 
animal sovereignty” solution Donaldson and Kymlicka is theoretically redundant even if it may 
be of rhetorical value by couching wildlife rights in the parlance of international politics.   
Firstly, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s find animal rights theory and wildlife property theory 
underdeveloped as the theories are purportedly unable to provide satisfactory explanations of 
some important questions. One such is the question of stating clearly the content of wildlife 
property rights, whether it is an individual wild animals’ niche for itself and its family or the 
entire habitat shared with other wild animals. Other unanswered important issues, in Donaldson 
and Kymlicka’s view, are the limits on human activity imposed by wildlife property rights, 
                                                          
humans, for example, simply want to become millionaires or billionaires to feel accomplished. This is however, 
not my problem here.  
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monitoring boundaries and regulating mobility, and protecting wild animals from dislocation 
by human activity or by other wild animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 160).  
The inability to respond to the above issues, Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest, is the inevitable 
consequence of animal rights theory being “a framework that focuses solely on the intrinsic 
moral standing of animals” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 160). Wildlife property theory is 
in their view an improvement over animal rights theory because it recognises “that our relations 
with wild animals must be understood in more relational and political terms. However, … 
focusing exclusively on property rights is incomplete and misleading as an account of these 
political relationships” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 161).  Hence, we have an alleged or 
implicit transitive progression from animal rights theory, wildlife property rights theory, and 
ultimately to wild animals’ sovereignty. I will try to respond to this problem before presenting 
and responding to the second criticism made against property rights by Donaldson and 
Kymlicka.  
Being based ‘solely on the intrinsic moral status of animals’ is Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
identified source of limitation for animal rights theory. The theory should, in their view, offer 
a ‘relational and political’ story too. By Donaldson and Kymlicka’s lights, animal rights theory 
is weaker than wildlife property theory which in turn is weaker than wild animals’ sovereignty 
theory (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 169). It is, however, not clear why Donaldson and 
Kymlicka think this. I find this transitivity bizarre as the three frameworks are not mutually 
exclusive. Wildlife property and wild animals’ sovereignty—if there is such a thing—are but 
manifestations or derivatives of animal rights theory rather than rival approaches. Donaldson 
and Kymlicka’s confusion arises from their too narrow view of animal rights theory as being 
restricted to only prohibitions against direct physical harm. However, this is not a view Tom 
Regan35 would identify with and certainly not the view put forth or implied in this thesis in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
Animal rights theory simply identifies being a subject-of-a-life or possessing sentience as the 
value-identifier for eligibility to warrant the protection of moral rights. It is misleading to treat 
a criterion for holding rights as the sole focus of a theory. In fact, according to animal rights 
theory, sentience is merely the beginning, opening up the possibility for many rights depending 
                                                          
35 Regan clearly sees his rights view as prohibiting depriving of wild animals their habitats. He says, “individual 
animals have valid claims and thus rights against those who would destroy their natural habitat … [one of the] 
practices that unjustifiably override the rights of those animals” (Regan, 2004a: 360). In fact, this implication of 
the rights view is, for Regan, crucial as it forms a convergence point for rights theory and environmental ethics.  
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on what elements constitutes an individuals’ wellbeing. If some interests are political in nature, 
that will naturally lead to rights with the associated political dimension. In a way, moral rights 
are inevitably about the relational and political. A proposition denoting a moral right states a 
relation between the subject and the respondent of a right. And to the extent that moral rights 
denote just or unjust state of affairs, they belong to the realm of the political ensuring justice is 
at least one of the primary justifications for the state. As a political institution, the state exists 
primarily, at least, to guarantee the rights of those within the parameters of its authority. If 
moral rights are understood this way, to deny that moral rights theory is relational and political 
is baffling. And perhaps even more baffling would be to deny that property rights are relational 
and political. 
Wildlife property rights theory gives justification for ownership and sets out prohibitions and 
permissions for those who own or for the non-owners of a property. An individual can own. By 
extension, a family can own. By further extension, communities can own, … several 
communities can own. The important point is that private, collective, and communal property 
all boil down to individual moral rights. Individual private rights are at one pole whereby 
ownership excludes everybody else but the owner. Null property is at the other pole whereby 
nobody is excluded from access to or exploitation of a resource.  
Common-pool property is somewhere in between individual private property and null property. 
Some individuals have access to, and have the liberty to exploit, a resource to the exclusion of 
some other individuals. We have a class of individuals with use and security rights with respect 
to the resource and a class of individuals with no use and security rights to the resource. The 
first class (mentioned in the above scenario) we may call a family, clan, a village, or whatnot. 
My point is that individual rights still determine common-pool resource regime.  
Conversely, it is not a collective such as a community that is excluded as such. Rather, it is 
every individual member of the second class that is prohibited from using the resource in 
question or from illicitly depriving first class’s individuals from enjoying the resource. Thus, 
moral rights theory based on the intrinsic moral status of individuals—their capacity to have an 
interest that tracks some element of their wellbeing—yields a bundle of rights to exclude others 
singly or jointly from a resource, from using the resource, and from having security in 
possessing the resource. Unless Donaldson and Kymlicka can unpack their criticism of the 
grounding of rights theory on the ‘intrinsic moral status of individuals’, I see their criticism of 
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the approach’s limitation as based on an uncharitable interpretation and as essentially 
unpersuasive.  
Additionally, not all resources essential to wellbeing are material. People also create intangible 
cultural institutions and norms such as languages, rituals, rites of passage, and political 
structures. For many people, these elements of culture define who they are, providing a cultural 
landscape in which they can find meaning and flourish. That many rational and virtuous people 
are willing to make huge investments—including risk of loss of one’s life—in the preservation 
of a culture somehow goes to underscore culture’s importance to individuals’ wellbeing. If this 
is reality, then individuals could have a right to a language just as they do to a piece of land. It 
is the individual’s legitimate interests in a language, and in a set of norms and values, and social 
structure that may give rise to what we can call cultural rights. Violations of these cultural rights 
through alien rule can create anomie, with harmful effects on individuals’ wellbeing.  
In the last few paragraphs, I have tried to explicate what I see as relational or political 
dimensions of moral rights theory. Donaldson and Kymlicka envisage a non-political 
dimension and a political dimension and that moral rights theory suffices for the non-political 
but insufficient for the political. I argue that this may not be the case. It is quite plausible that 
moral rights theory as applied to humans and to animals is sufficiently robust to account for 
both property rights and sovereignty.  
Donaldson and Kymlicka have questioned property rights theory for its alleged failure to 
identify boundaries for territories owned by individual wild animals. However, as argued in the 
previous section, only one boundary is required for all wild animals living in an identifiable 
ecosystem or national park.36 Wildlife ownership of habitats and natural goods found therein 
does not exclude other indigenous species or non-anthropogenic ‘invasive’ species. Members 
of all species own the land in common to the exclusion of human beings. A human case clearly 
shows that there is nothing conceptually or practically problematic with this kind of ownership. 
Members of one tribe but coming from different families and clans may have ownership of the 
natural goods in a forest, to the exclusion of members of some other tribe. With regards to the 
forest in question, individuals have no claims against each other to any given square inch of the 
forest apart from perhaps where the intra-group rule of first capture applies. It is not the case 
                                                          
36 Although an argument can be made for reallocation of land to wild animals, for my purposes, I have taken a 
fait accompli approach such that wildlife property rights will be limited to current protected area demarcations. 
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therefore, pace Donaldson and Kymlicka, that wildlife property is underdeveloped with respect 
to boundaries of ownership of parcels of land within an ecosystem.37    
I will now address Donaldson and Kymlicka’s second concern—forcible dislocation or 
displacement of wildlife. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument relies heavily on the analogy 
between colonialism and dislocation of wildlife from their habitats. In their view, colonialism 
was based on the doctrine of terra nullius. Consequently, “existing inhabitants [such as 
Australia’s Aborigines] were in an important sense simply rendered invisible” (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, 2011: 168). In Donaldson and Kymlicka’s view, wildlife property rights do not 
sufficiently protect wild animals from being displaced by humans. Colonialism provides us 
with reason or evidence for this insufficiency of property rights. 
European imperialists were often quite prepared to accept that indigenous peoples had property 
rights, even as they denied them sovereignty. The result was that indigenous individuals or 
families were able to maintain a plot of land, but lost their collective autonomy, as Europeans 
imposed their own laws, culture, and language on indigenous peoples. Similarly, what wild 
animals need is not (or not only) a property right in an individual nest or den, say, but protection 
of their right to maintain their way of life on their territory—in short, they need sovereignty. 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 178).  
The nub of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument for sovereignty seems to be simply that, from 
the lessons of colonisation, wild animals cannot have full protection against dislocation or 
displacement by humans from their habitats based on animal rights theory. In their view, just 
like terra nullius was evoked for colonialism, wildlife territory is conceived as uninhabited, 
awaiting human acquisition and development. To give full protection of wild animals over their 
habitats Donaldson and Kymlicka recommend sovereignty for wild animals akin to that of 
human nation-states. They explain the role of sovereignty thus: “Insofar as the flourishing of a 
community’s members is tied up with their ability to maintain their own forms of social 
organisation on their territory, then we commit a harm and an injustice when we impose alien 
rule on them, and sovereignty is the tool we use to protect against that injustice.” (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka, 2011: 172; emphasis added). A community’s sovereignty entails that “we have 
no right to govern that territory, let alone to make unilateral decisions by stewards on behalf of 
wards” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 170).  
Assuming mine is a fair representation of the argument by Donaldson and Kymlicka, I interpret 
the argument as an inductive argument from analogy and I evaluate it as inadequate. The 
                                                          
37 Of course, among the wild animals themselves, there is some wild ‘morality’ at work with territory markings 
indicating what parcel of land belongs to a family or clan of hyenas or elephants. But I think the morality at 
work is the ‘might-is-right’ sort. Other members will most likely ‘respect’ the boundaries only to the extent that 
the contrary might cost them their limb or life.  
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analogy between colonialism and displacement of wildlife from their habitats, in my view, 
contains some factual inaccuracies and an important disanalogy. However, before proceeding 
to address these concerns about Donaldson and Kymlicka’s analogy, I would like to highlight 
a seeming contradiction. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka allege that colonialists deemed indigenous territory terra nullius, and 
because of this, proceeded to occupy it. They claim that “the justifications given for colonizing 
animal habitats are strikingly similar to the ‘terra nullius’ justifications for colonizing 
indigenous lands” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 168-169). If we assume that this was 
indeed the case—apparently, it was not the case—then, Donaldson and Kymlicka are 
contradicting themselves. Terra nullius literally refers to “uninhabited territory” (Ritter, 1996: 
7) and there is no suggestion Donaldson and Kymlicka have in mind a different construal.   
The contradiction occurs because Donaldson and Kymlicka deny that wildlife property rights 
can adequately protect humans or wild animals from displacement or dislocation. Yet they 
employ a concept that refers to land as nobody’s property to explain colonisers’ rationale for 
colonizing other peoples or wild animals. Surely, if the justification of colonisation was the 
apparent absence of property rights in land by indigenous people, then had the colonisers 
recognised indigenous people’s right to their territories, morally at least, the existence of 
property rights alone would have prevented colonisation.   
Contrary to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s view, wildlife property theory would suffice to ward 
off colonisers. And similarly, wildlife territorial ownership would successfully ward off those 
who wish to displace wild animals from their natural habitats. But despite endorsing the terra 
nullius colonisation thesis, Donaldson and Kymlicka want to insist colonialists did leave 
indigenous people’s land ownership intact but still colonised them. Terra nullius is absence of 
property rights and not absence of sovereignty.  
Having exposed the contradiction, I will now proceed to discuss specific problems with 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s analogy between colonisation and displacement of wild animals 
from their habitats.  
The first problem with the analogy is Donaldson and Kymlicka’s identification of absence of 
sovereignty as what let imperialists impose their rule over indigenous peoples and resources. 
European imperialists could accept that indigenous peoples had property rights and yet deny 
them sovereignty, Donaldson and Kymlicka think. This is a theoretic possibility with respect 
to what Lea Ypi (2009) refers to as civilising colonialism whose purported aim was 
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enlightenment of barbarous ethnic communities. However, this does not seem to match the 
facts of colonisation. There are at least two reasons to be sceptical about Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s claim that colonialists accepted indigenous property and land rights even as they 
imposed alien rule.  
Firstly, colonialism was partly motivated by the quest for new territory for settlement and by 
commercial reason.  Colonialism took two forms that Lea Ypi aptly describes as “settler 
colonialism” and “commercial colonialism” (Ypi, 2009: 161). In many cases the decision to 
own foreign territory was made beforehand. The partition of Africa among some European 
countries at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) is a case in point. Brute force and deceit were 
used to actualise the remote sharing of territory on the African continent. Furthermore, to some 
extent, both Britain’s Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company and Belgium’s King 
Leopold’s International Association of the Congo indicate the colonial interest in resources or 
property. Theodore Roosevelt unequivocally admitted the colonial intention of land 
dispossession:  
The rude fierce settler who drives the savage from the land lays all civilised mankind under a 
debt to him. It is of incalculable importance that America, Australia, and Siberia should pass out 
of the hands of the red, black, and yellow aboriginal owners and become the heritage of the 
dominant world races (quoted in Dowie, 2009: 14).    
This explicit statement of the colonial motivation casts doubt on the view that colonialists 
respected indigenous people’s property rights. Although the reasons for colonialism are 
multifaceted, it seems there was a clear intent, at least in some cases, to disposes indigenous 
people of their land and resources. 
There is reason for scepticism about Donaldson and Kymlicka’s civilising colonialism, which 
may have involved political or cultural usurpation while leaving intact indigenous people’s 
basic individual and property rights. A common image of the colonialist is that he went to 
Africa with a Bible under his armpit and a gun in his hands. Another illustrative story is that 
the colonialist asked the indigenous people to bow down in prayer. When the colonialist said 
‘Amen!’ the natives looked up to find their land and resources gone. I think these anecdotes are 
closer to historical reality of colonialism than Donaldson and Kymlicka’s picture.  
If we accept land displacement and resource expropriation from indigenous peoples by 
Europeans as forming at least part of the motivation for colonising non-European societies, it 
seems we must reject the assumption made by Donaldson and Kymlicka. It seems that it is not 
the case that imperialists accepted indigenous peoples’ property rights in their land and natural 
 95 
 
resources and merely imposed foreign rule or alien cultural ideas. In many cases, it appears 
political rule was but a means to acquiring and maintaining control over resources to which, 
prima facie, the indigenous people had a prior moral claim. What this means is that, contrary 
to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s view, sovereignty does not serve any purpose over and above 
property rights and is thereby rendered redundant as the possible alleged missing link for 
protecting wildlife from dislocation by humans.  
Furthermore, even if we accepted that imperialists would not violate indigenous people’s 
ownership rights to resources, there is a second reason for questioning the relevance of 
sovereignty. Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to be claiming that if the colonised societies had 
sovereignty, colonialism would have passed over them in a fashion similar to the Jewish 
Passover.  
When Europeans colonized the Americas, they denied this was a violation of the sovereignty of 
indigenous peoples on the grounds that indigenous peoples lacked any concept or practice of 
sovereignty—no individual or institution within indigenous communities was seen as having 
‘absolute political power’ to issue commands binding on all members (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 
2011: 172).  
However, this attempt at explaining forced rule and resource expropriation runs into 
counterexamples. As Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves acknowledge, “many indigenous 
societies such as the Incas … clearly did have state-like structures” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 
2011: 286, n.17). Pre-colonial Africa has documented kingdoms with great political power, 
authority, and hierarchical structures. Among the well-known are the Azande, Buganda, Zulu, 
Kongo kingdoms, and Ethiopian empire (see Middleton, 2001).  
It seems fair to say, for the imperialists, presence of sovereignty or lack of sovereignty was not 
a factor in colonising non-European societies. Indeed, as mentioned above, where the existence 
of sovereignty could not be denied, colonialism advocates would cite the spreading of 
civilisation seen as European norms and values such as monogamy as reasons for subjugating 
other societies (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 287, n.17). This creates a problem for 
Donaldson and Kymlicka. If the presence of sovereignty—in at least some African societies—
did not deter the imperialists, why would it now be the solution to protecting wildlife habitat in 
a way that property rights is not?  
It seems that Donaldson and Kymlicka’s sovereignty addendum to animal rights theory lacks a 
defensible motivation. In other words, terra nullius was constructed or implored to 
rationalise—not to justify—control of other people and resources in many cases by brute force. 
Some authors have argued that terra nullius is a legal fiction. “It is becoming widely 
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acknowledged that terra nullius was not used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
justify dispossession of Australian Aborigines. Terra nullius, it seems, was an impostor” 
(Fitzmaurice, 2007:1). David Ritter, for example, contends that “the classification of the 
Australian colonies as something like ‘terra nullius’ did not … cause aboriginal land rights not 
to be recognised under Australian common law” (Ritter, 1996: 7). In fact, land which the 
colonialists took had owners and at least some of the societies on which they imposed their rule 
had political sovereignty.  
A premise of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument for the superiority of sovereignty rights 
over property rights is that indigenous people had property rights but no sovereignty. Their 
argument has some credence if in fact colonialists recognised indigenous people’s land rights 
but proceeded to colonise them because of lack of sovereignty. It turns out we do not have such 
cases or, if such cases exist, there are so few that they can only offer very weak support for 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument. What seems historical is that colonialists had no regard 
for indigenous property rights in land or in sovereignty. Hence the fact of colonisation cannot 
be used as a theory test between a property-based theory and a sovereignty-based theory. As 
the basis for Donaldson and Kymlicka’s analogy collapses, their argument is rendered weaker.  
In addition to the above-highlighted historical inaccuracies, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
analogy fails because of an important disanalogy between human societal sovereignty and the 
proposed wild animals’ sovereignty. This is the difference that whereas we can separate 
between expropriation and political domination or illegitimate political power in the case of 
humans,38 the distinction does not exist in the case of wildlife. As Donaldson and Kymlicka 
point out, it is possible—conceptually at least—for colonised humans to maintain their right to 
a parcel of land and yet find themselves forcibly subjected to the laws, culture, and language 
of the colonial masters. That is to say, property rights and sovereignty can come apart 
conceptually. This, however, has no analogy in the case of wildlife.  
The upshot of the above disanalogy is that in the case of humans, sovereignty seems to play a 
unique role of protecting political and cultural elements of their society. Hence, there is 
something for sovereignty to protect which is not sufficiently, if at all, protected by property 
rights such as the right to a habitat. Contrariwise, in the case of wild animals, nothing seems to 
                                                          
38 This is the distinction between the right to resources and territory and the right to jurisdiction (Ypi, 2009). I 
think property rights comes with the notion of sovereignty which is distinct from the sovereignty of political 
self-determination. Perhaps making a distinction between property sovereignty and political sovereignty can 
help make the discussion clearer.  
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count as imposition of laws, culture, and language of an alien community that would warrant 
the sovereignty appendix in addition to animal rights or wildlife property rights. Europeans can 
impose Christianity, languages, and loyalty to European royalty among African tribes. 
However, such imposition on wild animals can only be the content of fictional literature. 
Lastly, part of the alleged superiority of the sovereignty model over the property rights model 
is based on Donaldson and Kymlicka’s committing a straw man fallacy; they caricature John 
Hadley’s argument for wild animals’ property rights. As cited above, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
assert that “what wild animals need is not (or not only) a property right in an individual nest or 
den, say, but rather protection of their right to maintain their way of life on their territory—in 
short, they need sovereignty”. Clearly, a property rights argument for a bird’s nest or a hyena’s 
den is insufficient. But Hadley has clearly not argued for wild animals’ property rights in their 
isolated hiding, sleeping, or breeding spots.  He states unequivocally that “the paradigm case 
of nonhuman animal property ownership is enjoyment of a secure territory free from deleterious 
human impact” (Hadley, 2005: 306). Any doubt left as to the content of wildlife property rights, 
Hadley dispels with his book’s subtitle, A Theory of Habitat Rights for Wild Animals (Hadley, 
2015). It is thus clear that property rights for wild animals are essentially rights in their habitat 
and in the natural goods found within the habitats. This right proscribes not only extractive 
human activities but also any form of intrusion that will compromise wild animals’ enjoyment 
of their property, the habitat.  
Indigenous people already had/have moral title to their land and so do wild animals to their 
habitat. Morally justified legal rules or political conventions can only be seen as supervening 
on the pre-existing moral reality. The wrongness of colonialism comes from violation of 
property rights of indigenous people, the violation of political rights to self-rule among other 
racial injustices, and as Ypi (2009: 174) argues, the “violation of standards of equality and 
reciprocity in setting up political relations.”39 This does not mirror well dislocation of wild 
animals from their habitats, which, in my view, would be sufficiently forestalled by recognition 
of property rights of wild animals alone.  
In summing up, this chapter has tried to distil the concept of property from Anthony Honoré’s 
liberal conception of property. The result is a bundle of rights—rights to exclude, use, and 
security—that I believe are not ethnocentric or speciesist. Using this concept, I argue that the 
                                                          
39 I think Ypi’s Kantian analysis of what’s wrong with colonialism is tantamount to morally nonbinding contract. 
Necessary conditions for a morally binding contract are sanity of contractors, no withholding of information, no 
force or threat of force, and the end is not to violate some rights (see Hooker 2000: 53).  
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idea of owning wild animals is conceptually confused as the idea of wildlife rights does not 
comport with the idea human ownership of wildlife. Wildlife rights impose restrictions that 
would attenuate what it means to own something. Conversely, fully owning wildlife would 
dilute what it means for wildlife to have moral rights. Given the scarcity of the goods of life, 
whoever owns something usually does so to someone’s disadvantage. Morally, this calls for a 
stringent justification for excluding others from a resource. In this chapter, I explore ‘first 
occupancy’, ‘labour-mixing’, and ‘basic needs’ justifications. I find them wanting but 
illuminating, leading to a synthetic account of morally justified initial acquisition.  
Finally, the account of wildlife property faces the charge of inadequacy from Sue Donaldson 
and Kymlicka. Hence, in the rest of the chapter I try to fend off the threat posed by the rival 
theory of wildlife sovereignty. I argue that Donaldson and Kymlicka’s theory of wildlife 
sovereignty is not superior to John Hadley’s or my version of wildlife property theory. I argue 
that rather than filling up any conceptual vacuum in the protection of the moral rights of wild 
animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka misdiagnose a non-existent problem and prescribe a solution 
which, if adopted, would merely serve to muddy the discussion, prolonging it when what should 
now preoccupy political philosophers is the integration of wildlife rights into new or existing 
hitherto anthropocentric political theories and institutions to halt the massive dislocation of 
wildlife, degradation, and fragmentation of wildlife habitats.  
Rejection of human ownership of wild animals and affirmation of wild animals’ 
ownership of some natural goods has completed setting up the stage for re-evaluating 
human-wildlife relations. I will now turn to one of the most controversial topics in 
wildlife conservation and political ecology. This is the problem of human-wildlife 
conflict, broadly construed.  
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Chapter 6 Human-Wildlife Conflict:  A Rights-Based Analysis 
Humans have a love-hate relationship with wild animals. The relationship oscillates between 
protection and extirpation from time to time, from society to society, and from species to 
species. A plethora of changing values influences what happens at the human-wildlife interface. 
John Robinson has eloquently expressed some of the contrasts that colour the contours of our 
relationship with wild animals:  
Jaguars are cultural icons throughout South America, but they also are major predators of cattle. 
Baboons exhibit social shenanigans that keep ecotourists enthralled, but they also raid crops. 
Elephants elicit inordinate attention from conservationists, but they are a threat to human life and 
limb. Pigs, goats and donkeys are valued by animal rights advocates, but they tear up our parks 
and reserves (in Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz, 2005: xiv).  
The upshot of this human-wildlife relationship complex relationship is that even for human 
beings who for various reasons value wild animals, conflicts are an inescapable aspect of the 
moral terrain we share with wild animals. Acknowledging that wild animals have rights does 
not solve human-wildlife conflicts as such. However, what animal rights theory does is provide 
a different account of what legitimate human-wildlife conflicts are and the morally acceptable 
ways of preventing or resolving the conflicts whenever they might or do occur.  
This chapter navigates cases in which the rights or interests of wildlife conflict with those of 
humans. These cases, I shall refer to as instances of human-wildlife conflict. These instances 
include when a human threatens the life, health, or livelihood of a animal or vice versa. 
Sometimes the conflicts arise from mere perception of a threat rather than from an actual threat. 
Human use of wildlife ‘resources’ is not normally regarded as a token of human-wildlife 
conflict and neither are managerial practices that involve decimation or extirpation of wildlife. 
In my view, however, these are conflicts in the sense of parties of the two sides having prima 
facie irreconcilable interests. The killed wild animal presumably has an interest in not being 
killed while the wildlife managers’ interest is the opposite—killing the wild animal.  
A conflict of rights is, in my view, a legitimate conflict. Those conflicts arising from human 
interests to utilise wildlife are not, in my view, genuine conflicts of rights. This is because—as 
argued in the previous chapter—humans have no use rights in wildlife when wildlife rights 
prohibit the use. In the next section, I discuss the question of the moral legitimacy of self-
defence with a view to offering some insights into human-wildlife conflicts. Judith Jarvis 
Thomson is a thoroughgoing rightist and so, her theory of self-defence provides an appropriate 
starting point for my analysis of rights-based justification of self- and other- defence.  
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Before discussing the problem of self-defence in the context of human-wildlife conflict, I need 
to clarify a few important terms that spell out relationships in self-defence scenarios. Parties in 
the scenarios occupy roles of direct threats, indirect threats, bystanders, culpable threats, 
innocent threats, and victims. A being who is a threat puts another being, victim, in harm’s 
way. An indirect threat will not harm the victim but her movements, actions, or position 
contribute to the danger to the victim in a way that, were the indirect threat absent, the direct 
threat would cease to pose any danger to the victim. Unlike the indirect threat, the direct threat’s 
position, actions, or movements will in themselves actually harm the victim (Frowe, 2014: 32).  
Threats can be culpable or innocent. Unlike culpable threats, innocent threats lack ill intent and 
are not negligent either but they fortuitously pose a threat of harm to the putative victim. Judith 
Thomson suggests an even simpler way to understand innocence—as “free of fault” (Thomson, 
1991: 284 n1). By definition, whether directly or indirectly, moral patients—who include wild 
animals—are always in this category of innocent threats. This is because, “unlike human moral 
agents, they cannot be anything but innocent” (Regan, 2004a: 295).   
6.1 Critique of Thomson’s Account of Self-Defence 
Thomson (1991) offers a rights-based defence of self-defence. Let us look at one of the 
scenarios she presents. She asks us to imagine a man who, by no fault of his is falling towards 
you and you have no way of getting out of the way to your safety. “If you do nothing, the fat 
man will fall on you, and be safe. But he is very fat, so if he falls on you, he will squash you 
flat and thereby kill you” (Thomson, 1991: 287). The very fat man is a paradigmatic innocent 
threat. The man could have been pushed by some malicious person or it could be that he was 
merely blown off balance by an unpredictable strong gust of wind. He poses a threat to your 
life not as a moral agent but as a mere moral patient. According to Thomson, it is well within 
your rights to kill the fat man to save yourself, his innocence notwithstanding.  
Thomson's argument for self-defence in the fat man case or indeed any other case is as follows 
(Let us assume Y is the victim and X the threat):  
(1) X has a right to kill Y if and only if Y has no claim that X does not kill her.  
(2) Y has a claim that X does not kill her.  
(3) X has a duty to not kill Y. 
(4) If Y does not kill X, X will kill Y. 
(5) In threatening to kill Y, X loses his right that Y does not kill him.  
(6) Thus, it is permissible that Y defensively kills X.  
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Thomson stresses that “what makes it permissible for you to kill them is the fact that they will 
otherwise violate your rights [sic] that they not kill you.” (Thomson, 1991: 302n13). The point 
she is making is that moral agency is irrelevant to the permissibility of killing someone who 
would otherwise kill you. In other words, moral agents and moral patients are morally in the 
same position and the same account goes for them as to why they may be killed defensively. 
It is easy to see that we can substitute X with some carnivore or any wild animal that has the 
capacity to attack and injure or kill a human being who in this case substitutes the Y. In addition, 
although Thomson talks about killing, the question of self-defence need not always involve the 
use of lethal means. The structure of the argument remains the same whether we are talking 
about killing or some other non-lethal but harmful forms of defence such as pepper-spraying, 
tasing, or darting to disarm a threat. With these remarks, I will proceed to evaluating Thomson’s 
argument. 
Although I agree with Thomson's conclusion and with premises (1) and (4), I find her insistence 
on (2), (3), and (5) problematic. Premises (2) and (3) are logically equivalent. Thus, they fall 
or stand together. I will address these first before addressing number (5).  
Thomson holds that the fat man who, by no fault of his, falls in a narrow well and will certainly 
kill you while he survives unless you kill him first would violate your right just as a malicious 
driver steering his truck towards you would. She rejects the hypothesis “that the fault-free driver 
[or fat man] violates no right of yours if you do not stop him, and therefore does not cease to 
possess a right by virtue of what he does” (Thomson, 1991: 301-302). Because for her what 
matters is only that, if not killed, the threat would have violated the victim’s right, Thomson 
posits the same explanation for the justifiability of killing the threats irrespective of whether 
they willed their behaviour or not. This conflation of a villainous driver, innocent driver, and 
innocent fat man is rightly questioned by Benbaji (2005) and Frowe (2014).40  
To give a rights-based account of innocent threats, we must recall the internal structure of a 
right. A right—we noted in Chapter 2—must have a subject, content, and a respondent. The 
subject of a right is any being whose interests could be aided or frustrated. The respondent—
as the term suggests—must be someone capable of responding to a prohibition or requirement 
in the right’s content. In other words, the respondent must be able to recognise the content of 
                                                          
40 I disagree with the alternative accounts supplied by Benbaji and Frowe, which, however, I will not delve into 
here. Space allows me only to insert my own conceptual wedge between defence against a villainous aggressor 
and against a fault-free free-falling right-bearer. I must note, however, that unlike Benbaji’s and Frowe’s, my 
wedge seeks to remain loyal to the Hohfeldian framework.  
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the right and alter her behaviour accordingly. It only makes sense to hold certain rights against 
a being that has the ability to grasp the notion of a right (that is, the subject, content, and 
recognition of herself as the respondent) and the capacity to respond appropriately. Only moral 
agents fulfil this requirement. Rights prescribe or proscribe how the respondent ought (or ought 
not) to behave. Therefore, anyone or anything that cannot respond appropriately to the 
prescription or proscription cannot qualify as a respondent. Thus, boulders and moral patients 
cannot be respondents to any rights. They are not—pace Thomson—the sort of beings against 
whom we can have a claim-right that they do not kill us.  
If X cannot respond to our rights, then we cannot have rights against X. And if X cannot respond 
to our rights, then X cannot have duties to respond to our rights. Therefore, we must reject the 
argument that predicates the permissibility of our killing X on X’s failure to abide by the duty 
not to kill us. My own account of why we are justified in attacking those unjustifiably 
threatening us involves merely pointing out and correcting what I think is a minor oversight in 
Thompson’s account.  This misstep occurs in premise (5)—the assertion that, “In threatening 
to kill Y, X loses his right that Y does not kill him.” Thomson’s account leaves a mystery of 
how the aggressor loses or forfeits his claim-right against being attacked by the putative victim.  
The flaw in Thomson’s account, I believe, consists in restricting her account to first-order 
rights-relations. In Thomson’s account, all the justificatory work is done by claim-rights, 
liberty-rights, and their correlatives. Consequently, Thomson misses a crucial turn, and missing 
this turn leads her to conflate otherwise discrete cases of the villainous and innocent threats. 
The conflation lies in her asserting that both villainous and innocent may be killed because they 
would otherwise violate the victim’s right. The turn she misses becomes evident when we 
consider L. W. Sumner’s analysis of the Hohfeldian framework of rights. Sumner explains that 
the first-order relations involving claim/duty and liberty/no-claim are static. Beings are, so to 
say, frozen in these moral positions. But the second-order alethic relations introduce into rights 
relations some dynamism.  
The dynamism introduced by alethic rights relations can help us understand how moral 
positions change in real-life’s continuously changing moral landscapes. The power-right is at 
the pivot of this flexibility. I must quote at length: 
Basically, I have the power to affect (that is, alter or sustain) some normative relation just in case the rules 
of the system make it possible for me to do so. A rule which confers a power thus creates the normative 
analogue of a physical ability. Familiar instances of powers in rule systems include … the capacity of 
individuals to alter their own normative relations by making agreements, and so on (Sumner, 1987: 29).  
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The power-right is not only exercisable in altering one’s normative relations but also of those 
who wittingly or unwittingly come under one’s power. Ways to alter moral relations between 
X and Y include giving away to the other what one has and entering agreements. In both these 
two ways, both X and Y—themselves or through some legitimate proxies—voluntarily accept 
the new moral relations. This emanates from one of the most important interests, the interest in 
self-determination. But voluntariness is not necessary for change of rights-relations. One’s 
moral rights and correlative moral burdens can change involuntarily or non-voluntarily. 
However, this happened, by entering into your moral zone any moral patient becomes liable to 
your decisions relative to the gravity of the intrusion. We are on the verge of explaining the 
mystery of how innocent and culpable aggressors alike may lose their right to life.  
My moral zone is the domain under which I have the final word on what happens to me or 
others. In other words, I have powers. Within the confines of this domain, those who enter it 
become subject to my decisions. In Hohfeldian terms, by entering Y’s moral zone, X’s moral 
status changes from immunity to liability corresponding to changes in Y’s moral status 
changing from disability to power. It is important to note that Y’s having a power-right against 
X means only that Y may alter X’s claim-right into a no-claim. Y’s having this power-right 
against X gives to Y the hitherto unavailable liberty-right to harm X. It does not follow—as 
Thomson thinks it does—that X loses or forfeits her claim-right. For all we know, Y may be a 
pacifist or a martyrdom-seeker who may decide against altering X’s claim-right. This account 
comports well with a very important dimension of self-defence namely, other-defence.  
Other-defence or alter ego defence involves “cases in which you cannot save yourself but 
someone else can” (Thomson, 1991: 305). We can express the same thought by saying other-
defence involves cases where you are not imperilled but you are in a position to save somebody 
else who is. I think it is important to note that Thomson’s definition of other-defence highlights 
the victim’s inability rather than the victim’s unwillingness to defend herself. This makes an 
important moral difference in the justification of other-defence.  
We ask the same question as in self-defence but with actors being different: “Is the third party 
justified in killing an aggressor against an innocent putative victim?” Thomson answers 
affirmatively with the caveat that leaves room for agent-relativity.41 She states that self- and 
                                                          
41 To appreciate the importance of this caveat, imagine that the man falling in the narrow well is the beloved son 
of the elderly and sickly man at the bottom of the well. It is easy to see that the elderly man might sacrifice 
himself for his beloved son to live. This agent-point-of-view is prima facie opaque from a third party’s point of 
view.  
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other- defence “are not exactly two sides of the same coin in light of considerations of 
autonomy” (Thomson, 1991: 306). The introduction of considerations of autonomy brings in 
the possibility of a third-party meddling where they should not be meddling. The third-party 
would be justified in killing the aggressor only if the victim implicitly or explicitly wishes that 
the third-party intervene. Other-defence is not agent-neutral for this reason that, in responding 
as if it were a case of self-defence, the third-party might actually not only violate the right of 
the victim but also of the threat since the threat’s loss of a claim-right is incumbent upon the 
victim’s decision. Other-defence is therefore permissible only in cases where the victim cannot, 
and not so in those cases where the victim simply will not defend herself. Thomson’s analysis 
is interesting and sounds plausible. I think, however, that there is more to the story of the 
asymmetry between self- and other-defence.  
There seems to be an agent-relative privilege in self-defense that is absent for other-defence 
that is not explicable merely by reference to the inability/unwillingness distinction. This 
difference is that whereas self-defence by the innocent is justified in cases of innocent threats 
and culpable threats alike, other things being equal, other-defence is justified only in cases of 
culpable threats. I do not have any confident argument for this. I can only timidly venture three 
explanations, some that are perhaps more sociological than philosophic.  
The first explanation for the asymmetry in permissibility for self-and other- defence is that in 
the case of an innocent threat, we are faced with a situation where innocent people, who, in 
Jonathan Quong’s words, are “tragically locked in a lethal conflict” (Quong, 2012: 58). In this 
scenario, the call is not for third parties to make and, in fact, we have to sympathise with the 
victim that she had to harm an innocent being, albeit permissibly so. At the same time, we feel 
sorry for the innocent threat for finding himself in such an unenviable situation where, despite 
his innocence, his defending himself is morally impermissible for he has strayed into a power 
domain of another rendering himself liable to defensive harm.  
Secondly, in the case of the culpable threat, other-defence is prima facie permissible because 
the assailant violates some shared moral norms against malicious or negligent harm to others. 
The assailant’s threat is thus recognised by other moral agents as unjust and, arguably, everyone 
has permission to prevent an injustice. The reason for this agent-neutral permission is easy to 
see on the rights account. The assailant lacks any claim-right whatsoever that others do not stop 
him from causing wrongful harm to others. This logically translates to the implication that 
everyone else has a liberty-right to stop the assailant from harming the victim. It is again easy 
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to see why this is the case. Causing wrongful harm to others does not track any element of the 
assailant’s wellbeing, and of course, the function of moral rights is to protect some elements of 
wellbeing. The victim in this case has some important interest to protect whereas the assailant 
has none. 
Lastly, other-defense of an innocent victim is disguised self-defense.42 When a driver 
maliciously steers his truck towards an innocent pedestrian, he does not threaten her alone; he 
threatens all of us. When some serial killer strikes in a community, the prevention of the next 
attack is a matter of self-preservation or a matter of protecting those dear to us. I have every 
reason to fear for my life when a man is on the loose who kills only for his sadistic pleasure. 
So, his threatening another, gives me permission to act defensively as if in my own behalf. To 
adapt John Locke, by threatening one of us, the culpable aggressor has “declared War against 
all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as … one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom 
Men can have no … Security” (1967, supra note 2, at 278). A threat upon one is a threat upon 
all and a defence of one is a defence of all. However, this third justification for alter ego defence 
suffers from a problem that it cannot be generalised without some qualifications. It seems less 
problematic if the state is the defender, though.  
The foregoing analyses, albeit timid ones, bring us to a happy ending with respect to wild 
animals. We have no permission, all things considered, to intervene when a predator attacks 
another wild animal or, as the case may be, a human being. Only innocent victims may defend 
themselves or may be defended by others against wild animal threats. On the other hand, when 
a moral agent threatens to violate a wild animal’s rights, we are within our rights to interfere 
on behalf of the victim to prevent an injustice from occurring. The laws regarding self- and 
other- defence must change to reflect non-speciesist prohibitions and permissions that are not 
biased in their content towards humans.  
Speciesist bias is currently pervasive in the way that human threats to wildlife are treated and 
vice versa. As Bernard Rollin observes, in many states in the United States “a farmer can shoot 
a dog that crosses his property as a potential threat to livestock. Ironically … a householder 
                                                          
42 This point applies to other-defence of the innocent even against an innocent threat where the threat is a 
carnivore. Human-eating carnivores such as those in J. H. Patterson’s The Man-Eaters of Tsavo are a good 
example showing how an attack on one can spiral into a threat for all. “At first [the two man-eating lions] were 
not always successful in their effort to carry off a victim, but as time went on they stopped at nothing and indeed 
braved any danger in order to obtain their favourite food” (Patterson, 2015: 10). I give this example only for 
demonstration and not to show Patterson was justified in lethally defending himself and his workers. It might as 
well have been that the humans violated the lion’s territorial rights, eaten or scared away the lions’ usual prey, 
and this is why the lions needed an alternative diet of human flesh.  
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may not shoot a burglar or robber unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that his life is 
threatened (Rollin, 2006: 155).43 Of course, I assume—as I believe Rollin does—that livestock 
is here being seen as property and so they are not being defended as right holders. It is also 
well-known that stray dogs in the Third World are systematically killed on mere suspicion that 
they pose a public health threat of rabies to humans, which treatment is not extended to humans 
confirmed to be carrying contagious pathogens. In the remainder of this chapter, I apply some 
of the theoretic principles arrived at here and in preceding chapters to human-wildlife relations.   
6.2 Other-defence of Wildlife against Human Threats 
Under the current political arrangements, the defence of wildlife is primarily the role of states. 
Thus, wildlife living within the Amboseli National Park are under the protection of the Kenyan 
state. In performing this task of defending wildlife, governments have sometimes employed a 
highly militaristic approach that involves a shoot-to-kill policy against suspected poachers 
found in wildlife territories. This seems a clear-cut case of other-defence and this section shall 
be limited to a discussion of this, if controversial, approach. 
In the mid 1980’s, Zimbabwe launched Operation Stronghold whose core was the shoot-to-kill 
policy. The operation was devised to tackle the rife poaching of elephants and rhinos for their 
tusks and horns respectively. Within a decade of its launch in 1984, about 170 poachers had 
been killed, the majority being Zambian and a few Mozambicans and Zimbabweans (Duffy, 
2000).44 In 1988, Daniel arap Moi, then Kenyan President, issued a shoot-to-kill directive 
against poachers (Boynton, 2014: 34). As narrated by then Director of the Kenyan Wildlife 
Services, Richard Leakey, in his memoir Wildlife Wars, the poachers were killing not only 
elephants but also tourists and game rangers, and had also killed a lion conservationist. Richard 
Leakey was happy with the directive. He issued a strong warning: “This is the last stroke for 
the marauders in our national parks and game reserves. If they are wise, they will leave these 
areas—now! …. We are here and everywhere; we are looking for you and we will find you. 
And when we do, that’s the end” (Leakey, 2002: 100-101). In a matter of days three Somalian 
                                                          
43 The apparent bias may be because of several nonlethal means of dealing with the human threat that may not 
be available in the case of a animal threat. However, doubts justifiably linger that dogs—being dogs—are 
deemed more disposable than humans qua human. In the absence of a rabies outbreak, one would expect a non-
speciesist policy to recommend nonlethal means of preventing dog attacks. The danger posed by burglars seems 
more clear and imminent than that of a stray dog who may have simply lost his way home or has been neglected 
by his human guardian.  
44 It is not clear exactly how many wild animals were poached during the same interval. It is, however, estimated 
that from the time commercial poaching of the black rhino began in Zimbabwe to the early 1990s, black rhino 
numbers in the wild had dwindled from 3000 to 240-350 (Duffy, 2000: 45).  
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poachers were killed, after which Leakey told a park warden: “You know, I used to wonder if 
we could really stop these poachers. But now I know we can” (Leakey, 2002: 103).  
The Botswana Defence Force provides a more recent case of the shoot-to-kill policy, albeit an 
unwritten one. The Environment Minister is reported to have said that “if you want to come to 
poach in Botswana, you may not go back to your country alive … and poachers would be shot 
even if they surrendered” (Konopo, Ntibinyane, and Mongudhi, 2016). In the last twenty years, 
twenty-two Zimbabwean and thirty Namibian poachers have been killed by the Botswana 
Defence Force. We can conjecture that poachers allegedly killed are far outnumbered by the 
elephants and rhinos killed, though without the shoot-to-kill policy there would probably have 
been many more elephants and rhinos killed. 
The point of the above cases is that states have defended or can defend wild animals even if 
this means killing the human aggressors. Opponents of the shoot-to-kill approach often refer to 
violation of human rights by militarised anti-poaching units. That is fair enough. Ideally, no 
rights should be violated and, if the killed men are poachers, no rights are violated. It is 
noteworthy that in the poacher fatalities mentioned above, the majority of them are from 
neighbouring countries. There can be very little doubt what the men were doing in wildlife 
protected areas that are sometimes hundreds of miles from their own countries. Further, Richard 
Leakey has aptly described the poachers as “willing to kill every last animal in a herd. These 
poachers and their backers were ruthless”45 (Leakey, 2002: 2). Some protesters complain of 
wildlife agencies treating wild animals as though they were more important than humans. This 
may, however, turn to be mere speciesism. If their own villages were under attack from foreign 
rebels pillaging, raping, and killing their fellow villagers, it is doubtful the villagers or their 
sympathisers would complain that the lives of the locals were being regarded as more important 
than those of foreign militia killed on sight.  
Poaching is more a war scenario than some isolated crime. Some poachers use military-grade 
weapons to kill wild animals or wildlife wardens. As Richard Leakey reported, wild animals 
“were not being killed with spears and arrows by poor, hungry tribesmen; they were being 
                                                          
45 Richard Leakey’s assertion is based on the recovery of ivory that indicated some short tusks came from very 
young elephants. In an interview (September 2013) I had with a ‘former’ poacher in South Luangwa National 
Park, Zambia, I learned about the tenacity of the poachers in their poaching. I asked why the poachers continue 
with their poaching even after their colleagues are imprisoned or are killed by wild animals. His response was a 
rhetorical question whether mines are closed because a mine collapse has killed some miners. For him, being 
arrested, imprisoned, or killed is an occupational risk like any other.  
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killed with automatic weapons by well-organised bands” (Leakey, 2002: 4).46 More recently, 
in one of the world’s most dangerous national parks, according to National Geographic—
Virunga National Park—for example, 152 park rangers have been killed since 1996 mainly by 
militia operating within the park (Draper, 2016: 62). Over a period of ten years, a total of one 
thousand park rangers in thirty-five countries had been killed by poachers (Parry, 2014: 17).  
I have described the shoot-to-kill as if it were other-defence in line with my rights-based 
analysis of other-defence. However, this is not the case. Leakey describes elephant poaching 
as “orchestrated economic sabotage” of the Kenyan tourism-reliant economy (Leakey, 2002: 
4). Glenn Tatham, head of Zimbabwe’s Operation Stronghold was more categorical. His 
justification of the shoot-to-kill policy was that “the rangers were carrying out their duties and 
protecting the national heritage in the same way that the police would protect a bank vault 
against armed robbers” (Duffy, 2000: 49). Elephants and rhinos are clearly seen as bank 
vaults—foreign exchange earners or GDP boosters—by many African governments and 
citizens. It seems evident, then, that the motivation for defending wild animals using lethal 
force is not the protection of animals’ rights but rather, protection of other human’s economic 
or property rights. However, the shoot-to-kill helps us to see what other-defence of wildlife 
would be like. If we can shoot to protect wildlife for our economic interests, we have an even 
stronger reason to kill poachers in defence of wildlife rights.  
6.3 Wildlife Threats to Humans 
In this section, I discuss some impacts on humans resulting from human-wildlife conflict. 
Human-wildlife conflict impacts severely on the lives and livelihoods of humans especially 
those living near national parks but also including visitors to national parks. I focus only on 
direct threats to humans or to human property. The moral question I try to answer is, “What—
from the rights view—are the morally permissible ways of preventing or managing the 
conflicts?” 
Thirgood, Woodroffe, and Rabinowitz (2005) have provided a five-fold typology of the sources 
or manifestations of conflicts between wildlife and humans. These are, (1) human fatalities and 
injuries, (2) transmission of disease, (3) predation on livestock, (4) predation on game, and (5) 
                                                          
46 It may have been the case at the time and place Leakey was referring to that it was not the poor killing elephants 
with spears. But a UK Daily Mirror in-depth investigation reports a poacher who had killed seventy elephants 
using a spear (Parry, 2014). Watson et al. (2013) have also demonstrated wide use of indiscriminate wire-snaring 
whose ease of setting up, low cost, and low risk of detection make them a particularly dangerous means of 
poaching by the poor and hungry villagers living close to national parks. Even though the intended prey are smaller 
wild animals, large herbivores and carnivores are maimed or killed when they are inadvertently caught in the traps.   
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crop depredation. I will only add one more: (6) competition for scarce natural goods. The list 
seems comprehensive enough for my purposes here although the fifth category will be 
expanded to include all damage to property. It is also possible that a single conflictual incident 
has more than one of these aspects. I will discuss these six types of conflicts in turn with greater 
attention to human fatalities and injuries. First, I will summarily deal with (3), (4), and (6), 
which, in my view, are side-issues of discussions of earlier chapters or at least issues about 
which there is widespread consensus among animal ethicists. Later I will discuss (1), (2), and 
(5) with (2) as essentially a subset of (1). 
Wild animals sometimes prey on cattle, goats or sheep kept by humans for their own slaughter 
and consumption. The rights view already rules out use of animals in this way (Regan, 2004b; 
Francione, 1995). Without animal husbandry, predation of livestock would virtually cease to 
be a source of human wildlife conflict. However, not all domestic animals are kept in a way or 
for purposes that are morally impermissible. Companion animals, rescued and adopted animals 
are examples of animals that may live with humans without their rights necessarily being 
violated. Due to their dependency on their human friends or carers, such animals have an 
acquired or emergent positive right that the humans defend them against wild animals (See 
Beauchamp, 2011). In other words, humans have fiduciary duties towards these animals, which 
include the duties to defend those under their care. However, most domestic animals are bred 
for human use as meat or some other animal uses. With these uses reduced or eliminated, there 
would be fewer domestic animals, which in turn would reduce the number of attractants that 
contribute to human-wildlife conflict. Hence, in the case of predation on livestock, human 
‘owners’ are not victims.  
Some human-carnivore conflicts arise from carnivore “limitation of economically valuable 
prey populations” (Thirgood, Woodroffe, and Rabinowitz, 2005: 21). For example, in North 
America, brown bears and grey wolves are persecuted and culled for preying on moose and 
caribou that are valuable prey to humans as well. Moose and caribou are highly valued for their 
meat by Alaskan residents and non-residents while moose antlers are also sought after as 
trophies. However, the conflict between humans and carnivores for limited prey is morally not 
a conflict of rights but one of conflict of interests. The carnivore rights are legitimate, as argued 
in Chapter 4’s discussion of the problem of predation. In contrast, human interests are 
illegitimate; they do not yield moral rights. The moral asymmetry is that, whereas the grey 
wolves and the brown bears have a liberty-right to their subsistence, humans have no claims 
against the carnivores’ liberty-right to hunt. Further, humans have a duty to not kill moose, 
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caribou, or any other wildlife. Hence, wildlife policy should reflect these moral relations by 
prohibiting humans from interfering with predation and from preying on any wildlife.  
Also noteworthy is that carnivore predation on humans and livestock is at least in part due to 
human hunting of prey species. Reduced prey populations make it harder for carnivores to find 
their traditional prey. Humans and domestic animals such as dogs make an attractive 
alternative. It seems a policy to prohibit human predation of herbivores and omnivores would 
go some way in preventing human fatalities and injuries resulting from carnivore attacks.  
Conflicts between wild animals and humans result in deaths and injuries to both wildlife and 
humans. Dangerous incidents resulting in deaths or injuries occur during various mundane 
everyday activities. Obviously, carnivores will always pose a threat to humans in one way or 
another especially as predators. The big cats, wolves, and hyenas evoke an evolutionary fear in 
humans as humans are potential food. In addition to carnivores, human contact with mega-
herbivores can also end in death or injury to humans and wildlife. For example, in Lupande 
game management area (about 1800sq. miles), in Zambia, 78 elephants and 33 humans died 
within a period of five years beginning 2004. The number of elephants killed includes only 
deaths from Problem Animal Control operations. Cases of elephants killed from retaliatory 
attacks by humans are not documented (Nyirenda et al., 2013: 108). Quigley and Herrero (2005: 
43) remind us “that often when attacks occur—whether provoked or unprovoked—the animal 
is pursued and killed.”  
Provocation or lack thereof is important to the analysis of ethical response to hostile human-
wildlife encounters. Provoked attacks by wildlife occur “when a person(s) enters an animal’s 
personal space or purposely tries to touch, injure or kill the animal and the animal attacks, or 
the person(s) had human food or garbage attractants … within the animal’s personal space” 
(Quigley and Herrero, 2005: 29). Famous wildlife presenter Steve Irwin is a good example of 
the danger of entering the ‘personal’ space even of a perceived benign wildlife. While filming 
for a documentary, he swam too close to a stingray, which struck him lethally. Some tourists 
have faced a similar fate. Of the seven fatal wildlife attacks in South Africa between 1988 and 
1997, three “tourists left their vehicles and approached the pride [of lions] on foot for closer 
photographs” while two others were killed by hippos because—against clear regulations—they 
walked in an unfenced area and for walking too close to a hippo calf (Fennell, 2012: 222).  
There is reason to believe that many cases in which fatal and injurious conflicts occur between 
human and wildlife are a result of provocation by humans. Experts on carnivore attacks on 
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humans are categorical: “In all these cases, the animal is defending itself or some attractant or 
possession. The offensive action—the attack—is initiated by the animal due to a perceived 
threat” (Quigley and Herrero, 2005: 33). In addition, it is a truism that wild animals—whether 
carnivores or mega-herbivores—act more defensively and aggressively when they have 
vulnerable offspring among them.  
Many wild animals have territorial behaviour. Lions, for example, mark and aggressively patrol 
and defend their territories while roaring to warn off would-be-intruders. This territorial 
behaviour should be known by both park officials and visitors alike. As one commentator 
observed, “It’s pretty straightforward, really. The tourists are stupid…. The rangers … are over-
worked and under-funded” (Fennell, 2012: 222). It appears, therefore, that it is human beings 
who require management to prevent conflicts rather than resorting to killing wild animals to 
resolve conflicts resulting from some human’s careless or irresponsible actions.  
Cases of provocation of wildlife by humans are cases where it seems the wild animals have a 
moral right to self- and other- defence against perceived or real human threats.47 Not only may 
the mother elephant kill the threat to itself or its young one, but human agents may also do so 
in their behalf. As argued above, the agent-relativity complication does not arise in the case of 
defence of moral patients. Current legislation does not consider interspecies equality that moral 
rights confer. Apart from cases involving poachers, the defence situation is rigged in advance 
in favour of human threats to wildlife.  
Sometimes there are media reports of tourists who fly out of the safety of their home countries 
and then walk out of the safety of their vehicles for an up-close photograph of some wild animal 
and then are lethally defended when the wild animal—most likely feeling threatened—attacks 
them.48 The case of the killing of Harambe,49 a gorilla at Cincinnati Zoo, because he was 
perceived as a threat to a human who had strayed into Harambe’s enclosure is indicative of the 
wildlife and tourism policy in conflictual human-wildlife contacts. Provoked or not, the policy 
                                                          
47 Compare, for example, with the Stand your Ground law in Texas, Florida, and other states in the United States 
that justify the use of lethal force on mere perception of threat to oneself as warranting shooting the perceived 
threat.  
48 I am making here the supposition that many wildlife tourist destinations have sufficient warnings about 
appropriate tourist behaviour. However, often times, adventurous tourists may simply relish the thrill of violating 
the regulations and having instead to stare death in the face. David Fennell reports as follows the thinking of some 
tourists for getting too close to wild animals: “This trip is expensive, and we deserve the opportunity to have some 
‘extras’…. Just think what my friends at home will say when I tell them I actually got to pet an orang-utan!” 
(Fennell, 2012: 203). Quong (2012: 52) describes a similar but hypothetical case—Delia’s Risky Behaviour.  
49 See Paula Casal’s (2016) “Death of the Zoo” where she gives brief but illuminating reflections on the 
Harambe incident and about the phenomenon of zoos. 
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seems to be that it is the human being who must be defended against the wild animal. On the 
rights view, this approach is morally untenable. Rights are moral levellers and, therefore, in 
cases of provocation by humans, if non-lethal means cannot be used to rescue him, the human 
must be left to his own fate.  
My argument for self- and other- defence is applicable only in cases of a threat to an innocent 
victim. But where human beings recklessly stray into wildlife’s ‘personal space’ or they 
deliberately provoke wild animals, they are no longer innocent and self-defence is no longer a 
morally open option. True, where nonlethal means of self- or other- defence are available, even 
a culpable threat might be saved from potentially lethal defensive action by wildlife. Other 
penalties may be more appropriate than letting a careless photographer be killed when we can 
harmlessly scare off the defensive wild animal.      
Instinctively, a human will defend herself against a wild animal’s defensive attack. If the human 
being successfully defends herself non-lethally, she must be punished for violating the wild 
animal’s right by the initial threat and any subsequent injuries suffered by the wild animal. The 
punishment meted on her must be as severe as it would have been if she had caused comparable 
injury to a fellow human. If she lethally defends herself, this is a violation of the wild animal’s 
right to life and must be accompanied by sanctions that parallel cases of homicide. Lethally 
defending oneself in such cases is a double rights violation. The wild animal has a right to not 
be threatened as threatening is a form of harm that affects negatively the wild animal’s 
wellbeing through anxiety and associated opportunity costs such as relocating young ones.  
Secondly, the wild animal has a right to not be killed, a right that she is liable to lose only if 
she attacks a non-threatening innocent human who then decides to use his power-right to alter 
the wild animal’s claim-right to life into a no-claim. Perhaps the most important point is that 
wildlife that defensively attacks humans must not be killed. It does not matter that the human 
who strays into the gorilla’s space, for example, is innocent. It suffices that the animal feels 
threatened in its space. In fact, a lion must not be killed even to save a child who has been 
neglected to stray into its space by his mentally infirm mother. Other means may be used to 
rescue the child but not lethal or seriously harmful means.  
Some attacks on humans by wildlife are unprovoked. Unprovoked attacks by wildlife are those 
in which the human victim did not do anything to agitate the wild animal and cause them to 
become aggressive. Sometimes wild animals stray into human settlements and pose threats or 
wreak havoc to human property. Several factors can lead to unprovoked attacks. These factors 
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include predation, presence of disease that makes the wild animal irritable or aggressive, or 
wildlife seeking right of way (Quigley and Herrero, 2005: 33). For some carnivores—especially 
those that are very hungry, very weak, or very old—humans are an alternative source of food 
to animals the carnivores normally prey on. A sick or injured animal can be dangerous even if 
unprovoked by humans. Wildlife normally have established routes or migration corridors for 
going to look for food or to sources of water. In all these cases, humans who happen to be 
nearby are in danger. These are, all things being equal, cases of threats against innocent human 
victims. As argued above, the humans have a right to self- or other- defence against individual 
animals that attack.  
However, the devil is in the detail of what makes things equal (or unequal). Provocation seems 
to connote actions taken in close temporal and spatial proximity. Yet growing human 
populations and increased development activity may exacerbate human-wildlife conflicts. 
What this means is that care must be taken to ascertain the relevant facts before we can defend 
or make rules to defend humans under attack by seemingly unprovoked wildlife.  
Another serious manifestation of the human-wildlife conflict is crop raids by herbivores and 
omnivores. This can fall under provoked or unprovoked threats posed by wildlife. As Quigley 
and Herrero (2005) have pointed out, provocation can be in the form of food and garbage 
attractants. Growing (certain) crops near protected wildlife territory can thus be provocation or 
invitation of certain herbivores and omnivores. Unprovoked crop-raiding is still a possibility 
especially where natural food is scarce due to environmental or climatic conditions such as 
drought. Crop-raids can be very costly to wild animals especially through retaliatory killings 
by farmers. Innocent farmers have a right to defend their crop or farm produce against wildlife. 
However, to prevent excessive and arbitrary defensive actions, it is desirable that management 
strategies are put in place for state agencies to do the defensive work for the farmers whenever 
it is possible to do so.  
Furthermore, wild animals are not moral agents. For this reason, I do not think the so-called 
retaliatory attacks by villagers on wildlife are retaliation in the conventional sense, against wild 
animals. I think such attacks should be understood as protests against ineffective wildlife 
governance by government agencies and conservation nongovernmental organisations or as 
pre-emptive defensive actions. Ineffectiveness by relevant agencies can be in the form of failing 
to prevent the attacks or crop raids by wild animals or failing to provide adequate and timely 
compensation for damage or loss caused by wild animals. 
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6.4 Bushmeat and Rural Livelihoods 
One of the commonest uses of wild animals is as meat―a source of nutrients or a source of 
palatal pleasure. Let us call this use subsistence hunting, which Gary Comstock defines as the 
“traditional practice ... of habitually killing [wild] animals at a sustainable rate to feed one’s 
self and family when no other adequate sources of protein are available” (Comstock, 2004: 
360). This is a good definition except for some minor corrections. It does not seem that hunting 
needs to be ‘traditional’ or ‘habitual’ to be subsistence hunting. A lone plane-crash survivor 
who hunts and kills wild animals to survive is obviously a subsistence hunter even though doing 
so is neither traditional nor habitual. Additionally, the association between subsistence and 
protein deficiency is largely a by-product of literacy. Many rural and illiterate people hunt and 
kill simply because they are hungry or because meat is tastier than available protein-rich plant-
based foods. In my view, it is still subsistence hunting if a vegetarian villager kills an impala 
to generate some money to buy some plant-based foods, for example, after a poor crop season. 
Lastly, subsistence need not be restricted to food. I do not see why hunting to earn some money 
to build some basic shelter or clothing should not be classed as subsistence hunting. It is 
subsistence hunting provided it is not excessive or for luxuries.  
Meat obtained from carcasses of wild animals is part of the diet of people all over the world. 
The off-take is however highest in West-Central Africa with lower but still significant killing 
and consumption in Asia and South America (Brown and Davies, 2007). In recent estimates, 
figures of bushmeat consumption in the Congo Basin alone for example, “range between one 
and five million tonnes per annum” (Brown and Davies, 2007: 1). If we project these estimates 
over a five-year period and convert tonnes of meat into individual wild animals, we are looking 
at ‘speciecide’ worse than any genocide in human history.  
A study by Taylor Brown and Stuart A. Mark among the Bisa people in northern Zambia—
where I originally came from—provides some details of hunting at household and community 
level.  According to Brown and Stuart (2007) in a village of about 2,600 people, twelve percent 
are directly involved in hunting either as hunters as meat carriers. Furthermore, not only is the 
bushmeat a source of protein to the villagers but about “one-third of all local households gain 
at least some income from [the bushmeat] trade” (Brown and Taylor, 2007: 92). In the past, 
when wild animals “where killed or snared, the meat was distributed to residents within the 
hunter’s village” (Brown and Stuart, 2007: 94). However, with improved hunting methods and 
increased market demand for bushmeat, hunters target and kill more and larger mammals for 
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urban markets such as Ndola on the Copperbelt (310 miles away) and Lusaka, Zambia’s capital 
(400 miles away).  
The case of the Bisa people around the North Luangwa National Park mirrors that of the Kunda 
people around the South Luangwa National Park. Watson et al. (2013), for example, have 
discovered a positive correlation between the increase in demand for bushmeat and the increase 
in wire-snaring of wild animals in South Luangwa National Park and adjacent buffer zones or 
Game Management Areas.  In fact, to varying shades of seriousness, this is the picture of the 
bushmeat consumption and trade in Africa (see Davies and Brown, 2007).  
The cases of ordinary people living adjacent to national parks constitute what I refer to as soft 
cases as they are relatively easier to resolve. Some of the households are now made up of 
immigrants from other villages or even urban areas while some have attained at least a basic 
level of education or have acquired some income-generating skills that can enable them engage 
in livelihoods that are not dependent on wildlife exploitation. In short, usually, they have viable 
alternative sources of income that already exist or may be created as the Zambian initiative, 
Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) demonstrates (see Lewis, 2007; Dale 
Lewis’ COMACO overview video interview at http://www.itswild.org/).  
There are, however, morally hard cases of subsistence hunting by humans who need to kill wild 
animals in order to survive. Oft-cited cases are those of tribal peoples who more or less share 
habitats with wild animals and the lives of the humans are so intricately interwoven with those 
of the wild animals and the ecosystem that the solutions available for the soft cases seem less 
plausible in such hard cases. I will address the special case of tribal peoples in the next section. 
However, the overarching question is the same in soft and hard cases: Is it morally permissible 
for humans in dire need of bushmeat for nutrition to kill wild animals for their consumption? 
Is it morally permissible for them to use wild animals merely as a resource for their sustenance?  
Let us begin with the most clear-cut cases where killing is necessary for survival. Such a case 
presents itself most clearly in the case of a lone plane-crash survivor. The deer he is about to 
kill has a right that he does not kill it; he has a duty not to kill it. His killing the deer is clearly 
a violation of the deer’s negative right. It follows that the survivor ought not to kill the deer 
even if he faces the hard choice of kill or starve. The direness of one’s need does not change 
the moral landscape in this case. Our neediness does not dissipate rights other people or animals 
have that we do not help ourselves to their limb or property.  
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On the rights view, the deer’s moral relation to the survivor does not change as the survivor 
becomes more vulnerable to starvation. The survivor has no power-right over the deer before 
or after the plane-crash. Since the deer has the same right as innocent humans in relation to the 
survivor, it is helpful to check our speciesist intuitions by substituting the deer with an innocent 
human being. Immediately, it becomes clear cannibalism will not be morally permissible in 
this instance as long as the survivor will first have to kill an innocent human being for his meal. 
Killing a being with a right not to be killed in order for you to survive is simply impermissible 
egoism. Therefore, the threat of malnutrition or starvation to poor people is not an adequate 
moral reason for subsistence hunting.  
Subsistence hunting is not the only form of hunting tied to rural livelihoods. Trophy hunting is 
another form of hunting that hunters, conservationists, and some philosophers justify by 
appealing to rural people’s subsistence needs. Alastair S. Gunn and David Schmidtz represent 
philosophers for whom human survival or economic needs trump the rights of the hunted wild 
animals. Both support trophy hunting as necessary for the survival of wild animals. Their 
approach finds them converging in their support for Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).  
The CAMPFIRE programme is one of the allegedly more successful and referenced of 
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) programmes launched in 
several African countries in the 1980’s. The rationale for such programmes is simple. If poor 
African communities are entrusted with care for wildlife and significant benefits accrue to them 
from utilisation of the wildlife ‘resource’, they will not themselves unsustainably use wildlife 
or encroach on wildlife land and they will support anti-poaching programmes. David Schmidtz 
puts it succinctly thus: “In parts of Africa, the dilemma for subsistence farmers is this: if they 
cannot commodify elephants (by selling ivory, hunting licences, or photo safaris), then they 
will have to push elephants out of the way to make room for livestock or crops” (Schmidtz, 
2002: 418). CAMPFIRE and similar programmes in Southern Africa are thus seen as offering 
a win-win model for wildlife governance.  
Wild animals do not become extinct or endangered with extinction (a win for conservationists 
such as WWF and the IUCN) and human development is achieved for rural communities living 
close to wildlife and revenue earned for national economies (a win for the human beneficiaries 
and for economists such as the IMF and the World Bank). The price for the wins is paid with 
life by the trophy animals and psychological trauma in the case of social wild animals such as 
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elephants. CAMPFIRE can only yield Pareto optimality if the killed wild animals did not have 
to pay the price.  
But philosophers who see themselves as pragmatic—contrasted with ‘idealistic’ animal rights 
theorists—do offer some justification for the violation of wildlife rights to achieve 
anthropocentric conservation goals. Gunn (2001: 76) points out that “Many national parks … 
maintain populations of trophy animals because this is the business that they are in ….” And, 
if the regulation of lions “can be done for the economic benefits of impoverished local people 
by the issuing of game licences, why not?” (Gunn 2001: 89; emphasis added). David Schmidtz 
adds that “CAMPFIRE allows hunting” and “does not treat animals as if they have rights. But 
in Zimbabwe, it is CAMPFIRE that protects the wildlife, not PETA” (Schmidtz, 2002: 422; 
emphasis added). 50  
CAMPFIRE may be the ecologically and economically viable programme that its supporters 
claim. But it is not just. Such a programme makes change of moral paradigm difficult. It is hard 
for villagers and programme managers to develop an attitude of proper respect and care for 
wildlife, while at the same time seeing it as a resource. It is an approach that is based on veiled 
blackmail and false dichotomy. Pro-hunting conservationists offer support to CAMPFIRE in 
exchange for hunting permits hence the popular phrase of conservation ‘paying its way’.  
The approach further advances the false binary of trophy hunting-driven conservation or 
poaching-driven extinction of fauna. Yet alternative approaches are available—as I will suggest 
in the next chapter. Thus, people need not rely on whatever revenue is collected from killing 
some wild animals. Clearly, the CAMPFIRE approach would fail a non-speciesist test since 
killing of some humans to raise funds for others or create more living space for others would 
not be considered as a solution to poverty or population growth. Those parents who marry off 
their underage daughters or sell them into prostitution are properly judged to be evil. This is so 
even if the resources acquired from the marriage or prostitution help five of their other children 
achieve tertiary education and attain a higher standard of living and life expectancy than if their 
sister had not been married of or sold into prostitution. 
                                                          
50 Notably, Gunn and Schmidtz’s near-perfect picture of CAMPFIRE seems to depend on information from 
likely financial benefactors or beneficiaries of the programme: safari camp owners, African Resources Trust 
project manager, CAMPFIRE. Interestingly, for more information they both authors refer readers to the 
organisations’ websites or their contact email. Mathew Scully gives us an additional reason to be sceptical of the 
CAMPFIRE public relations claims. “SCI secured renewal of congressional support for … CAMPFIRE, under 
which the creatures are sold off at $10,000 and up in Zimbabwe” (Scully, 2002: 67).  
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Furthermore, one question that supporters of hunting do not address adequately is why the 
rights of starving humans should trump those of elephants being auctioned to be shot for their 
tusks or for a hunter that is shooting for prizes at the Safari Club International (SCI). Once we 
accept that wild animals hunted as trophies have individual rights, it is hard to see how we 
would call CAMPFIRE a win-win programme. To strengthen their arguments, both Gunn and 
Schmidtz implore a false dichotomy between trophy hunting and extinction of wildlife species.  
Dale Lewis’ COMACO programme provides a counterexample to the false dichotomy. Unlike 
CAMPFIRE, COMACO does not deal in wildlife products. Instead, local communities and 
former poachers are empowered with skills, materials, and a ready market for agricultural 
products.51 Farmers grow their crops and process them into products for Zambian supermarkets 
and for export. This seems to effectively address local poverty and win local people’s support 
for wildlife protection without relying on the death of some wild animals for material benefits.  
6.5 Wildlife Rights and Rights of Tribal Peoples 
One of the most problematic issues in animal ethics is that of the relationship between wildlife 
and tribal peoples. Yet nearly all animal ethicists—including anthologies that aim to cover a 
comprehensive range of old and emerging problems in animal ethics—sidestep this problem 
(Regan and Singer, 1989; Sunstein and Nussbaum, 2005; Beauchamp and Frey, 2011). This 
seems understandable. The moral response is fairly straightforward but politically sensitive. 
With the background of historical injustices against tribal peoples across the world, it is not an 
easy thing to point out radical moral imperatives that go against the cultural, subsistence, and 
economic interests of these socially disadvantaged peoples.  
The disadvantages experienced by tribal peoples are evident in that even in highly developed 
states of North America, tribal peoples face hardships that are typical of less developed 
countries of the global South. Searle (1995) states, for example, that the Canadian Inuit, Metis, 
and Dene have living standards that fall far short of the average of the rest of Canada. Stephen 
Corry—an anthropologist and indigenous people’s rights activist—lists the problems of tribal 
peoples around the world as follows: slavery, violence, disease, land theft, resource theft, 
capitalism and globalisation, conservation, and climate change (Corry, 2011). However, any 
social injustices or tribal people’s poverty, notwithstanding, I will in this section only go in one 
direction—the one to which my cumulative arguments of preceding chapters point.  
                                                          
51 However, Dale Lewis himself seems not opposed to trophy hunting (See Lewis and Alpert, 1997).  
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Tribal peoples are defined as those groups of people “who have followed ways of life for many 
generations that are largely self-sufficient, and are clearly different from the mainstream and 
dominant society” (Corry, 2011: 22). Tribal peoples are normally indigenous people and hence 
they also go by the label ‘indigenous people’. This can be misleading, however, as we can have, 
and do have, indigenous peoples that are now (part of) the mainstream society. Equally, a group 
could be a ‘tribal people’ and yet be composed of immigrants. An example is the Santeros of 
Cuba, who are of African Yoruba descent. ‘Tribal people’ is therefore a more apt label. There 
are many examples of tribal peoples today living in all our planet’s continents. They include, 
among the more famous ones, the San, Pygmies, Inuit, and the Makah. These are our 
contemporaries who have, however, for various reasons, not (fully) joined mainstream cultures 
in the nation-states in which they are geographically located. Their lifestyles and livelihoods 
usually revolve around hunting, gathering, herding, and crop-growing.  
Is it morally permissible for humans in dire need of nutrition from wildlife to kill wild animals 
for consumption or to hunt and kill to preserve a way of life? The preceding section dealt with 
what I term soft cases. The tribal peoples’ case is the hard case—both morally and politically. 
Here I am primarily interested only in the moral. In order to separate the moral from the 
political, I will set up an imaginary scenario for subsequent moral evaluation.52  
Two human communities live next to each other. One of them, the Gees (Giants) and the other, 
the Dees (Dwarfs). The Dees live in constant fear of a violent and sudden death at the hands of 
the Gees. Not only do the Gees obtain vital nutrition from the Dees’ corpses but the hunting 
down, killing, and eating of the Dees is an ancient tradition that goes back for aeons of time. 
Hunting legends are recounted around evening fires from one generation to another, sometimes 
while the Gees roast and enjoy the remains of their neighbours, the Dees. Moreover, the 
hunting of the Dees is imbued with deep spiritual meanings and helps determine social 
structures according to bravery shown during the hunts.    
Is it permissible for the Gees to hunt the Dees? No. The Gees may be taller and stronger than 
the Dees but moral rights are moral levellers. Morally, they are at par and any member of either 
group has, all things considered, the same moral importance and moral rights. In the language 
of our analytical framework, any individual d has a claim-right against every individual g that 
g does not wrongfully kill her. It is clear enough that no matter who the Gees are, as long as 
                                                          
52 The scenario I set up is inspired by Gary L. Comstock (2004) although he differs from me in that he subjects 
his cases to consequentialist analysis albeit with similar conclusions.   
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they are moral agents, it is impermissible for them to kill and eat Dees as meat. The Dees may 
be nutritious and delicious—in fact, they may be the only food left for Gees; the Gees still have 
a duty to not kill the Dees for food. A fortiori, it is impermissible for the Gees to kill Dees for 
any cultural, spiritual, or social reasons.  
Theo Ikummaq, a Canadian Inuit and secretary-treasurer of a hunters’ organisation claims, 
“Hunting is the way I grew up and a way in which my people eat” (Chivers, 2002). This is a 
popular line of reasoning employed by tribal peoples and those who advocate for their rights. 
But, as Paula Casal puts it, “If an individual wishes to impose substantial suffering, or be 
granted exemption from the law, surely she should at least offer grounds others can understand 
and find minimally credible” (Casal, 2003: 10).  In the case of rights violations, the grounds 
must be exceedingly weighty indeed to warrant systematic violations of moral rights of 
innocents. Clearly, Ikummaq’s response that killing and eating walruses—and now including 
auctioning them off to non-resident trophy hunters—is “the way I grew up” is unsatisfactory to 
warrant violating walrus rights.  
Ikummaq’s is an argument from tradition which is fallacious since traditions themselves may 
be appropriately subject of a negative moral judgement. All cultures have had to abandon 
traditions that were cherished by their ancestors but could not pass the moral scrutiny of later 
generations—or that of other societies, as the case may be. For some, this includes cannibalism; 
for others, it includes slavery; for most, it includes systematic subjugation of women.  
The Gees represent the tribal peoples and the Dees represent wildlife such as whales, walruses, 
and other wild animals that tribal peoples kill for food, as a cultural practice, or those they kill 
in complicity with rich hunters who sometimes pay $6,500 to shoot a walrus (Chivers, 2002).  
The uncompromising negative response above against hunting takes as irrelevant any 
suffering—including severe malnutrition or even starvation—by tribal peoples that may result 
from complying with the prohibition of killing wildlife. Tom Regan’s response to losses that 
might befall those who now benefit from the meat industry is just as enlightening for the case 
of the Gees (Inuit, etc.) and Dees (wildlife): 
Just as the benefits others obtain as a result of an unjust institution or practice is no moral defense 
of that practice or institution, so the harms others might face as a result of the dissolution of the 
practice or institution is no defense for allowing it to continue. Put alternatively, no one has a 
right to be protected against being harmed if the protection in question involves violating the 
rights of others (Regan, 2004a: 346). 
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Current benefits tribal peoples derive from the suffering and death of wildlife simply cannot 
trump the rights of wildlife. An adult walrus—prized by trophy hunters for its tusks—can weigh 
up to two tonnes. The meat extracted can feed tribal villagers for weeks while the $6,500 a 
trophy hunter pays could uplift economically the impoverished Inuit of Northeast Canada. 
However, the famous “Transplant” thought experiment of an innocent person’s organs being 
forcefully harvested to save the lives of others (Thomson, 1990: 135) demonstrates the 
wrongness of using other right-bearers as mere means to the ends of others—no matter how 
many the others are. It is undeniable the plight the five organ beneficiaries or of the Inuit and 
other tribal peoples is serious. Even though tribal peoples are victims of historical and current 
violations of their rights, it is morally unjustified to violate the rights of wildlife in order to 
right these wrongs perpetrated by other humans.  
Steven Wise (2005) notes that economic interests can be a huge obstacle to respecting the rights 
of those whose rights violations are an important ingredient of an economy. Ironically, this was 
no less true in the case of slavery than in the case of tribal peoples’ continued violation of 
wildlife rights. In both cases William Lee Miller’s observation is accurate. When there are 
substantial economic interests, “[r]ationalizations are supplied, positions are softened, conflict 
is avoided, compromises are sought, careers are protected, life goes on” (cited in Wise, 2005: 
20). This said, it is important to separate the moral from the political. Moral judgements can be 
made independently of practical problems of enforcing such moral judgements.  
Those who argue that wildlife rights trump the interests of tribal peoples may face the objection 
that their position is racist or misanthropic. It is sometimes argued that animal rights thinkers 
would rather see tribal peoples starve than see tribal peoples survive on wildlife. Citing the 
Inuit peoples of the Arctic and impoverished people in the Horn of Africa, Carl Cohen barely 
stops short of calling Tom Regan’s “austere vegetarianism” misanthropic. “One has only to 
look at the face of recurrent starvation in Africa to decide whether this animal rights diet is 
humane or inhumane” (Cohen in Cohen and Regan, 2001: 232). There are at least two possible 
responses to the racism or misanthropy objection.  
The first response is that there is nothing racist or misanthropic about defending wildlife rights 
from violations by impoverished tribal peoples. This is easy to see. The defence of wildlife 
rights rests on the same logic as the attack on the institution of enslavement of black people in 
Britain and the United States. In fact, members of the Inuit, San, or Pygmy tribal peoples will 
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themselves need to use the same logic to convince their own tribes people against violations of 
wildlife rights.  
Slavery—an institution that lasted thousands of years—had become an essential part of the core 
of the economies of some countries or cities. Some anti-abolitionists argued that white people 
would wallow in disease and abject poverty if slavery were done away with (see Wise, 2005). 
We can perfectly understand and sympathise with poor communities that are victims of 
capitalist exploitation or racial discrimination or drought or disease. But when members of such 
communities rob and kill innocents, we rightly condemn them regardless of whether this was 
done for survival. Defence of a victim can go hand in hand with sympathy or even love for the 
culprit. She is an inconsistent animal rights activist who would not condemn violations of the 
rights of blacks, children, or women. Paula Casal sums up the same point well, “The very 
concern for the worst off which justifies our support for disadvantaged groups also prohibits 
sacrificing their weakest members” (Casal, 2003: 22). The very logic that protects abuse of 
tribal peoples by governments and huge corporations is the logic by which tribal peoples’ 
hunting of wildlife must be banned. Those earnestly concerned for justice will condemn 
injustice regardless of who are the victims or culprits of the injustice. 
The second response is that Tom Regan, Gary Francione, and others are primarily engaging in 
moral philosophy—albeit the applied sort. Implementation of their radical but logical 
conclusions is something else. The rules governing social change cannot rely solely on moral 
rights but must take into account human psychology, political, and economic theories and 
realities. There are many cases where the right thing to do might be done wrongly.  One, for 
example, ought not to give in to blackmail. But the rights violations in the offing might be so 
many and egregious that, for prudential reasons, one might have to give in to blackmail by a 
terrorist.  
To put it in another way, political compromise, say, towards some temporary modus vivendi, 
does not necessarily indicate moral acquiescence. Many people believe female genital 
mutilation and child marriage are morally abhorrent traditional practices that must be banned 
and the bans enforced. Yet an effective approach might focus more on education rather than 
enforcement of bans and imprisonment of people who have engaged in these centuries-old 
practices. Similarly, with respect to practices that violate wild animals’ rights, an approach of 
winning minds and hearts and offering sustainable alternatives may be more efficacious in 
protecting wildlife than mass arrests and imprisonment of tribal peoples.    
 123 
 
We might think that tribal peoples’ practices involving the killing of wildlife should be banned 
and the ban should be enforced but not to the point where people are shot. Education about 
alternative livelihoods and lifestyles and moral education about the moral value of wildlife can 
be used where applicable. Here, Henry Shue gives some sound advice to rights theorists seeking 
social change: 
One must learn something about the life-cycle of social norms: how they are created, nurtured, 
and destroyed. For a theory of rights is a theory about which norms various groups ought to have, 
and this must depend in part on how norms actually operate psychologically and politically, 
within and across cultures. One needs then, among other things, to talk with members of other 
cultures (Shue, 2004: 227).  
Enforcement of rights need not always be through militaristic intervention. Where violations 
are part of an ancient cultural practice not perpetuated by practitioners’ malice or culpable 
ignorance, less violent approaches to cultural change may be more appropriate and effective. 
Ideally, tribal peoples must accept new norms that recognises the moral standing of wildlife. 
Compliance with new laws and wildlife policies must emanate primarily from this acceptance, 
and coercive means for enforcement must be employed only to supplement the non-coercive 
strategies. Acceptance is far much better than forced compliance. Unlike compliance, 
acceptance entails “dispositions not only to behave in certain ways but also to feel in certain 
ways” (Hooker, 2000: 76). In the long term, it is more effective and efficient to ensure wildlife 
justice if tribal people feel remorse or guilt if they harm wild animals and they feel indignation 
if some of their tribesmen harm wild animals.  
Justified intervention on behalf of innocent victims would need to appreciate that evil practices 
such as female genital mutilation, child marriages are—perhaps till now—part of much 
cherished and revered traditions such that (1) we must be more charitable to members of 
communities that engage in the practice and that (2) the best way may not be to kill or 
incriminate all culprits but, rather, to win the hearts and minds of those people engaging in 
those practices that are morally wrong. A wildlife rights supporter, therefore, need not be seen 
as racist or misanthropic for arriving at conclusions that put wildlife first before tribal peoples. 
The wildlife rightist’s radical conclusions simply indicate the morally right and desirable state 
of affairs that may not be realisable or that may require some strategic non-ideal compromises 
and, probably, a long time to realise. What is clear is that our political and social institutions 
must seek to change towards the morally acceptable human-wildlife relations.  
States must seek to end social injustices and compensate past injustices against tribal peoples 
in ways that do not involve legislation that permits tribal peoples to perpetuate injustices against 
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wild animals. Robbing Peter to pay Paul does not end injustice but merely transfers the injustice 
to another victim. Similarly, legislation or policies that allow wildlife killing for previously 
wronged tribal peoples only serves to cause further injustice to a new group that in any case 
has been a victim of injustice together with—and as victims of—tribal peoples. It is a double 
injustice for wildlife.  
This chapter has discussed the problem of human-wildlife conflict in the new light of both 
animals and humans are right-holders. This levelled moral status results in a re-evaluation of 
self- and other- defence involving humans and wild animals. Currently wild animals are harmed 
or killed whenever a human is under threat whether the human is innocent or not. I argue that 
this policy is unjust and must be replaced with one which permits only rescuing humans who 
are innocent. Liable or culpable humans may be saved only in those circumstances where such 
rescue can be accomplished with minimum or no harm to wild animals. I defend the shoot-to-
kill policy against poachers as a case of justified other-defence. I further address the 
emotionally charged problem of human interests that are premised on exploitation of wildlife. 
I deal with the problem of bushmeat for subsistence of peasants living near protected areas and 
the more intense problem of tribal peoples who rely not only on wildlife as a source of nutrition 
but also on hunting as part of their cultural heritage.  
A utilitarian approach might be compromising and perhaps advocate limiting the numbers of 
wild animals killed and restricting methods used. That option is unavailable for an adherent to 
the view of wildlife justice based on moral rights of individual wild animals. I argue that the 
only non-speciesist and rights-respecting policy is prohibiting of any killing of wild animals to 
satisfy human interests. I argue that both in the case of humans and in the case of wildlife, 
nothing in the Hohfeldian matrix changes because of a human’s desperation for survival. That 
is, the deontic relations between the imperilled human and the individual whose meat would 
lead to that human’s survival remain the same at the point of the human’s starvation as they 
were when he was well-fed. The right of an innocent individual—a monkey or a human—not 
to be killed does not become weaker or vanish the nearer some human being gets to starvation.  
In the final substantive chapter, I will discuss critically the problem of responsibility for 
protecting wild animals from human-created harms.  
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Chapter 7 Responsibility for Wildlife Rights 
In previous chapters, I have argued that wild animals can and do suffer injustice ranging from 
physical abuse, loss of property, to invasion of ‘personal’ space. The injustices do not only 
involve physical pain and death. They involve immense psychological anguish and trauma and 
disruption of social structures paramount for individual wellbeing (Moss, 1992; Bradshaw, 
2004). Elephant orphanages in Kenya, Chimpanzee orphanages in Zambia, ivory stockpiles in 
Viet Nam, wildlife zoos and museums in England, all tell different stories that attest to human 
injustices inflicted on wildlife. The central question I try to answer in this chapter is one of 
identifying those with the duty to ensure protection for wildlife and how those identified may 
need to act.  
Negative duties to wildlife are straightforwardly erga omnes. All moral agents are under 
obligation not to violate rights of wild animals. As my discussion of the duty to assistance in 
Chapter 3 shows, positive duties are more restricted. There are several arguments for positive 
duties to morally considerable beings (Miller, 2007). For utilitarians (e.g. Goodin, 1985) and 
some human rights philosophers (Shue, 1980; Griffin, 2008) the existence of need or 
vulnerability is sufficient to create a duty on those with ability to mitigate and improve the 
conditions of the needy. This chapter will not be based on—and will not discuss—any of these 
grounds for positive duties that are based merely on ability and opportunity to help the needy. 
I follow, rather, those like Thomas Pogge whose grounds for ascribing positive duties appeal 
to some injustice to which the agent has some causal connection such that the agent’s behaviour 
is tantamount to complicity to the injustice.53 The positive duties I envisage are those I have 
described in Chapter 2 as emergent duties.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss the current statist model 
for wildlife protection. The second section attempts to free cosmopolitanism from its speciesist 
incoherence while in the third section, I trace causal responsibility and ascribe positive duties 
to states whose foreign policies, domestic wildlife regulations, and foreign investment policy 
or behaviour cause or constitute wildlife rights violations. I argue that although the current 
statist approach is flawed, a statist-cosmopolitan approach provides a theoretically defensible 
and practically viable model for protecting wildlife all over the world. In the proposed model, 
                                                          
53 This is not to underestimate the importance of utilitarian, right-less obligations. In fact, since the goal of rights 
is not value maximisation as such, it might well be the case that right-less duties would achieve more for wildlife 
protection. However, I wish simply to narrow the focus to compelling duties that can be demanded and must be 
discharged as a matter of justice and not merely a matter of beneficence or promoting the good.   
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nation-states no longer have the ultimate say on the fate of wild animals that happen to share 
political borders with them. Other-defence interference by other state or non-state actors is 
permissible just as acts of benevolence especially in cases where the host state is unable to 
protect or provide for wild animals. More importantly, foreign states may be more liable than, 
or as liable as, the host state in discharging duties of justice towards wild animals in a given 
locality. Lastly, I make some tentative proposals of what form cooperative international 
protection for wildlife might take both in preventing future rights violations and in mitigating 
effects of recent past harms.  
7.1 Statist Wildlife Protection 
In chapter 5 I argued against the idea that wild animals are primarily legal property of the state. 
When treated as property, wild animals do not have any special protection different from owned 
inanimate things. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) classifies wild animals 
together with plants and micro-organisms as ‘biological resources’. Article 3 of CBD goes on 
to state that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own [biological] resources pursuant to their 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction (United Nations, 1992: 4). 
The CBD—whose overarching objective is sustainable development—thus recognises states’ 
absolute ownership rights over their wild animals as resources. As noted in chapter 5, CITES, 
which regulates international trade in endangered species plant and animal species, takes trade 
in wildlife as a moral given. The convention’s primary focus is to stop the threat of international 
trade to the numerical survival of species of wild fauna and flora. What is interesting to note is 
that ‘wild fauna and flora’ are bracketed together and treated with equal importance. A wild 
animal species may go onto or off a list for permitted international trade just like a plant species 
depending on its scarcity or abundance. In short, with regards to these two important 
international conventions—CITES and CBD—wild animals, plants, and micro-organisms are 
at par and are, at least in theory, given equal protection.  
Both state laws and international law acknowledge wildlife as property of states under whose 
national geographical jurisdiction they happen to be. I take it to be uncontroversial that the 
primary responsibility of protecting property lies with the owner. In the case of private property, 
individuals or corporations ‘enlist’ the state for additional protection of their property. I 
herewith state what I will call the narrow statist thesis for wildlife protection as follows:  
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The state is the primary protector of wild animals within its state borders54 for the following 
two reasons: 
(a) Wild animals are resources or property of the states in whose political boundaries they 
live, or 
(b) Wild animals are spatially located under these states’ jurisdictions even taking into 
accountant transboundary nature of wildlife habitation in many cases around the world.  
Some writers—and Chapters 3 and 5—have since argued that animals have a wellbeing that 
matters to the animals from their own cognitive viewpoint and that they are not property. We 
can therefore reject (a). I will now proceed to the second reason, (b), for the statist approach to 
wildlife governance which can accommodate the claim of wildlife rights. On the narrow statist 
view, wild animals are in the jurisdiction of state X, so, by default, it is X’s responsibility to 
protect the wild animals found within its borders.  
Some people might find some advantages in the view that host states have the primary 
responsibility for wildlife justice. One apparent advantage is strategic managerial positioning. 
The host state has, prima facie, best ‘know-that’ and ‘know-how’ of its physical and cultural 
terrain. It is in the best position to collect data regarding the security of its wild animals. 
Secondly, the host state having the primary responsibility prevents political problems to do 
with sovereignty. If another state were to be actively involved in wildlife governance within 
the borders of another, there is a likelihood of raising questions of interfering with the 
sovereignty or security of the host state. These two reasons are however easily shown to be too 
weak to support the narrow statist approach. 
Firstly, it is not true that the host state will have the best or monopoly of knowledge and means 
for protecting wildlife within its borders. Most of the world’s wild animals are now found in 
less developed countries. These are also countries with lower average education levels, which 
presumably includes low knowledge levels in subjects related to wild animals. Secondly, the 
threats faced by wild animals transcend national borders and capacities. Thirdly, ways of other 
states intervening can be found—and in fact do exist—that do not threaten the host nation. 
States routinely cooperate through bilateral relationships.55 States can also act to protect 
wildlife through intergovernmental non-state actors.  
                                                          
54 I will sometimes refer to such states as ‘host states’. 
55 Arguably, most bilateral agreements reflect national interests of both parties. It may thus be difficult to achieve 
bilateral cooperation between states interested in protecting wild animals and others interested in exploiting them 
 128 
 
Once we take the rights of wild animals seriously, the narrow statist approach exhibits similar 
limitations as with the case of ensuring rights for humans in the state.  Onora O’Neil (2004) 
advances three reasons why it is not enough to see states as primary agents for ensuring justice. 
These are that states can be unjust, states can be weak, and states can be porous to powerful 
agents that become active within their borders. Although O’Neil has in mind states as securers 
of the rights of their citizens, her reasons are possibly even stronger when applied to the case 
of wildlife rights, as I try to show below. 
Many states across the world have governments that have acquired and maintain power by 
sheer brute force. They lack political legitimacy. Others are simply corrupt, and distribute 
national resources in a way that results in severe rights violations. The 1994 Rwanda genocide 
of Tutsis by the ruling majority Hutus is just one case in point. Clearly tyrannical states cannot 
be expected to protect their own citizens’ rights as they are violators themselves. Quite the 
contrary, in these cases the citizens need protection against their own states.  
The situation can only be expected to be worse with regards to wild animals as they are unable 
to defend themselves or plan and execute a revolution, and violation of their rights receives 
hardly any international condemnation partly because all states are violators of wildlife rights 
and indeed they are violators of animals’ rights in general. Unlike the case of human rights 
violations, most states are systematic violators of wild-life animals’ rights, varying only in 
severity and extent of violations. Even humans whose rights are violated by other humans, 
states, and organisations are also involved in violating rights of wild animals.  
States under pressure to grow their economies sometimes turn to national parks for more 
agricultural land. Jonathan Adams and Thomas McShane state that, in Rwanda, conversion of 
parkland for agricultural use is an even bigger threat to gorillas than poaching is. For example, 
in the 1960s, the Rwandese government converted 25,000 acres of Albert National Park for 
growing pyrethrum (Adams and McShane, 1992: 126). Whereas ethnic hatred and racism have 
caused some state-perpetrated rights violations—for example, Rwandan genocide, the Nazi 
holocaust, and South Africa’s apartheid—speciesism permits human interests to easily trump 
the rights of wild animals in virtually every state. Unlike human citizens, wild animals do not 
need a totalitarian dictator to have their rights wantonly violated. A popular democratic 
                                                          
for economic gain, for example. However, I here assume that already, states have come to the enlightenment that 
wild animals are not property. Moreover, the point is merely that, where there’s agreement, a foreign state can run 
programmes in another state’s territory without threat to or violation of sovereignty.  
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government might, much more easily, in principle, see wildlife lose their habitat at the altar of 
human development than a totalitarian regime with a wildlife-loving dictator.   
Unlike rogue or tyrannical states, weak states may have the political will to protect wild 
animals, but lack the ability. Weak states are very likely to be poor states as well. This means 
that weak states cannot adequately provide for their citizens, let alone protect wild animals. 
Richard Leakey has clearly stated the challenge of poverty to protecting wildlife. “Managing 
public institutions in countries that suffer from underdevelopment and poverty is never easy 
…. Protecting elephants and conserving natural ecosystems remain my personal priorities. But 
I am not sure this would be so were I ill, hungry, and living in despair” (Leakey, 2001: ix-x). 
Weak states may thus be faced with what David Schmidtz (2002) refers to as “conflict of 
priorities”. This type of conflict depicts the dilemma between protecting wild animals or 
protecting themselves that poor Africans may face even if they share the same wildlife values 
as well-off Westerners. I think both Leakey and Schmidtz correctly describe the situation of 
weak states’ inability to protect wildlife.  
Living next to wildlife is usually dangerous and costly anywhere in the world, especially among 
poorer communities. Weak states have greater competition for resources between poor humans 
and wild animals. Competition for resources is a major cause of human-wildlife conflicts. 
These often result in violations of wild animals’ rights through encroachment, and the so-called 
retaliatory killings of wild animals that destroy crops or kill domestic animals. The conflicts 
are exacerbated by poor state protection of humans and ineffective or non-existent 
compensation schemes, which in turn are typically due to lack of funds and lack of strong 
institutions.  
The last reason Onora O’Neil gives for not entrusting states as sole primary agents of justice is 
that some states are porous states. This problem relates to outside actors having undue influence 
that may undermine the host state agencies.  Examples of such foreign elements include 
transnational corporations and international crime syndicates. There are clear cases of wildlife 
rights being violated as a direct or indirect result of the activities of foreign elements. 
Transnational corporations, as will be elaborated in the next section, sometimes take advantage 
of weak institutions to violate rights of local people and wild animals.  
Porous states are also vulnerable to crime syndicates, which include terrorist or rebel militia. 
Virunga National Park—home of half of the world’s surviving mountain gorillas—has been 
infiltrated by militia fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The militia include the 
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Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Tutsi National 
Congress, who use the cover of the forests and exploit wildlife ‘resources’ (Draper, 2016). 
According to a Daily Mirror award-winning investigative report, the East African terrorist 
group al-Shabaab earns about $365,000 monthly from ivory alone (Parry, 2014:5). In Nepal, 
the taking over of Bardia’s National Park by Maoist rebels has led to a reduction in rhinos from 
seventy-three to just three in a period of two years (Messer, 2010: 2334).  
There seem to be no tenable grounds for allocating the responsibility for wildlife protection to 
host states alone as primary agents. We have reasons to reject the idea that wildlife is property 
of host states. Furthermore, proximity to wildlife is insufficient to justify always making host 
states the primary agents for ensuring protection of the rights of wild animals. Host states can 
be unjust, weak, and porous and thus abuse or fail to protect wildlife within their borders. 
“Given that there are many bad states, many weak states and many states too weak to prevent 
or regulate the activities of supposedly external bodies within their borders, the thought that 
justice must always begin by assigning primary obligations to states [is] implausible” (O’Neil, 
2004: 247). O’Neil’s concern is the state/non-state divide. I think it is a legitimate concern. 
However, I think that, in the case of wildlife rights, her conclusion will be stronger and more 
relevant if applied to the host state versus foreign state divide. In other words, it might be the 
case that a foreign state has a greater moral responsibility of protecting wild animals than a host 
state has.  
7.2 Extended Cosmopolitanism 
In this section, I will attempt to show that cosmopolitanism in its current form manifests one 
important blind spot. The blind spot is cosmopolitanism’s omission of animals as individuals 
who matter morally and as individuals who must be accounted for in any legal or international 
institutions for ensuring justice. I argue that once we remedy it of its speciesist flaw, 
cosmopolitanism becomes a powerful vehicle for realising justice for wild animals around the 
world. I argue for a statist-cosmopolitan approach.  
Unlike the statist approach critiqued by Onora O’Neil, I advance a broad statist position that 
does not single out the host state as the primary duty-bearer for wildlife rights but, rather, places 
the moral burden on foreign states as well to the extent that all are causally linked to making 
wild animals vulnerable. The burden of justice to wild animals is two-fold. It involves negative 
duties and emergent positive duties that are usually premised on the failure to discharge the 
negative duties.  
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Like any moral perspective, cosmopolitanism comes with some nuances on both theoretical 
and practical levels. However, there is a set of fairly set of uncontroversial propositions that 
represents the core of cosmopolitanism. Thomas Pogge (2008: 175) accords us the first three 
propositions that are central to cosmopolitanism: 
a) Moral individualism: “the ultimate units of [moral] concern are human beings, or 
persons.” (Pogge’s italics) 
b) Moral universalism: “the status of ultimate unit of [moral] concern attaches to every 
living human being equally”. 
c) Generality: “Persons are units of moral concern for everyone”.  
Cosmopolitans hold that all humans matter equally morally and this, in turn, imposes 
obligations on moral agents everywhere. These core elements of cosmopolitanism are echoed 
by Erin Kelly (2004: 183) who defines cosmopolitanism as the view “that the fundamental unit 
of moral concern is the person, and that all persons matter morally. Cosmopolitanism is thus 
individualistic and universalistic; states or societies can have moral claims only derivatively."  
Ironically, however, these foundations for cosmopolitanism are so uncontroversial that they are 
bound to be endorsed by virtually all major traditional moral theories. This has, understandably, 
led some to declare that “we are all cosmopolitans now” (Blake, 2013). Whether one’s criterion 
for moral considerability is capacity to experience pleasure and pain or possession of rational 
autonomy, the subjects of moral concern will straightforwardly include individuals outside 
one’s race, ethnicity, or nation.  
To the three cosmopolitan claims, I will add one more that appears to me to be unproblematic 
but helps to set a picture of cosmopolitanism that does the work this chapter seeks to perform. 
The fourth assumption of cosmopolitanism is that,  
(d) political institutions, like states, have moral value only in so far as they respect people’s 
interests (Caney, 2005: 232).  
A cosmopolitan moral world view is interventionist, at least in theory. The fourth proposition 
thus animates cosmopolitanism by defining the justification and limitation of the state in terms 
of its role of protecting or promoting people’s rights or interests. I think two conclusions can 
be made from this.  
Firstly, the state has no intrinsic value over and above ensuring respect for human rights, some 
of which will be obviously conventional rights including rights to healthcare, education, 
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housing, and transport. Secondly, states or any other political institutions have the liberty to 
ensure respect for human rights anywhere in the world. This conclusion aligns with the United 
Nation’s Responsibility to Protect, which states that if imperfect states fail to protect human 
rights, then the closer-to-ideal states are at least permitted “to disregard the non-interference 
norm usually attached to the institution of sovereignty and to interfere” (Karp, 2014: 46). To 
avoid arbitrary unilateral intervention, usually such intervention would require a UN resolution 
which any state on the UN Security Council could veto. 
Notwithstanding its laudable moral expansionism, cosmopolitanism commits the fallacy of 
speciesism—which is to regard as having less or no moral standing members of species other 
than our own, Homo Sapiens, just for the simple reason that those individuals are not members 
of our species. If cosmopolitanism’s reason for breaking the tribal or national barriers is equal 
moral worth, it seems inconsistent to restrict moral cosmopolitanism to humanity.56  
For many cosmopolitans, the international moral currency is human rights. But in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3, I have argued that there is no defensible ground for human rights that is not 
simultaneously a ground for animal rights. I have argued that moral rights protect those interests 
that track elements of wellbeing, and wellbeing turns out to be interspecific.  Thus, Victor 
Tadros is right in doubting “that we have any rights in virtue of our standing as human beings. 
It is the properties that typical humans have that ground their rights rather than the fact that 
they are humans. Non-humans that have these properties have the same rights” (Tadros, 2015: 
447). Non-intellectual elements of wellbeing cut across species and the adjective ‘human’ in 
‘human rights’ is—at least in most cases—misguided at best, and speciesist at worst.  
Cosmopolitanism can, however, easily remedy the speciesist blind spot. We can alter features 
(a) to (d) above by adding ‘animals’ to ‘persons’, ‘people’ or ‘human beings’. Alternatively, 
we could eliminate any reference to human beings and refer instead to all sentient individuals 
or all individual animals, since humans are animals too. This move has been anticipated by 
Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown: “Moral cosmopolitanism could be grounded in human 
reason, or some other characteristic universally shared among humans (and in some cases other 
kinds of beings) such as the capacity to experience pleasure and pain” (Kleingeld and Brown 
2014: 11; emphasis added). This goes to show that there is nothing inherently conceptually 
                                                          
56 I think it is more accurate to say that moral theories such as utilitarianism, virtue theory, or cosmopolitanism 
do not exclude animals as such. Rather, it is moral philosophers who fail to acknowledge or include animals in 
their philosophising. Our psychology and personal interests sometimes hinder us from taking moral arguments 
to their logical conclusions. 
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problematic with inclusion of wild animals in the cosmopolitan moral framework. Thus, a non-
speciesist cosmopolitanism will take seriously the rights of wild animals anywhere on earth 
against wrongful harms by humans anywhere on earth as well as ensuring rectificatory actions 
even against what may be innocent inflictions of harm.  
Victor Tadros has alluded to a cosmopolitan inclusion of wild animal with specific reference 
to the right to security. He says: 
International interference is surely permitted, and perhaps required, in order to enforce duties 
owed by state officials to non-human animals, at least in the form of international condemnation 
and monetary sanctions. It is permissible for international organizations to condemn, and perhaps 
sanction, states that offer insufficient protection to non-human animals against being wronged by 
citizens of those states. As officials have positive duties to non-human animals to protect them 
against being harmed severely, non-human animals have a right to security (Tadros, 2015: 448). 
Although I agree with the non-speciesist cosmopolitan spirit in Tadros’ statement, I disagree 
with his assumptions that reflect the narrow statist approach critiqued above as well as his views 
on the nature of duties of justice owed to wild animals. Tadros seems to assume that the host 
state has the primary responsibility of ensuring wildlife rights are respected.  
It is particularly important to resist any generous ascription of positive moral rights for wild 
animals as doing so will create a runaway inflation of rights that will devalue rights as measures 
of justice. As Brad Hooker has rightly observed, proliferation of rights threatens “not only to 
debase the rhetorical power of the term [‘moral rights’] but also to blur conditions for 
appropriate application of the term” (Hooker, 2014: 170). To preserve the power of rights and 
their clear application for cases of justice or injustice, it is vital to block blank-cheque positive 
rights. In my view, justice only involves those cases in which the right-bearer’s vulnerability is 
explicable through some relevant actions or omissions of the putative obligor.  
I have argued above that cosmopolitanism can conceptually accommodate the rights of animals. 
I have also denied that positive rights trigger moral obligations erga omnes. Saladin Meckled-
Garcia has pointed out that, “With no relevant agent identified, there are no strict obligations, 
no strict accountability, no real principles of social justice” (Meckled-Garcia, 2013: 112-113). 
My contention is that relevant agents for wildlife justice can and must be identified on the basis 
of two kinds of moral rights. The first kind is negative rights against wrongful harm. A 
chimpanzee in Uganda’s Queen Elizabeth National Park has the same right against a Ugandan 
villager as it does against the British Prime Minister. Both humans have the potential to 
wrongfully harm the gorilla through their actions or omissions. The elephant in Zimbabwe’s 
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Hwange National Park has a negative right against President Robert Mugabe as well as against 
an ivory crafts dealer in China.   
Emergent positive moral rights are the other type of rights for identifying relevant agents for 
ensuring wildlife justice. These duties emanate from initial actions or omissions that harm 
wildlife whether these actions or omissions are wrongful or not.57 In other words, unlike 
negative duties, positive moral duties do not require that the initial harm is a failure to discharge 
an obligation. Nevertheless, it is an injustice not to make amends for the harm that was caused 
when one can make amends. Wild animals are sometimes owed compensatory duties by agents 
who did not violate their rights. In the next section, I will describe actions or omissions of 
agents that are tantamount to wrongful harms or complicit to wrongful harms against wild 
animals in a way that identifies agents across the world as responsible for ensuring justice for 
wild animals.  
7.3 Global Wildlife Rights Violations 
In identifying principal violators of wildlife and those complicit to the violations, I will assume 
that individual humans, corporations, and states are agents. I take individual normal adult 
humans to be paradigmatic moral agents. The important feature of moral agents is that they can 
make moral judgements and can fashion their behaviour accordingly.  If an entity cannot 
understand and comply with rules or make moral judgements it does not make sense to hold 
that entity morally accountable or blameworthy for its behaviour. When we consider sufficient 
conditions for moral decision-making and acting on decisions reached, corporations and states 
seem, at least for my purposes, do qualify as moral agents.  
For an entity to be a moral agent, it must meet at least two criteria. The first criterion an entity 
must possess is a decision-making structure with an ability “to process, interpret and act on 
rules” (Karp, 2014: 9). Although a robot can process and act on information, only an agent 
proper can deliberately interpret rules and come to a decision whether to violate the rule or to 
comply with it. The second criterion for an entity to be a moral agent is for the entity to have 
some sort of unity or identity that “persists over time” (Karp, 2014: 8). It seems obvious that if 
we are to hold any entity morally accountable, it must in a way be the same entity that last year 
violated some moral rights that we are evaluating today.  
                                                          
57 Duties for wildlife adaptation to climate change is a good example of duties moral agents have despite having 
done nothing wrong other than occasioning harm upon some moral patients. See Kapembwa and Well (2016). 
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If the minimum requirements above are sufficient for moral agency, it seems corporations and 
states are moral agents whose actions are morally evaluable vis-à-vis moral rights protection or 
violation. They can enter agreements, make policies, and undertake actions in a manner 
relevantly analogous to individual moral agents. I take Robert Goodin’s statement to be an apt 
characterisation of the status of collectives as moral agents. He writes:  
But artificially created agencies are agents, too. Most especially, the state is a moral agent, in all 
the respects that morally matter. It, like the natural individual, is capable of embodying values, 
goals and ends; it, too, is capable (through its legislative and executive organs) of deliberative 
action in pursuit of them. The state is possessed of an internal decision mechanism (a constitution, 
and the process that it prescribes) that mimics perfectly … that which is taken as the defining 
feature of moral agency in the natural individual. Without such mechanisms, the state would not 
be a state at all. It would lack the minimal organisational content required for that description to 
fit. With such mechanisms, the state is indisputably a moral agent, much like any other (Goodin, 
1995: 35-36).  
Moreover, the moral agency of corporations or states is distinct from that of individuals within 
the state. The internal deliberative mechanism of these entities guides and constrains 
individuals in a way that the decisions arrived at may sometimes—even oftentimes, in some 
cases—differ from those the individual might make as a moral agent in their own individual 
capacity.  
The strategy of ‘naming and shaming’ corporations and states that violate human rights shows 
a reasonable belief in the targeted entities as moral agents that can deliberate and change their 
behaviour. Corporations and states can respond to demands of justice. Onora O’Neil’s rightly 
says, “There is nothing very unusual or surprising about ascribing obligations to institutions, 
including states” (O’Neil, 2004: 249). Because corporations and states have deliberative 
capacities for accessing, understanding, interpreting, and acting on information of a normative 
nature, they ought to behave justly towards wild animals. All types of moral agents—
individuals, corporations, and states—are involved as principals or through others who are 
complicit in the violation of wildlife rights. Below, I will discuss how individuals, transnational 
corporations and states are responsible for wildlife rights violations.  
Once we accept that animals have moral rights, it is clear that individuals are responsible for 
wildlife violations. Individuals violate the rights of wild animals when they kill them for any 
reason other than euthanasia or self- and other- defence of the innocent. Individual villagers 
violate rights of wild animals when they encroach on wildlife territory for resource extraction, 
permanent settlement, or agricultural purposes.  
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7.3.1 Safari Club International 
Although we can distinguish between individual, corporate, and state responsibility for the 
rights of wild animals, there is nothing logically preventing all kinds of responsibility in the 
same instances of rights violations. A case in point is the Safari Club International (SCI)58 based 
in the U.S. With 190 chapters around the world, the organisation seeks to protect hunting rights 
of its 55,000 members and to support wildlife conservation that recognises hunting “as an 
invaluable wildlife management tool” (SCI, 2016).  
Hunting has always been an international adventure and enterprise. Over a century before the 
founding of SCI, Europeans and Americans travelled to Africa to hunt. In his The Empire of 
Nature, John M. MacKenzie gives a detailed historical account of hunting before and during 
colonialism. He writes: 
In many areas of the world, the colonial frontier was also a hunting frontier and the animal 
resource contributed to the expansionist urge. In the era of conquest and settlement animals 
sometimes constituted a vital subsidy to an often precarious imperial enterprise, while in the high 
noon of empire hunting became a ritualised and occasionally spectacular display of white 
dominance. European world supremacy coincided with the peak of the hunting and shooting 
craze…. In addition, soldiers, administrators, professional hunters and wealthy travellers 
produced a seemingly endless stream of specialised hunting books, many of them ended up 
dressed up as natural history (MaKenzie, 1988: 7).  
Even as European states scrambled for Africa, a parallel scramble went on as corporations—
zoos and museums—in the U.S. and in Europe scrambled for live or dead specimen of African 
wild animals. Long before the establishment of SCI in 1972, in the U.S., that country’s twenty-
sixth president, Theodore Roosevelt, had hunted hundreds of wild animals in Africa.59  
One notable point about SCI is its global reach. Chapters and individuals are from all over the 
world. Individuals travel and hunt all over the world. The SCI hunting awards shows how their 
members from all over the world kill animals for fun or prestige. There are continental awards 
whose winners must have killed wild animals of certain species of certain continents. Thus, the 
organisation has awards such as African 15, European 12, South Pacific 8, North American 12, 
Asia 8, and South American 8, showing the part of the world and number of eligible species. 
Grand Slam awards include Dangerous Game of Africa, Bears of the World, Cats of the World, 
South American Slam of Indigenous Game, and so on. The SCI’s goals, structure, membership, 
                                                          
58 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the SCI is from the organisation’s website 
www.safariclub.org.  
59 My point of this brief historical note of hunting in Africa, is not to make a ground for backward-looking 
reparations for those past violations. It is, rather, simply to stress the extraterritoriality of wildlife rights 
violations. Backward-looking reparations raises too many factual and theoretical issues that fall outside the 
scope of this chapter and thesis.  
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and awards give us reason to believe that wildlife rights violations transcend national 
jurisdictions and thus those responsible for harms to wildlife in Mozambique—as principal 
violators or as accomplices to the violations—need not be Mozambicans.  
Individual hunters violate rights of wild animals regardless of their membership in SCI. Unlike 
more complex cases such as those of the Nuremberg tribunals where a chain of command 
existed, individual hunters harm wild animals in their own individual capacities for their own 
hedonistic gratification, personal glory, or economic gain. That they belong to an organisation 
is irrelevant to their individual moral responsibility.  
What is unique about members of SCI is that they have the protection of an organisation whose 
core aim is the protection of its members’ ‘right’ to hunt. Mathew Scully (2002: ch.2)—a 
former speechwriter for President George W. Bush—documents in detail the activities, 
affluence, and influence of SCI. The organisation offers hunting-related and trophy importation 
litigation to its members, provides education and information related to hunting and updates 
members about hunting destinations. As observed above, SCI organises hunting awards which 
encourages and rewards the killing of many wild animals from varieties of wildlife species.  
Another point about the SCI is the implication of states as agents of justice or injustice—the 
U.S. or other states such as Switzerland that have SCI chapters and many host states such as 
Zambia with wildlife sought by SCI members. These states that do not ban SCI chapters are 
implicated in the injustices committed against wild animals. They would not permit al-Shabaab 
training camps, so why do they permit SCI chapters?  
One of the strengths of SCI is the wealth of its members. The average member owns twenty-
two firearms, spends $14,000 a year on hunting, fifty percent of the members have an annual 
income exceeding $100,000 and the membership’s total annual hunting expenditure is half a 
billion dollars (Scully, 2002: 53). The annual convention, as Scully describes it, is a marketing 
and trading arena where safari owners, taxidermists, gun makers, and makers of other hunting 
paraphernalia convene to sell their goods and services. SCI financial reports show that the 
convention alone brings the organisation revenue more than $14,000,000 annually. 
With its resources including financial support they receive from some corporations, it is no 
wonder that “Since 2000, SCI has spent $140 million on protecting the freedom to hunt through 
policy advocacy, litigation, and education for federal and state legislators to ensure hunting is 
protected for future generations…. SCI has become a political force in Washington, D.C. and 
other world capitals” (SCI, 2016). In 2015 alone, the SCI Political Action Committee spent 
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over $600,000 on political lobbying. Ninety-four percent of candidates it supported were 
elected in the 2014 election while 147 SCI-supported pro-hunting candidates were elected to 
Congress. With over a quarter of the USA Congress being SCI candidates, wildlife legislation 
is likely not to negatively affect the alleged hunters’ ‘rights’ to kill wild animals locally and to 
import those killed outside the USA.  
As they have claimed, SCI are a “political force” not only in Washington, D. C. but in “other 
world capitals” as well. In Zimbabwe, as discussed in Chapter 6, CAMPFIRE is the face of 
SCI. Their political influence was even more apparent in Zambia following that country’s ban 
on all hunting quotas for leopards and lions in 2013. Following the hunting ban, the SCI invited 
then Zambian Minister of Tourism and Arts, Jean Kapata, to the annual convention to address 
the SCI Board of Directors. Soon after, the minister announced the lifting of the ban on hunting 
of the two big cat species. SCI commended “Zambia for this important development in its 
approach to lion and big cat conservation and its recognition that hunting plays a valuable role 
in the sustainable management and conservation of these species.”60  
The case of SCI is important for demonstrating how one non-state actor can have substantial 
power over states. It also shows—with regards to wild animals at least—even perceived just 
and strong states in relation to human rights are unjust and weak in relation to wildlife rights. 
More importantly, the case shows individual members of SCI such as Palmer Walter as morally 
responsible for rights violations of wild animals. SCI is responsible for encouraging and 
defending rights violations of wild animals. States make or maintain wildlife laws and policies 
that permit individuals and organisations to violate rights of wild animals. The primary problem 
is that no state recognizes wild animals as having rights. Below I present miscellaneous further 
evidence of the extraterritorial nature of wildlife rights violations through actions of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and states.  
7.3.2 Transnational Corporations and States 
Safari Club International is a non-state agent but not a transnational corporation. It was 
registered as a charity under the Internal Revenue Code 501 (c) (3) but has since changed to 
Internal Revenue Code 501 (c) (4) as a social welfare organisation. Moreover, organisation’s 
rights violations are primarily killing of wild animals and those that are inseparable from or 
                                                          
60 The SCI-Republic of Zambia relationship goes further back prior to this event. For example, Zambia’s 
Conservation Strategy and Action Plan for the African Lion’ thanks SCI for funding the lion conservation 
strategy (Republic of Zambia, 2009). This followed Zambia’s rejection of Kenya’s proposal to move lions from 
Appendix II to I of CITES. 
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normally accompany such violations such as psychological trauma and malnutrition for 
orphans. However, experts agree that habitat loss is the greatest threat to wildlife survival 
(Plessis, 2000: 14). The factors causing habitat loss help point to the agents responsible. The 
factors include “conversions to large-scale agriculture (eg, by fire, stocking rate, chainsaw, 
plough, or bulldozer), clearance by small-scale farmers, large-scale planting or logging, 
infrastructure development (eg, buildings, dams, powerlines, and roads) and mining” (Plessis, 
2000: 16). From this, it is relatively easy to identify the agents responsible for wildlife rights 
violations. 
Naturally, most TNCs have bases of shareholders or headquarters in the global North and in 
the emerging economies of Asia. A report financed by the European Commission revealed that 
this is the trend for logging corporations that have come predominantly from the U.S., Japan, 
and Europe but have recently been joined—and sometimes overtaken—by those from 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines and Indonesia (Sizer and Plouvier, 2000). In many cases, the 
logging does not follow minimum standards for harvesting trees. The logging mainly takes the 
form of ‘mining’ of forests “through selective harvesting of marketable species. Almost without 
exception, management plans are neither elaborated nor implemented, and even basic 
silvicultural principles based on sustainable yield have not been applied (Sizer and Plouvier, 
2000: 26).  
The UK and France are the largest European importers of tropical timber and the tropics of 
Africa are habitats for the critically endangered grauer’s gorillas. Large-scale logging affects 
wild animals in several ways, directly and indirectly. The clearing of large portions of forests 
reduces and degrades wild animals’ living space as well as the quality and quantity of food 
resources and water upon which they subsist. Indirectly, hitherto impenetrable wildlife habitats 
are made accessible through cleared forests and roads made for transportation of the timber raw 
materials. “The opening-up of new areas of primary forest for logging often attracts people to 
the forest, in the short-term for hunting, and in the longer-term for subsistence farming” (Sizer 
and Plouvier, 2000: 12). What maybe impermeable to indigenous humans, presents no problem 
for the heavy machinery used by logging corporations. Hence, TNCs not only violate wild 
animals’ habitat and subsistence rights but also literally pave way for further wildlife rights 
violations by hunters and indigenous human settlers. 
I will end this section by showing that it is not only physical actions that are responsible for 
wildlife rights violations. Mere decisions made by state and non-state actors in the developed 
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world can also cause wildlife rights violations. Firstly, Western liberal democracies have 
extensively privatised many sectors of service and goods provision to the public. By reducing 
its sphere of operation, states may, in effect, “privatise away their human rights responsibility 
together with their traditional state functions” (Karp, 2014: 29). Running corporations comes 
with moral responsibilities. And so, when states privatise corporations, they rid themselves at 
least of some of the corporations’ moral burdens. Examples include tax obligations, corporate 
social responsibility and abiding by any set ethical requirements such as responsibilities not to 
pollute or engage in bribery.  
However, states retain responsibility for the regulation of the industries they privatise. Even 
with the reduced direct responsibilities, states are often complicit to the actions abroad of their 
TNCs. TNCs are vital to the economies of the states in which they are based. The benefits come 
through taxes, employment, and goods and services the corporations provide home. Some 
TNCs are at least partially owned by states. Without the revenue from the extraterritorial 
activities of TNCs, states may find it harder to provide essential goods and services to their 
citizens. There is thus a huge incentive for states to facilitate or not interfere in TNCs profit-
maximisation even at the cost of violations of human or wildlife rights, especially when those 
whose rights are violated are foreigners or wild animals in poor countries.  
David Karp clearly describes the behaviour of developed states. He notes that “to the extent 
that states have a strong economic stake in their (home-based) companies’ profitability, states 
might, to this extent, prioritise regulation that makes it easier for those companies to make a 
profit instead of prioritising regulation that minimises the negative impact of those companies’ 
operations abroad” (Karp, 2014: 30). Thomas Pogge provides further evidence that until 1999, 
“most developed states did not merely legally authorize their firms to bribe foreign officials, 
but even allowed them to deduct such bribes from their taxable revenues” (Pogge, 2004: 268).61 
This behaviour of states shows at least that states had knowledge of corporations from their 
countries engaging in bribery overseas and went ahead to mitigate financial losses incurred by 
these companies’ engagement in corruption. It seems fair to say that if states behaved in this 
manner, then they were complicit in the corruption. 
Among the impacts of TNCs corruption is environmental degradation and, corollary, wildlife 
rights violations. In 2012, Zambezi Resources Limited, an Australian mining TNC’s mining 
                                                          
61 In 1999, developed states adopted the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  
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licence was rejected when Zambia Environmental Agency and Zambia Wildlife Authority 
found its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) did not meet standards for opening a mining 
operation in a wildlife protected area, Lower Zambezi National Park (Mining News Zambia, 
2014). However, in 2014, following an appeal by Zambezi Resources Limited, the Minister of 
Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection granted a licence to the TNC to 
proceed with the open-pit mining operation within the national park. Environmental and animal 
welfare groups successfully obtained a court injunction to stop the mining firm from beginning 
its mining activities. My point is merely that TNCs and periphery host states can, and 
sometimes do, collude in violating rights of poor humans and those of wildlife.   
I have described one way in which states of wealthy countries violate the rights of wild animals, 
that is, through support of TNCs that directly or indirectly lead to wildlife rights violations. 
Clear examples are those companies involved in logging, mining, and oil exploration and 
extraction. Decisions by strong states can have a big impact on violations of rights of wild 
animals. Below are a few cases in which such decisions that saved wild animals or condemned 
them to rights violations by poachers: 
• Following the addition of elephants to CITES’ Appendix I, prices of ivory quickly 
plummeted. “The day before the meeting, a pound of ivory sold for more than one 
hundred dollars; the day after, a seller would have been lucky to get five dollars” 
(Leakey, 2002:118). 
•  “In early June 1989, Pres. George Bush announced that ivory could no longer be 
imported into the United States; and a few weeks later Margaret Thatcher followed suit. 
Departments and jewelry stores in both countries stopped selling ivory. Sotheby’s 
auction issued a statement that they would no longer auction elephant tusks or anything 
made of ivory” (Leakey, 2002: 88). 
•  “In mid-January 1990, Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher didn’t help matters 
when she requested CITES to allow Hong Kong to sell off its stockpiles of ivory.  
Almost overnight we saw a fresh wave of poaching. Another twenty-one elephants 
where killed in Tsavo alone. [I] wrote bitterly in my diary: This is extremely serious 
and the upsurge in poaching and … trafficking has begun” (Leakey, 2002: 142). 
There is little doubt that individual moral agents, corporations, and states are individually or 
jointly involved in violating rights of wild animals in a way that is not necessarily limited to 
national borders. States are a particularly special agent as they have legislative functions as 
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well as executive functions accompanied by monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive 
instruments. I therefore think that Onora O’Neil’s (2004) attempt to make states and TNCs as 
primary agents of cosmopolitan justice ignores some fundamental differences between the 
actors such as their raison d’être and their capacities. Both individuals and corporations are 
moral agents subject to a larger moral agent—the state. As seen in the case of SCI and TNCs, 
states facilitate wildlife rights violations by individual and corporate moral agents. My view 
endorses the statist view that sees states as primary agents of ensuring protection of rights while 
corporations and NGOs are secondary agents for justice. What I desist from is the view that the 
host state for wildlife is the only state with primary responsibility for the rights of wild animals 
within its borders. I argue, rather, that it is all states to the extent that they have harmed wild 
animals living in poor parts of the world.  
7.4 A Broad Statist Approach 
The negative duties of all states against wild animals requires that the states do not make 
decisions, legislation, policies or take actions that are injurious to the interests of wild animals. 
Within a short time of the UK allowing Hong Kong to sell its ivory, elephants were murdered 
in Kenya. It is hard to deny the connection. And if the causal connection holds, it is hard to 
exonerate the UK from the killings and the accompanying trauma to the elephants and those 
orphaned babies that, according to Moss (1992), can go into severe depression that may result 
in death.  
States have huge economic stakes in their TNCs whose extraterritorial investments are 
sometimes facilitated by the strong states through diplomatic channels as well as through loans. 
Some rights violating TNCs are for example funded by the European Investment Bank.62 In 
virtue of being weak states, poor countries have little to no regulatory capacity to ensure the 
powerful, diverse, and sophisticated TNCs abide by required standards that safeguard the rights 
of poor people and wild animals. Yet Western countries and banking institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank impose stringent conditions to bilateral aid 
or to loans including that recipient states uphold certain human rights. Hence, to require as a 
duty of justice that rich states impose stringent demands upon their TNCs operations in or near 
                                                          
62 For example, Anne-Sophie Simpere (2010) shows how European Investment Bank mining loans have been 
given to TNCs that pollute the air, water, and the soil by not adhering to Zambia’s environmental safety mining 
regulations. Even when some humans receive some meagre compensation for harms suffered, wild animals 
receive none.  
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wildlife territory is to ask for nothing novel. It is rather, to require that they take as seriously 
the negative rights of people and wild animals abroad as they do to humans at home.  
In providing legislation that not only allows for the existence of SCI but that also allows the 
organisation to be exempted from taxation, the U.S. state has on its hands the blood of wild 
animals killed through SCI all over the world. It is the duty of the U.S. to outlaw organisations 
whose sole reason for existence necessarily involves violation of wild animals’ rights. SCI does 
not want CITES to remove species from those Appendices where it is legal for SCI’s members 
to hunt them. For example, if lions or polar bears are added to Appendix I, this would mean an 
end to some of the prestigious awards including the African Dangerous Animals or the African 
Big Five awards.  
Steve Wise (2005) and other writers have compared the treatment of animals to slavery while 
others such as Charles Patterson (2002) have drawn parallels between human treatment of 
animals and the holocaust. I think an apt analogy for SCI is having the Ku Klux Klan or a 
terrorist group registered as tax-exempt non-profit organisation or a social welfare organisation. 
Although SCI claims to protect hunters’ legal rights to hunt, there can be no such moral right. 
Sadistic pleasures or the satisfaction of evil desires do not warrant the protection of rights and 
a fortiori, protection of the law.   
7.5 Cooperation in Ensuring Wildlife Rights 
There is, currently—and has been in the past—global concern for wildlife. The British Empire 
was one channel through which globalisation of wildlife protection occurred, albeit for 
anthropocentric reasons. For example, in current Zambia, whereas the British South African 
Company (BSA Co) Board strongly opposed the preservation of wildlife where doing so 
harmed their economic interests, the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the 
Empire countered that “I am strongly desired to ask that nothing should be done by any 
Department in any of the Colonies … to impair the present Game Reserves” (Astle, 1999: 27). 
In fact, the Society asked for the creation of further game reserves and national parks.63 Thus, 
to suggest a global approach to wildlife protection is not so much to suggest something novel. 
However, it is the realignment of values and reallocation of moral responsibility I suggest that 
point to reshaping of institutions for ensuring wildlife rights. 
                                                          
63 Game parks were arguably established as hunting grounds for ‘game’ animals. If it were not for the 
colonialists’ love of hunting, wildlife protected areas would probably not have been created. However, national 
parks are now the morally legitimate property of its inhabitants, the wild animals. We can only condemn 
national park habitats today on pain of committing the genetic fallacy.  
 144 
 
In the twenty-first century, Otter, O’Sullivan, and Ross (2012) note that supranational entities 
and regulatory frameworks exist that have competently managed animals for decades. The 
authors identify the Terrestrial Animals Health Code (TAHC), the World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE), and CITES as such codes or organisations. To these supranational 
agencies, we may add civil society organisations that have a global outlook. These include 
WWF and The Frankfurt Zoological Society.  
However, although global in character, institutions or organisations lack a coherent normative 
underpinning because “they are far more concerned with protecting rare and endangered 
animals (usually those considered desirable by humans) and safeguarding international animal 
trade than they are with ensuring individual animals avoid paid and suffering” (Otter, 
O’Sullivan, and Ross, 2012: 55). There are some exceptions though. Some non-governmental 
organisations with a global outreach explicitly recognise animal rights or the intrinsic value of 
animals. These include the World Animal Protection, and International Fund for Animal 
Welfare.64 However, even the organisations that recognise the moral status or rights of 
individual wild animals seem to work from the moral framework of benevolence and not 
justice.65 These organisations do, however, give indications the sort of cooperative institutions 
states should pursue as a matter of justice for wild animals.  
Wildlife governance is to a great extent already global with international organisations and 
institutions such as the IUCN, CBD, CITES, WWF, UN Environmental Programme somehow 
dictating member states’ wildlife policies as well as providing technical, material, and financial 
support for state agencies responsible for wildlife protection. There is also a plethora of local 
and international non-governmental organisations such as the Jane Goodall Institute and the 
David Sheldrick Wildlife Foundation—both headquartered in the UK—working for wild 
animals especially in Africa. Perhaps what is needed is coordination among all these actors 
once there is a moral paradigm shift from anthropocentric conservation to a zoocentric ethic 
that prioritises protection of wildlife rights. Because protected areas are found in geographical 
areas of sovereign states, the host states must be accorded key administrative roles—compatible 
                                                          
64 See their websites, www.worldanimalprotections.org.uk and www.ifaw.org respectively.  
65 My point is that recognition of rights requires identified obligors to desists from certain acts or omissions. 
There is, however, no contradiction in innocent moral agents—such as the NGOs cited—acting to mitigate the 
effects of rights violations even when the beneficent moral agents are completely innocent and not liable for the 
harm occasioned on wild animals. Once A’s right has been threatened or violated by B, a kind moral agent, C, 
may permissibly step in to help A. 
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with their interests such as national security—within the international wildlife governance 
framework in order to respect their territorial integrity.  
Poor states can barely protect or provide for their citizens. Financial constraints are a major 
obstacle to recognising the rights of wild animals as well as to ensuring protection of wildlife 
rights. Usually wildlife is seen as a source of revenue even if this means loss of lives or 
compromised wellbeing for wild animals. Poor states may also see wild animals as preventing 
economic development by occupying fertile agricultural or mineral-rich land or as preventing 
infrastructure development.66 Dislocating wildlife from their habitats for any economic projects 
would violate wildlife rights and is impermissible as national parks are wildlife property. 
However, securing the host state’s and local communities’ support is essential to ensuring 
wildlife rights. There is therefore need for the international community to at least fund wildlife 
protection to mitigate the host states’ economic opportunity costs. 
After the United Kingdom permitted Hong Kong to sell their ivory, Richard Leakey was on the 
edge of despair:  
We are desperate for arms, ammunition, and equipment. Our radios are useless and we do not 
have nearly enough people. So much to do! I feel quite daunted by the sheer size of the problem. 
Money, money, money—beg, beg, beg! How long can I do this? Two weeks later, I was on my 
way to England with my hat in hand. I had to keep begging. There was no other choice (Leakey, 
2002: 142-143). 
Such is the irony that a strong state decides to further its own national interest and elephants 
and game rangers protecting them must pay with their lives67 while poor countries must spend 
more to protect the wild animals or beg more from the same rich countries that initiated the 
dominoes resulting in escalated poaching. Poor states sometimes must borrow from rich states 
or from banks in rich states to protect wild animals.  
My point here is that, the distribution of costs of protecting wild animals is unjust to poor 
countries who have not only to lose economic opportunities of not being able to start certain 
economic activities in or near the national parks, but must reallocate their meagre resources or 
borrow to protect wild animals from vulnerability created by some rich states. Furthermore, 
                                                          
66 In the 1980s, Richard Leakey prevented the building of an oil pipeline through Nairobi National Park (Leakey, 
2001) and he is now trying to stop the building of a highways across Nairobi National Park and across the 
Serengeti that will especially put migrating wildebeest at risk annually (Boynton, 2014). In both instances, 
Leakey was depicted as hampering much-needed development. 
67 Leakey himself is a survivor of a near-fatal plane crush. Some, including Leakey himself, believe this was an 
attempted assassination by those who profited from the illegal trade in ivory. Assuming this was an assassination 
attempt, Leakey’s life was imperilled and his life significantly transformed from the resulting amputations 
chiefly because ivory prices were high enough to kill for. The cost of ivory is determined partly by policy 
decisions of rich or strong states far away from the elephants.  
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reallocated resources result in poorer communities pressuring them to resort to poaching or 
encroachment on wildlife territory which in turn increases the incidence of human-wildlife 
conflicts and resultant wildlife rights violations.  
Begging for resources to protect wild animals depends on a morality different from the one I 
am arguing for. It depends on the morality of benevolence. There is an abundance of goodwill 
in the strong states especially towards the protection of certain charismatic species such as 
elephants, chimpanzees, or gorillas. According to National Geographic, of the DRC’s $8 
million annual national parks operating budget only five percent comes from the DRC 
government. The rest comes from the European Union, the U.S. government, and international 
NGOs (Draper, 2016: 71). If rich states have a duty of justice towards wildlife, then it is 
inappropriate for them to ‘assist’ poor states or NGOs working in host states as a matter of 
charity to enable the poor states or NGOs protect wildlife. Rather—assuming an appropriate 
supranational body existed—a supranational body or the poor states should demand that the 
rich countries bear their burden of positive duties arising from the rich states making wild 
animals vulnerable.  
Even assuming rich states are not causally responsible for wildlife vulnerability, begging 
assumes wrongly that the begging host countries have the primary responsibility of protecting 
wildlife in virtue of ‘ownership’ or proximity. In fact, it is the abler, rich countries who should 
shoulder more of the duty of benevolence—assuming arguendo that such a duty exists—to wild 
animals. Moreover, the problem with begging is that it is likely to come with conditions against 
the poor host nations or against the wild animals, as in the case of SCI who fund conservation 
just so they can be assured of killing some wild animals.  
Last, charity means that when donors have financial strain or a change of government, those 
programmes to which they give freely risk being abandoned. Anti-poaching operations are day-
to-day activities and any disruption in funding will result in an increase in wildlife rights 
violations. Thus, although organisations such as the David Sheldrick Foundation or Virunga 
Foundation may set up trusts in London or Washington, D. C. for donations from individual or 
corporate donors, this must be merely supplementary to the non-optional funding by states. 
Resources provided by states may be managed through any viable model such as one that takes 
the host state as the focal point, through a United Nations—or a UN-like—consortium of states 
and wildlife welfare/rights organisations.  
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To sum up, this chapter has tried to argue that many states other than one in which the wild 
animals live have a duty of justice to the wild animals. Because wild animals are legal property 
of states in which they are found, protection of wild animals is assumed to be the sole or primary 
responsibility of such states. I have argued that this is mistaken as, on the rights view, wild 
animals cannot be property any more than humans can be. I then follow Onora O’Neil’s 
criticism of the statist view of (host) states as having the primary responsibility for ensuring the 
protection of moral rights. I argue that, as far as negative duties to wildlife are concerned—
which in my view are the rights constitutive of justice in addition to emergent positive rights—
extraterritoriality is an automatic implication.  
To demonstrate the extraterritorial implications of wildlife rights violations, I used the cases of 
SCI and TNCs. I discuss SCI at length because not only does the organisation encourage 
wildlife rights violations by its members but it also provides arguably the single biggest 
obstacle to legislation and global policy that would provide serious protection to rights of wild 
animals.68 This non-state actor is successful is protecting the ‘rights’ of members to violate the 
moral rights of wild animals. SCI is also successful in fighting against the inclusion of species 
such as polar bears and lions to CITES Appendix I and in so doing, it helps indirectly to 
perpetuate wildlife rights violations by criminal poaching syndicates. I have further linked 
wildlife rights violations to rich states’ abetting their TNCs’ deleterious actions in wildlife 
territory and, directly, through policies or legislation that perpetuate hunting or trade in species 
of fauna. I then reach my verdict on which agents have the primary responsibility for ensuring 
wildlife rights are not violated. These are states around the world whose actions are in various 
ways directly or indirectly responsible for wildlife rights violations. I end with a tentative 
proposal that would help safeguard wildlife rights through ensuring the discharge of negative 
duties and emergent positive duties. In the proposed global framework, it is states that are the 
primary actors but they may or must work with or through non-state agencies for effective 
enforcement of wildlife rights.   
  
                                                          
68 Safari Club International has taken credit for two successes at the 2016 CITES COP 17 in Johannesburg. The 
two successes are that polar bears were excluded from the agenda for possible inclusion on Appendix I and, 
although lions were debated, they are still on Appendix II. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
The last half century has seen the emergence and flourishing of animal ethics as an academic 
discipline. Even as ethical discussion of animals has become entrenched in philosophy, a 
disproportionate amount of literature has focused on domestic animals or wild animals in zoos 
or science laboratories. Meanwhile the literature focusing on wild animals has a bias towards 
those wild animals closest biologically to humans—the primates—or to some charismatic 
mammals or cetaceans with high intelligence or emotional and aesthetic appeal. My thesis is a 
full-fledged focus on all wild animals. I have traversed what I see as key moral issues affecting 
wild animals. These issues are normally only covered in piecemeal fashion within the 
discipline, although the last five years have witnessed a surge in wildlife ethics—mostly 
consequentialist—literature especially focusing on the suffering of wild animals.  
Moral philosophy is an expansive field. It is therefore not surprising that any practical ethics 
problems are approached from an array of normative theories. The approach I have taken is one 
of justice construed very narrowly in terms of respect for moral rights. On this view, an injustice 
occurs if and only if, and because, some moral agent has failed in discharging an obligation 
correlative to someone’s right. Although moral rights theory or justice is but a fraction of 
morality, it is arguably the most important part of morality. Moral rights denote what is owed 
to someone, what someone can demand, fight, or kill for justifiably. This power of moral rights 
explains why people tend to create some conventional rights when some particularly important 
interests are at stake.  
Moralities that promote charity or goodness as such are very important. But, in my view, many 
instances where beneficence is called for are instances where some injustices have led to the 
vulnerability. A just world would have much less use for philanthropy than an unjust one. An 
important difference between justice and charity is that justice can be rightfully enforced. For 
wild animals that may not elicit so much kindness from humans—especially for those seen as 
pestilential or as threats to human interests—moral rights seem the best way to protect them 
from anthropogenic harm.  
The oratory of moral rights is so powerful that it is behind the defeat of diabolical 
discriminatory institutions including patriarchy, apartheid, and slavery. Unfortunately, like all 
powerful currencies, moral rights face the danger of being counterfeited. Too many illicit 
claims of moral rights can dilute the value of rights and generally make it harder to trade in the 
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powerful normative currency of moral rights. For some writers acknowledging moral rights for 
animals is just one such a way of diminishing the power of moral rights.  
On the other hand, animal rights theorists tend to take moral rights as a philosophic given and 
simply embark on applying them in the various contexts and conundrums involving animals. I 
think the background philosophical work on moral rights can be very rewarding to rights 
thinkers focusing on animal issues. In this thesis, I have explored the structure of moral rights 
and the normative role of moral rights. This, I believe, has led to some new ways of diagnosing 
and resolving of moral problems involving wild animals that avoid the ambiguity that results 
from not distinguishing the various types of rights—claims, liberties, powers, and 
immunities—which entail different moral obligations.  
Unpacking the structure of moral rights is beneficial in stemming the influx of rights by 
requiring specification of the scope—subject and respondent—of moral rights claims. Parents 
are appropriate respondents to their child’s positive claim-right to provide the right quantity 
and quality of food. But the neighbours’ child cannot demand provision the same goods 
although she can surely beg for the generosity of the first child’s parents. Positive rights claims 
impose a very heavy burden upon the obligor such that injustices can easily be committed 
against wrongfully identified obligors. Such injustices are akin to those of convicting someone 
on false testimony. The content of a right is also helpful in curtailing both invalid claims of 
moral rights and mistaken argumentative counterexamples. This is so because not just any 
interest passes off as content of moral rights but only those interests that track some element of 
wellbeing.  
Many problems afflict wild animals, many of whom will be found in designated protected areas. 
Most of the evil wild animals suffer from is not caused by human beings. Oscar Horta (2010), 
for example, has described the r-strategy69—a reproductive strategy in which millions of 
offspring are produced but only a tiny fraction survives to reach adulthood. The rest perish 
painfully from predation, thirst, or starvation. In addition to the inevitable victims of the 
profligate r-strategy, there are also bushfires, diseases, droughts, and earthquakes not caused 
by humans but which cause immense suffering to millions of wild animals.  
                                                          
69 The r-strategy is contrasted with the K-strategy in which some animals produce few offspring and normally 
invest a lot of time and energy in providing for the young ones and protecting them until they are old enough to 
fend for themselves.  
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In the face of so much natural evil, there is no reason to make a universal ‘let them be’ ban 
against any intervention to help wild animals that can be helped without violating rights of 
some other wild animals. Although humans are morally permitted to intervene intelligently and 
cautiously to aid some animals, humans are not required to do so as a matter of justice. True, 
duties of beneficence are morally binding. For example, people ought to help those in serious 
need, if these people can help at only a small cost to themselves. But omission to discharge 
such duties, although such omissions could be morally wrong, do not constitute any injustice. 
In the absence of morally justified (legal) conventions, such duties of beneficence cannot be 
rightfully enforced. That there are no unacquired positive moral rights of wildlife to human 
protection is an important point that prevents a runaway inflation of moral rights.  
I do not deny that there are sound moral theories that would require human cooperation to aid 
wild animals or to develop virtues of kindness and generosity to wild animals. But in my view, 
it is to misspeak to talk about wildlife rights to aid in instances where humans are not morally 
responsible, causally responsible for, or complicit to, wildlife suffering. My thesis has been 
about what actions are morally permitted, required, or prohibited as a matter of justice with 
regards to human-wildlife relations.  
When it comes to justice for wildlife, there are several pertinent issues that are both 
philosophically intriguing and of great importance to wildlife policy. Most of the injustices 
humans commit against wild animals result from the denial of a moral status for wild animals 
that warrants the protection moral rights provide. Wildlife policy around the world—while 
recognising the need to avoid cruelty to wild animals—falls short of full recognition of the 
moral rights of wild animals and stringent requirements and prohibitions this entails for 
humans. Anthropocentrism is the ethical bedrock of wildlife governance praxis with wild 
animals relegated to the status of natural resources for humans to exploit. Under such an ethical 
framework, it is morally permissible—if not morally required—to kill predators that are seen 
as vermin, or as competitors for some economically or aesthetically valuable wild animals. 
Under that wildlife ethic, humans are further permitted to introduce species, to decimate or 
extirpate species that are deemed as excess or as threats to ecosystems or to biological diversity.  
Under a rights-based wildlife ethic, intervention in predation or in environmental protection by 
killing or harming prey would be seriously curtailed. When humans attack innocent others, the 
victims or some third party can rightfully prevent the attack even if it means seriously harming 
the attacker. The attacker holds no liberty-right to attack innocent others and so others may 
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rightfully impede the attack. The attacker also becomes morally liable to defender’s defensive 
harm as she has a power-right to alter the attacker’s negative right not to be harmed. Carnivores 
are never liable to humans for their attacks on wild prey. It is morally bad that prey kill and 
feed on other sentient wildlife but it is not morally wrong. It is a near-truism that promoting the 
good must not be purchased at the cost of rights violations. We may lament the evil of predation 
but we are prohibited from violating predators’ rights to prevent the natural evil of predation.  
The behaviour of some wild animals and their dwindling or irruptive populations can pose a 
threat to an ecosystem that serves some human-centred interests such as tourism, sustainable 
yield in bushmeat, biodiversity, and so on. Wildlife policy permits the thwarting of such threats 
using any means possible. This permission, I think, results from the mistaken view that wildlife 
is human property and may thus be exploited for meat and tourism that must be sustainable. A 
related mistaken belief is that the ecosystem does not belong to wild animals that reside in it. 
Wild animals own their habitats and their habitats may undergo natural cycles of deterioration 
and resurgence. It is an injustice to control lethally wildlife populations to keep ecosystems 
‘optimal’ in human eyes.  
Wildlife justice prohibits humans violating rights of individual wild animals to maintain an 
ecology that best serves human interests. However, humans may legitimately intervene in cases 
that may amount to self-defense. Many writers acknowledge that rights of humans or animals 
may be overridden to prevent a moral catastrophe. If a leader of a pack of wolves is leading 
them towards a cliff where they will surely all fall off to their deaths if nobody intervenes, I 
think a far-off sniper may shoot the lead wolf to serve the rest of the pack. Down to earth, if a 
hyena family has an incurable lethal disease, the rights of the family members may be 
justifiably overridden if killing them will stop them from transmitting the virus causing the 
devastating disease from being transmitted to neighbouring families.  
I think such isolated measures may be justified in the case of human beings as well where safe 
isolation is impossible. If an insane Ebola patient runs off from the quarantine camp and he 
may only be stopped through a lethal gunshot before he enters an overcrowded place, I do not 
see why his right to life may not be overridden. However, wildlife policy allows 
programmatically killing some animals to control populations when nonlethal options are 
available. On the contrary, in the case of control of human populations, birth control measures 
are voluntary and any birth control measures without participants’ informed consent are viewed 
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as a gross injustice. I believe systematic lethal control of wildlife populations is institutionalised 
speciesist injustice. Such a practice cannot be part of a morally sound wildlife ethic.  
Trophy hunting, poaching, trade in wild species of fauna—both legal and illegal, climate 
change, and corporate extractive activity in wildlife territory are some of the major threats to 
wildlife rights. Individuals and corporate entities that engage in these activities or exacerbate 
vulnerability to wild animals are not residents of any single state. In addition, wildlife is not 
property of any states, even those states in which the wild animals have their habitats. Given 
these two positions, states in which the wild animals reside—whether the state in question is 
Scotland or the Democratic Republic of Congo—do not have the primary responsibility of 
protecting the wild animals living within the national borders.  
Poor states with wildlife in their territories lose a lot of human resource and their limited 
revenue—usually borrowed from rich states or from banks in rich states—in protecting wild 
animals. Yet elephants, rhinos, gorillas, and many other wild animals are in danger, to some 
extent, due to the actions and omissions of countries like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
France, China, the United States, and Vietnam. These countries receive economic and other 
benefits from trade in wild animals’ products, from the trophy hunting industry, and from 
activities of their transnational corporations. Rich states are not oblivious to the devastating 
effect on wildlife habitats of some of their corporations involved in mining, oil exploration, 
construction, agriculture, and logging in poor states. Wildlife are denuded of their protective 
and productive habitats making them vulnerable to poaching and starvation and additional 
threats of habitat encroachment resulting from making wildlife territories more accessible to 
local humans.  
Given that wild animals suffer injustices from many states’ actions, omissions, and complicity, 
it is simplistic to require ‘host’ states to have the primary burden of shouldering the direct and 
indirect costs of protecting wild animals. My view is that, because of direct responsibility and 
complicit being diffuse, justice for wild animals requires many or all states acting together with 
other states to protect wild animals.  
States violating rights of its citizens or non-citizens receive various forms of international 
sanctions that range from naming and shaming, exclusion or expulsion from some international 
organisations, to military intervention. Violating the rights of wild animals is an injustice. But 
having certain dealings with states or corporations that violate wildlife rights is morally 
complicit and both types of behaviour require culprits’ initiating or participating in some 
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preventative and compensatory programmes. Concerns for efficiency and coordination point in 
the direction of some global organisation(s). Intergovernmental prototypes exist in the case of 
human rights. There are also model international non-governmental organisations protecting or 
promoting wildlife interests that could be implemented under an intergovernmental framework 
for wildlife justice.  
This thesis has moved from affirming moral rights for wild animals to pointing to what sort of 
actions—unilateral or cooperative—states must initiate or contribute towards ensuring justice 
for wild animals. Many pertinent issues have been critically explored relating to how humans 
ought to justly treat wild animals. Many of these issues are essentially interdisciplinary among 
disciplines such as anthropology, conservation biology, political ecology, and economics. 
To this effect, it is unrealistic that many issues could be exhaustively explored or analysed in 
this work.   My thesis, thus, does not pretend to be the final word. Rather, I hope that 
philosophers will find in this work new helpful ways of looking at ethical problems arising in 
human-wildlife relations. I hope scholars in relevant fields are challenged by some arguments 
and their implications to seriously rethink the moral position that their fields assume pertaining 
to wild animals. The real prize, for me—as is for any practical ethicist—would be the adoption 
of at least some of my arguments by animal activists, environmentalists, and wildlife policy 
makers, both at the local and at the global levels.  
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